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ABSTRACT
Context and rationale – This work originates from policy priorities established within
Defra to manage exotic animal diseases (EAD); specifically to understand the causes of
low probability events, and to establish contingencies to manage outbreak incidents.
Outbreaks of exotic animal diseases, e.g. FMD, CSF and HPAI, can cause economic
and social impacts of catastrophic proportions. The UK’s government develops and
implements policies and controls to prevent EAD and thus minimise these impacts.
Control policies to achieve this are designed to address the vulnerabilities within the
control systems. However, data are limited for both the introduction of an EAD as well
as its resurgence following the disposal of infected carcasses, i.e. the pre-outbreak and
post-outbreak phases of an EAD event. These lack of data compromises the
development of policy interventions to improve protection. To overcome these data
limitations, predictive models are used to predict system vulnerabilities.
Methodology – Conventional predictive methods use two approaches; qualitative
approaches to develop descriptive overviews of the entire system, and quantitative
methods to analyse specific exposure pathways. Each method fails to provide a
complete analysis of the system as well as failing to achieve connectivity between
description and analysis. The result is that there is an incomplete understanding of the
causes of EAD transmission even when the best available knowledge. Thus, outputs
produced by conventional models cannot determine the vulnerabilities within
established controls. The research presented here develops a method to apply systemic
models to overcome these limitations.
A bottom-up approach is used within this study to develop systemic models for EAD,
which produce comprehensive analyses of exposure. Using systemic models for this
problem establishes i) the relationship between cause and effect for events and pathways
that influence EAD transmission and the system’s behaviour, as well as generates (ii)
insights into all pathways and events that influence transmission and exposure to EAD,
regardless of the perceived likelihood of impact. This analysis of the entire system
structure provides sufficient detail to identify key vulnerabilities in the controls.
Output and conclusions – The systemic models presented in this thesis:
iv
 Compare all exposure pathways based on the influence they exert on the overall
vulnerability to an EAD;
 Produce an unbiased assessment of exposure pathways and events that are
responsible for transmission;
 Provide an understanding of system behaviour that generates insights to improve
intervention strategies, e.g. for low probability events.
 Adds to the range of tools available for risk analysts to improve their ability to
detect vulnerabilities in EAD controls.
This research demonstrates how systemic models can provide an analysis of the entire
system from its structure to the key vulnerabilities. Improvements identified from these
insights are likely to reduce significantly the vulnerability to EAD by managing critical
control points (CCP). Application of systemic models to the pre-outbreak and post-
outbreak phases achieves:
 An overview of the drivers of exposure;
 Identifies specific activities and pathways of exposure responsible for generating
high-level risks and
 Produces additional descriptive information on the causes of failure responsible
for exposure.
 Enables the development of more informed policy interventions.
Keywords:
Policy development; Carcass disposal assessment, Import risk assessment, Low
probability events, Risk mitigation strategies
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GLOSSARY
Barrier Any obstacle reducing the chances of disease transmission,
these may be physical and biological barriers and activities
performed
Barrier Failure rate Represent the frequency of barrier failure events associated
with a specific process
Bottom-up model Modelling technique, based on the description of the system
where system behaviour and pathways systems emerges for a
series of rules used to define the EAD agent transmission
characteristic
Carcass disposal
assessment (CDA)
Predictive study targeting the impact of carcass disposal during
the post-outbreak phase or post t2 phase
Diagonal cell In the interaction matrix, it represents a network node. In the
diagonal cell are also included the sources and receptor nodes
Disease free status The OIE, mandated by the WTO, officially recognises disease-
free areas of countries for trade purposes
Disease spread
model
Predictive study targeting transmission during the outbreak
phase or t0-2 phase
Events or barrier
failure events
Represent a situation or activity causing the preventative
barriers (natural and man-made) associated with a specific
process to fail in the detection and elimination of the disease
agent, leading to a situation in which transmission is possible.
Exotic Animal
Diseases (EAD)
Disease agents included in the list of notifiable disease by the
OIE
Expert-based model A model that relies exclusively on expert opinion a source of
information to describe the system behaviour and evaluate risks
Feature Events and
Processes (FEP) list
Method of recording data, capturing information on all system
components and variables, and expert assumptions providing a
auditable trail of information
Features Represent system components where the disease agent may be
present. In these models Feature includes all sources, all
receptors and all component of the system where the disease
may be present at any one time.
Hazardous agent Substance or biological entity liable to cause harm to a
receptor: including EAD agents and other chemical,
biochemical and biologic agents
Import risk
assessment (IRA)
Predictive study targeting transmission during the pre-outbreak
phase or pre t0 phase
Incidence Represents the frequency of a process
xvii
Off-diagonal cell In the interaction matrix, these represent an adjacent connection
between two network nodes. Each off-diagonal cell is
associated with a process (potential transmission) and an event
(causing barrier failure) and therefore a process/event.
Pathways system All available pathways of exposure that form links between
source and receptor for a specific pathogenic agent
Predictive modelling Studies developed to predict the outcome of one or multiple
events. These models may be computer-based or expert-based
Process Represents an activity and/or movement (e.g. live animals, food
goods, people, etc.) which present the potential for transmission
of the disease agent
Process/event Represents the interactive behaviour between a process that
potentially enables disease transmission between two features
and the barriers protecting transmission
Risk factor Any form of EAD transmission, e.g. livestock, meat produce,
fomites, vectors, other host)
Scenario Character of a pathway of exposure, through the description of
the sequence of event uniting the disease source to a susceptible
receptor
Scenario-based
model
Computer based model focussing on one or multiple pathways
of exposure. These models use a binomial or an event tree
based model to estimate the likelihood or quantity of the agent
exposed through a pathway
System The source-pathway-receptor relationship
System behaviour The interactive relationship between an EAD agent and the
source-pathway-receptor
Systemic Analysis A study aiming to analyse the full extent of the source-
pathways-receptor relation, by analysing all pathways of
exposure connecting source to receptor, regardless of likelihood
and impact, that are considered within the adopted definition of
system
Top-down model Modelling technique, where the assessor or experts based on
their perception of system behaviour, define the pathway(s) or
pathways system used to estimate the impact of exposure
1INTRODUCTION1
The work presented in this thesis addressed the subject of exotic animal diseases,
recognised and categorised by the World Organ for Animal Health (OIE) as caused by
disease agents posing significant health, economic and social concern (OIE, 2011a).
This is an international issue, which considers multiple disease agents and affects
multiple countries, worldwide. The context, in which it is addressed here, relates to
countries classified by the OIE as disease free, where an outbreak results in the loss of
such status with trade implications, which can escalate the economic impacts beyond
those associated disease control (Otte et al., 2004; Scudamore et al., 2002; Morgan and
Prakash, 2006).
It falls within any government’s role to protect its population from events causing
severe economical and health impacts (Otte et al., 2004). The development of strategies
to prevent and eradicate disease agents varies between countries, influenced by
geographical characteristics, and political and economic conditions. Here we analyse
the approach from the UK government for intervention in case of an EAD outbreak,
although acknowledging that issues identified may be common to EAD control for
multiple countries.
From a policy development perspective, an EAD outbreak progresses across three
phases. These are: (i) a pre-outbreak phase involving the introduction of an EAD into
the UK; (ii) an outbreak phase, involving the spread of the disease agent through the
UK and; (iii) a post-outbreak phase, which involves the disposal of the carcasses of the
infected animals. A review of the research literature indicates that there are significant
limitations in the research literature regarding the pre-outbreak and post-outbreak
2phases. These gaps represent limitations in the government’s capacity to understand the
full extent of the source-pathway-receptor relationship associated with these phases. As
a result, this limits the government’s capacity to develop strategies to minimise the
likelihood of exposing livestock to an EAD agent. Consequentially, existing policies
tend to focus on known threats with the potential to overlook the contribution to
exposure from characteristics of the source-pathway-receptor relationship that have so
far evaded analysis within the existing predictive models and reports associated with
EAD outbreaks.
This thesis presents work that develops the application of expert-based systemic models
to generate a better understanding of the source-pathway-receptor relationships
associated with the pre-outbreak and post-outbreak phases. In doing so, these models
generate an improved understanding of system behaviour and identify the drivers of
exposure that pose a significant influence in the development of EAD outbreaks. The
output of expert-based systemic models provides information on these two phases of an
EAD outbreak. In short, these improve the information and capacity to develop policies
that significantly reduce the likelihood of livestock exposure to an EAD across all
outbreak phases.
3Figure 1.1 Flowchart of the introduction and literature review
[key] Representation of the research literature, identified research opportunities and
rationale supporting the research objectives.
41.1 Exotic animal diseases
Exotic animal diseases (EAD) consist of a group of diseases recognised by the World
Organ for Animal Health (OIE) as those that pose greatest health, economic and social
concern. A complete list of diseases that fall under the EAD denomination is available
(OIE, 2011a). Other names include notifiable diseases and trans-boundary diseases.
This categorisation results from international recognition of their attributes that present
the potential to cause significant social and economic impacts.
“those that are of significant economic, trade and/or food security importance for a
significant number of countries; which can easily spread to other countries and reach
epidemic proportions; and where control/management, including exclusion, requires
cooperation between several countries”. (Otte et al., 2004)
The group of EAD includes an array of animal diseases caused by a variety of
pathogens. These may affect multiple hosts and have differing transmission attributes,
e.g. airborne spread for Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) or arthropod vectors for
African Swine Fever and Blue Tongue Disease (OIE, 2011a; Kitching et al., 2007;
Cottam et al., 2008b; Kitching et al., 2005; Wieland et al., 2011). Contrary to popular
belief, there is no evidence that the ongoing technological and policy developments
have achieved increasing protection for developed countries against EAD outbreaks
(Otte et al., 2004; EFSA, 2006; Thiermann, 2005). Moreover, a study by the European
Food and Standards Agency (EFSA, 2006), argues that the circumstances causing the
2001 FMD outbreak remain unchanged. Therefore, there are no indications that the risk
of outbreaks is decreasing. Furthermore, geographical features, free trade and ethnic,
social and cultural factors may increase the risk of exposure to an EAD pathogen. This
5is increasingly true for European countries. Recent examples of EAD outbreaks in the
United Kingdom (UK) include:
 Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) (Smith and Bradley, 2003; Defra,
2009a; Phillips et al., 2000; Donnelly et al., 1999);
 Foot and mouth disease (FMD) (Defra, 2011b; Anderson, 2002; Scudamore et
al., 2002);
 Classical swine fever (CSF) (Gibbens et al., 2000; Sharpe et al., 2001) and;
 Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) (Defra, 2007c; FAO, 2006).
EAD outbreaks are associated with high economic impact and therefore EAD represent
a group of diseases that require special attention on behalf of government and
international animal health agencies.
61.1.1 Government’s role in strategic planning and policy
It falls within government responsibility to protect the population from the impact of an
outbreak. Despite the array of pathogens included in the group of EAD, the UK
government adopts a similar policy towards each of them. Cost-benefit analyses
suggest that there are economic advantages in maintaining a disease free status, whilst
ensuring sustainable opportunities for international trade (Otte et al., 2004). This trade-
off influences disease control strategies at national and international levels. Developed
countries, such as the UK, make considerable costly efforts to ensure the disease free
status is maintained, i.e. preventing the exposure of livestock to an EAD agent.
Preventive disease control strategies include EAD control at its source, a policy that
considers global eradication. However, this requires considerable investment in
controlling and eliminating the disease in developing countries (EFSA, 2006; Scoones
and Wolmer, 2006). Furthermore, disease eradication has a low success rate.
Rinderpest, which was a devastating cattle plague, remains as the single successful
example of eradication (Scoones and Wolmer, 2006; Normile, 2008). The successful
eradication of Rinderpest resulted from a high level commitment and a costly and long-
term investment (Kitching et al., 2007; Kitching et al., 2005; EFSA, 2006). While
disease eradication remains typically a non-viable solution, the OIE supports
comprehensive plans to deal with the threat of EADs at a national level (Otte et al.,
2004; Defra, 2009b; Defra, 2011a; Morgan and Prakash, 2006). These assure a high-
level of prevention and preparedness through the development and the application of
prevention plans (Defra, 2009b; Morgan and Prakash, 2006; EC, 2004; AHA, 2005).
Prevention plans require the application of controls, such as trade and health certificates,
to avoid disease incursions into disease-free countries and routine monitoring activities
7to ensure quick detection of infected livestock (Defra, 2011a). When prevention fails
and livestock is infected, it activates contingency measures. These are essential
activities included in cost-effective programs to control and eradicate disease, at a
national or regional level (Defra, 2009b; Geering et al., 1999).
The policies developed and applied by countries which are disease free or currently
dealing with an EAD, including the UK, aim to prevent and minimise the social and
economic impacts that result from an EAD outbreak (Otte et al., 2004; Scudamore et al.,
2002; Morgan and Prakash, 2006; Bender et al., 2006; EA, 2001). These involve a
continuous process of policy and planning development. Scientific data and cost benefit
analysis reveal the importance of maintaining tight control over EAD pathogens
(Donnelly et al., 1999; Anderson, 2002; Scudamore et al., 2002; Defra, 2008b; Defra,
2006). However, this process is influenced by economic, social and environmental
factors, which may result in a weakening of the controls in place (Thiermann, 2005;
Aven, 2009). Therefore, matching the constant rise in threats with a strategic and
technological response is a requirement that needs to be recognised.
The development of efficient strategic responses requires insight into the factors and
mechanisms of disease transmission. This information allows an understanding of the
behaviour of the EAD agent during the EAD outbreak (Morris, 1995; Pearce, 1996;
Krewski et al., 1990). Thus, it provides insights on how to control and minimise the
impact of outbreaks.
81.2 EAD outbreak
An EAD outbreak comprises an interval between the infection of the first premises
across to the elimination of the last infected animal or dangerous contact (Defra,
2009b). Figure 1.2 displays the time line of an EAD outbreak for the UK. The moment
the first farm becomes infected is represented by t0. The time interval that follows, [t0,
t1] represents the spread of the EAD agent to other premises which occurs prior to the
detection of the EAD agent. This is known as the silent spread of the disease (De Vos
et al., 2004; Dubé et al., 2007). The silent spread of the disease finishes with the
detection of the EAD agent within a livestock premises. In Figure 1.2, t1 represents the
moment the presence of an EAD is detected. Detection of an EAD puts in motion a
contingency plan involving a standstill policy, which bans all movement of animals,
animal products and by-products from the premises (Defra, 2009b; Dubé et al., 2007).
These measures eliminate inter-farm contact to reduce the likelihood of further spread.
Alongside the standstill policy, the government adopts a strategy to eradicate the disease
agent. The time interval that follows, [t1, t2] represents the EAD spread whilst
contingency measures apply until the eradication of the EAD agent (Defra, 2009b; De
Vos et al., 2004; Dubé et al., 2007). The outbreak ends upon confirmation of the
elimination of the EAD agent from UK premises (Defra, 2009b). This moment is
represented by t2. Therefore, the interval [t0, t2] represents the duration of an EAD
outbreak.
The interval representing the EAD outbreak [t0, t2] is associated with the presence of the
EAD agent within premises. However, during the evolution of an EAD outbreak there
are circumstances when the EAD agent is, whilst absent from premises.
9Figure 1.2 Disease outbreak timeline
The UK government takes the responsibility to coordinate efforts to contain and
eliminate the EAD agent during an outbreak. Similarly, it is the government’s
responsibility to coordinate preventive measures to avoid EAD introduction (Defra,
2011a). It is also its responsibility to prevent resurgence of the disease following an
outbreak, which includes monitoring the residual products resulting from disposal of
carcasses (Defra, 2009b). Therefore, when defining the timeline of an EAD outbreak
from the government’s perspective, it is necessary to expand the definition beyond the
interval that considers the presence of EAD agents in livestock farms. Figure 1.2
displays two further intervals represented by grey rectangles. The first interval,
displayed to the left of t0, represents the pre t0 phase. It takes place before the infection
of the first premises and represents the transmission of an EAD agent from a foreign
country into the UK (Defra, 2010b; OIE, 2011c). This represent the introduction of the
EAD agent and is defined here as the pre-outbreak phase. A remaining interval
displayed to the right of t2 represents the post-t2 phase. This phase involves monitoring
the residual products derived from carcass disposal activities to ensure the resurgence of
the disease is not possible (EA, 2001; Ritter and Chirnside, 1995; Drummond, 1999;
Marsland, et al., 2003). This represents the prevention of disease resurgence from
disposed carcasses and is defined here as the post-outbreak phase. Therefore, from the
t0
pre-outbreak outbreak
Time
post-outbreak
t1 t2
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government’s perspective, an EAD outbreak occurs in a sequence of three phases.
These are:
 The pre-t0 interval representing the pre-outbreak or pre-t0 phase where focus is
on preventing the introduction of an EAD.
 The [t0 ,t2] interval representing the outbreak phase or t0-t2 phase where focus is
on preventing EAD spread and promoting containment and elimination (Defra,
2007c; Defra, 2011a).
 The post-t2 interval representing the post outbreak phase or post-t2 phase, where
focus is on preventing resurgence of the EAD from disposed carcasses to ensure
its elimination.
All phases represent EAD transmission according to the risk assessment paradigm of
source-pathway-receptor (Haas et al., 1999; Vose, 2008). The paradigm provides the
basis for defining the relationship between the source of the disease agents, the
pathways of exposure and the impact to receptors during each of the three outbreak
phases. The paradigm of source-pathway-receptor provides the framework to describe
the system under scope. Here, the definition of system is: (i) the collection of entities
influencing transmission, which by interacting with a specific EAD agent establish
a connection that links the source to the receptor and (ii) the controls and
regulations in place that these entities and stakeholders have to uphold in order to
sever those connections and prevent exposure. This definition of system, whilst
generic, defines a boundary that excludes from it all entities and controls not relevant to
transmission during a specific outbreak phase. Entities are defined under system’s
language as system components. Under this definition of system, any system
component influencing transmission must be included. Therefore, the list of system
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components may include entities, as diverse as the environment (soil, air and water),
livestock and wildlife, livestock lorries and humans population (veterinarians, fieldsman
and general population). Similarly, any pathway of exposure influencing transmission
of a disease agent from source up to exposure must be included, and therefore a system
representation must include all pathways of exposure. Here, pathways system stands
for the collection of all pathways of exposure available within a system
Figure 1.3 Source-pathway-receptor relation and research question associated with the
pre-T0, T0 - T2 and post T2 phases of the outbreak
12
Figure 1.3 describes, summarily, for each outbreak phase the source-pathway-receptor
and the research questions conventional associated with epidemiologic studies (these are
analysed in further detail in Section 1.3). Each phase (from left to right) corresponds to
a different source-pathways-receptor and to studies focussing on answering a specific
set of research question. These differences influence the definition of exposure and how
its impact is measured during outbreak each phase. For example, the pre-outbreak (pre
t0) phase has a fixed impact, which is the infection of the first livestock premises (Defra,
2011a). However, for the outbreak (t0-t2) phase, impact is associated with the number
of livestock premises infected and geographical spread of the EAD agent (Dubé et al.,
2007). This generates a phase specific context to EAD transmission, which influences
the characteristic of the source-pathway-receptor relationship - and the mechanism and
controls driving exposure - under scope in studies addressing exposure in a specific
outbreak phase.
The outbreak phase specific context to EAD transmission reveals system components
that are influential for one phase, which may not be influential for the remaining ones
and vice versa. An analysis of the system focussing on the system components reveals
changes to its composition as the outbreak progresses through its phases (Section 1.3).
This is true for the components representing the source of an EAD during each phase, as
is for the pathways of exposure and the receptor. Therefore, contextualisation
influences the composition of the system under assessment. Figure 1.3 displays the
source-pathway-receptor for the three outbreak phases (top). In the definition of source-
pathway receptor relation:
 Source represents the source of the EAD agent considered for each phase (Haas
et al., 1999; Vose, 2008).
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 Pathway stands for the pathways system and represents all available pathways
of exposure that result from the interaction between an EAD agent and the
system components. Therefore, pathways of exposure depend on the
transmission characteristics an EAD agent (Haas et al., 1999; Vose, 2008).
 Receptor represents the livestock population susceptible to exposure and harm
by an EAD.
The source-pathway-receptor relationship changes as the EAD outbreak progresses
through its timeline. This results in a progressive change to the system’s composition.
These changes occur at t0, when the concern moves from preventing EAD introduction
to controlling its spread and at t2, when the concern moves from controlling the spread
to preventing resurgence of the disease, thus minimising the environmental and health
impacts of carcass disposal. Furthermore, the specific context in which transmission is
assessed for each phase suggests the mechanisms and controls posing an influence in
exposure to EAD change alongside the systems composition. Consequentially, policies
and regulations applied to control EAD transmission for one stage may not apply or be
inefficient for the remaining ones. Policy development must consider these changes to
ensure effective control strategies are in place across the full length of an outbreak.
Following is a description of the system associated with each outbreak phase, focussing
particularly on the differences between them.
1.3 Changes to the system as the outbreak progresses
1.3.1 Pre-outbreak (pre- t0) phase
The pre-outbreak phase (pre-t0) phase represents the introduction of an EAD from a
foreign source of the disease and its exposure to British livestock. Figure 1.4 displays
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the system involved in the pre-outbreak phase. This diagram is collected from a report
produced by Defra, which reviews the controls in place to prevent EAD introduction
(Defra, 2011a). The figure represents the system associated with the introduction of a
hypothetical EAD, the Dreaded Lurgi. The diagram represents the fundamental
principles of the source-pathway-receptor relationship associated with the pre-outbreak
phase, i.e. a generic example. These are common to all EAD.
Figure 1.4 Pathways and nodes contributing the introduction of an animal a hypothetical
EAD
[Key] The diagram includes pathways and nodes presenting the highest relative risk for
a scenario based on a disease with a hypothetical profile (Defra, 2011a).
Figure 1.4 represents the source of an EAD as foreign countries (outside the UK) where
the disease is endemic or undergoing an isolated outbreak (top - pink rectangle).
Different diseases may be present in different countries. In principle, an EAD source is
within a foreign country (Gibbens et al., 2000; Defra, 2007c; Scudamore, 2002). The
exception is an accidental laboratory release of an EAD (Anderson, 2008). A UK based
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source represents an ongoing outbreak or the deficient elimination of the disease agent
from a previous outbreak.
Figure 1.4 represents a pathways system composed of the collection of exposure
pathways associated with the activities involved in the transmission of the disease from
the source through to the exposure of livestock (yellow rectangles). It is unwise to
present a description of all activities involved, as these are EAD agent specific and
therefore vary according to the transmission characteristics of the EAD agent
considered (OIE, 2011a; OIE, 2011b). Common activities involve legal and illegal
imports of meat goods, live animals and animal products, such a germplasm (Defra,
2011a; Defra, 2011c). These imports can also be associated with the livestock industry,
retail and food transformation industries or even personal imports. Therefore, there are
a large number of activities to consider which reflect a high number of exposure
pathways available for EAD introduction. For example, Figure 1.4 represents only the
pathways ranked as high risk in the study (Defra, 2011a).
Figure 1.4 represents the receptor, or the impact of exposure as exposure to livestock
(Defra, 2011a). This definition confines the impact of exposure to a single event, the
exposure to livestock (bottom – pink star). Although not specified in literature, a more
detailed description of this event is the infection of one livestock animal, as exposure
does not guarantee infection. Therefore, the infection of the first animal (t0) represents
the onset of the next EAD outbreak phase.
1.3.2 Outbreak (t0–t2) phase
The outbreak phase (t0–t2) phase represents the spread of the EAD agent across British
farms. The type of livestock premises, i.e. cattle, poultry or pigs, susceptible for
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infection and the modes of inter-farm transmission depend on the EAD agent
considered (OIE, 2011a; OIE, 2011b). Nonetheless, the system or source-pathway-
receptor relationship for the outbreak phase presents fundamental principles that are
common to all EAD. Figure 1.5 represents the spread of an EAD following the
infection of a livestock premises. This picture is based on the work developed to study
the spread of FMD in 2001 following the application of standstill measures (Cottam et
al., 2008a). Nonetheless, it represents the fundamental principles of the source-
pathway-receptor relationship associated with the outbreak phase.
Figure 1.5 Diagram showing the spatial relationship of 14 infected premises
[Key] 14 premises (filled circles) confirmed by laboratory testing and 9 infected
premises (clinical observations) that were subsequently found to be negative for virus
by laboratory testing (open circles). The originally infected farm represents the source
of the disease (red circle). The grey arrows show the direction of transmission events:
Based on Cottam et al. (2008a).
Figure 1.5 represents the source of the disease as the first infected premises (Cottam et
al., 2008a). This first infected farm (red dot – K premises) is the source of the EAD
(Defra, 2007c; Dubé et al., 2007; Cottam et al., 2008a).
Figure 1.5 represents the pathways system associated with activities providing inter-
farm contact that allow for the infection of new premises. These are described as
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transmission events (Cottam et al., 2008a). It is unwise to enumerate the activities
involved in inter-farm contact, as these are EAD agent specific and therefore vary
according to transmission characteristics of the EAD agent considered (OIE, 2011a;
OIE, 2011b). Common activities involve the movement of live animals and of
personnel between farms, fomites and the EAD agent transmission characteristics, such
as airborne and vector based transmission (Cottam et al., 2008b; Kitching et al., 2005;
Dubé et al., 2007; Cottam et al., 2008a; Harvey et al., 2007; Gloster et al., 2010; Garner
and Beckett, 2005). In Figure 1.5, the grey arrows represent inter-farm transmission
and thus pathways of exposure.
Figure 1.5 represents the receptor, or the impact of exposure, as the number of infected
farms and geographical spread of the EAD agent. This represents a generic definition
for measuring the impact of the outbreak (Dubé et al., 2007; Garner and Beckett, 2005;
Dubé et al., 2006), as it must also consider the number of animals infected and value of
these animals (Scudamore et al., 2002; Defra, 2007c). Nonetheless, the definition of
impact proposed here relates to the system’s principles of disease spread during the
outbreak phase, whilst acknowledging that the economic impact of the disease may
depend on added economic and policy factors.
1.3.3 Post-outbreak (post- t2) phase
The post-outbreak phase (post- t2) phase represents the interval after the elimination of
the last infected animal and the EAD agent can no longer be detected on livestock
premises. The post outbreak phase results from the adoption of a “stamping out” or a
“vaccinate-to-kill” policy to eradicate the disease agent (Defra, 2009b). Historically,
these represent the policies adopted by the UK’s government during EAD outbreaks
(Scudamore et al., 2002; Defra, 2007b). In reality, the implementation of a stamping-
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out policy occurs following the detection of the disease agent, between t1–t2. However,
as monitoring of the disposal sites continues after the eradication of the EAD agent
(Scottish Executive, 2002), for the purposes of this revision, the resurgence of the EAD
agent from the remains of the disposed carcasses is considered as a separate phase. In
the post outbreak (post t2) phase focus is expanded to consider the environmental and
health impacts of carcass disposal activities (EA, 2001; Lowles et al., 2002; Pollard et
al., 2008a; DH, 2001). Several disposal options are available for the disposal of
carcasses. This include disposal by incineration, burial and rendering under varying
conditions from highly controlled to open air disposal. Figure 1.6 displays a simplified
model of the events taking place during carcass disposal. The figure represents the
sources and receptors, illustrating the system or source-pathway-receptor relationship
associated with the post-outbreak phase.
Figure 1.6 the multiple sources of hazardous agents and receptors for the post outbreak
(post t2) phase.
[Key] The sources (red squares) and receptors (water bodies) associated with the
disposal of infected carcasses under a "stamping-out" policy: Black arrows represent
possible pathways of exposure and environmental contamination.
Figure 1.6 represents the sources as independent events. The disposal activities include
culling activities on-premises, removal of the carcass and transport to a processing site,
processing of the carcasses and management of the residual products of processing
Farm Processing Residuals
Groundwater
Surface-water
Airborne
Livestock Human
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(Defra, 2009b; Pollard et al., 2008a; AHA, 2007). Each of these activities represents an
isolated event. Therefore, each disposal activity represents a new release of hazards
into the environment. Each disposal activity is independent and therefore does not
influence the preceding or following ones. Furthermore, the nature of the activities
influences the hazardous agents released. This may include the EAD agents alongside
other biological hazards, biochemical hazards from carcass decay and chemical hazards
from carcass processing, i.e. fuel for incineration (Nutsch et al., 2004). Therefore, the
system includes multiple singular release events, occurring at different times and
locations.
Figure 1.6 presents examples of pathways of exposure (black arrows) associated with
carcass disposal activities. An independent suit of pathways is associated with a
particular disposal activity therefore it includes multiple localised pathways systems
(Pollard et al., 2008a). For example, Figure 1.6 represents the disposal of carcass as a
chain composed of three independent activities. These include the culling of animals on
a premises, processing of the carcass at a different location and managing the residual
product at a third location. For each activity, occurring at specific location, an
independent pathways system represents the interaction between the hazardous agents
and the environment (Nutsch et al., 2004). For example, these pathways may include
infiltration of the soil, contamination of water sources and air and exposure to wildlife
(Figure 1.6).
Figure 1.6 represents a receptor, or the impact of exposure, as environmental
contamination and the magnitude of exposure of the livestock and human population to
any of the hazards agents released during the disposal activity (Defra, 2011b; Pollard et
al., 2008a). This includes a potential resurgence of the disease through exposure of
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livestock to the EAD agent (Alexandersen and Donaldson, 2004). It also considers the
impact in air and water quality and health effect to the human and livestock population
resulting from the by-products of disposal (EA, 2001; Lowles et al., 2002).
1.3.4 System changes throughout the progression of an EAD outbreak
This summary describes the events taking place during each outbreak phase and
explores the changes in the source-pathway-receptor relationship as the outbreak
progresses. The changes to the system result from the difference in factors playing a
significant role in EAD transmission. For example, the movement of animals between
UK farms is significant in the spread of disease during the outbreak phase (Green et al.,
2006; Fèvre et al., 2006; Bigras-Poulin et al., 2006). However, such movements do not
influence transmission during the pre-outbreak phase, as all farms are free from the
EAD agent. Similarly, these do not influence the environmental contamination during
the post-outbreak phase. In conclusion, each outbreak phase represents a unique
dynamic in the source-pathway-receptor relationship.
1.4 Policy development across all phases of an EAD outbreak
Acknowledging these differences in source-pathway-receptor relationships carries with
it the recognition that information available to support policy decisions is not directly
transferable between the three phases of an outbreak. Moreover, it suggests that
effective policies to control EAD transmission for one phase may not be effective across
all phases. This leads to the conclusion that effective policy development involves
supporting decisions with phase specific information.
This work analyses the sources of information available to support the decision across
all phases of an outbreak. It identifies the limitations of the existing data to support
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decisions and develops a solution to overcome them with the aim of improving the
policy development capacity and contributing from a more efficient management of
EAD outbreaks.
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LITERATURE REVIEW2
2.1 Managing exposure throughout an animal disease outbreak
The policies developed and applied by developed countries, more specifically by the
UK, aim to prevent and minimise the social and economic impacts that result from an
EAD outbreak (Otte et al., 2004; Scudamore et al., 2002; Morgan and Prakash, 2006;
Bender et al., 2006; EA, 2001). The development of intervention strategies finds
support in data. The data available in the research literature provides insights on EAD
agent transmission characteristics and system behaviour (Morris, 1995; Pearce, 1996).
These insights support the development of management solutions to prevent the
exposure of livestock to an EAD and thus, minimising the impact of an outbreak (Defra,
2011a; Pollard et al., 2008a; Taylor, 2003; Peeler et al., 2006).
Information on the behaviour of the system across all phases of an EAD outbreak
allows for the identification of the factors influencing disease transmission in each
phase. This involves analysing all the factors influencing disease transmission and the
effectiveness of the controls in place to prevent it, regardless of their perceived
influence in the system (Murthy and Krishnamurthy, 2009). This analysis provides
information on the mechanism involved in disease transmission (Murthy and
Krishnamurthy, 2009; Pearce and Merletti, 2006). Furthermore, it establishes a relation
of cause and effect between the factors influencing EAD transmission and the control in
place prevent it, and the system’s behaviour (Murthy and Krishnamurthy, 2009; Carré
and Singer, 2008; Borrett and Patten, 2003). Such insights inform on the most
influential factors of a system’s behaviour, thus they provide information to support the
development of strategies to reduce UK’s vulnerability to an EAD.
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The information available on the source-pathway-receptor relationships for the three
outbreak phases falls into three categories. These are:
 Transmission characteristics of EAD agents
 Studies on past EAD outbreaks
 Predictive modelling
2.1.1 Transmission characteristics of EAD agents
There is a sound body of publications on transmission characteristics. This includes
information of the transmission modes, e.g. airborne, direct contact, ingestion and
inhalation. These also define the survival of EAD agents and viability outside the host
under various circumstances, e.g. temperature, humidity and medium (OIE, 2011b; OIE,
2011b; Brown and Gajdusek, 1991; Weesendorp et al., 2008; De Smit et al., 1999).
Defra and the OIE maintain a database that summarises the characteristics of disease
agents (OIE, 2011a; OIE, 2011b). Alongside this, there are a large number of studies
developed to analyse specific forms of transmission under field and laboratory
conditions. Table 2.1 displays a summary of studies associated with the transmission
characteristic of CSF under field and laboratory conditions. Such information is also
available to other EAD agents. For example, reviews of the transmission characteristics
of the FMD and HPAI virus are also available (Alexandersen et al., 2003; Grubman and
Baxt, 2004; Van Oirschot, 1999; IFST, 2004; Alexander D. J., 2001; Moennig, 2000).
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Modes of
transmission
Classic Swine Fever
Proven
in Lab
Disease
Import
References
Animal movements + + (Moennig, 2000; Terpstra, 1987; Elbers et al.,
1999; Artois et al., 2002; OIE, 2002; AHA,
2009; Stegeman et al., 1997)
Transport vehicles + + (Weesendorp et al., 2008; Moennig, 2000;
OIE, 2002; AHA, 2009; Stegeman et al., 1997)
Human contacts + + (Terpstra, 1987; OIE, 2002; Stegeman et al.,
1997; Ribbens et al., 2004)
Meat based food
products
+ + (OIE, 2002; OIE, 2002; Ribbens et al., 2004)
Wild boar + + (Moennig, 2000; Artois et al., 2002; OIE,
2002; Fritzemeier et al., 2000)
Airborne + - (Elbers et al., 1999; OIE, 2002; Stegeman et
al., 1997)
Other carriers
(mechanical vectors)
+ - (Liess, 1987)
Iatrogenic transmission + - (Liess, 1987)
Artificial insemination + + (De Smit et al., 1999; Elbers et al., 1999;
Stegeman et al., 1997)
Vertical transmission + - (Elbers et al., 1999; OIE, 2002)
Table 2.1 The transmission mechanisms for classic swine fever [CSF]
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A similar body of knowledge exists for the chemical and biochemical hazards
potentially released from carcasses during disposal activities (NIOSH, 2005; ATSDR,
2010). Information on hazardous agents characteristics, i.e. EAD agent and otherwise,
is common to all outbreak stages. Therefore, it is available to support intervention
strategies directed across all three phases of an EAD outbreak.
2.1.2 Studies on past EAD outbreaks
Following an outbreak, governments and international organisations report on the
analysis of these events. These documents describe in detail the events known to have
taken place during the progression of the outbreak with an inquiry into the causes and
decisions made to resolve the incident. Epidemiological reports on past outbreaks
include information on the pathways leading to EAD introduction for the pre-outbreak
phase, alongside information on the progression of the outbreak during the outbreak
phase (OIE 2010). In addition, governments may sometimes develop specific
documents that report the environmental impacts relating to the disposal of the
carcasses during post-outbreak phase (Environment Agency, 2001).
An analysis of these documents exposes a discrepancy in quality and quantity of
information available for each of the three outbreak phases. Typically, epidemiological
reports identify the progression of the EAD agent during the development of the
outbreak (t0-t2) phase (Sharpe et al., 2001; Defra, 2007c; OIE, 2010). The UK develops
reports that provide a particularly accurate recount of transmission events involved in
the progression and resolution of the outbreak (Sharpe et al., 2001; Defra, 2007c;
Anderson, 2008; Fritzemeier et al., 2000). Alongside official reports, a number of
studies are available in research papers that focus on the identification of all infected
premises and the chronological development of a specific outbreak (Cottam et al.,
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2008b; Green et al., 2006; Fèvre et al., 2006; Elbers et al., 1999; Stegeman et al., 1997;
Haydon et al., 1997). Therefore, there is a sound knowledge base on the progression of
an outbreak following the infection of the first premises, i.e. the nature of the source-
pathway-receptor relationship contributing to disease spread and the geographical
dispersion of an EAD during an outbreak.
In contrast for the pre-outbreak (pre t0) and post-outbreak (post t2) phases, the published
data that informs on the source-pathway-receptor relationship is limited. Information
regarding the behaviour of the system during the pre-outbreak (pre t0) phase is present
in the same epidemiological reports that record the spread of the EAD during the
outbreak phase (OIE, 2010). These reports include an analysis of pathways of exposure
responsible for EAD introduction. However, whilst the majority of these reports are
successful in identifying the first infected premises as well as the outbreaks’
chronological progression, only a small portion are successful in presenting a
conclusive hypothesis for the pathways of introduction. For example, from the
epidemiological reports published between 2008 and 2010 regarding CSF and FMD
outbreaks, only 30% advance a conclusive hypothesis for the source and pathway of
exposure responsible for the infection of the first premises (OIE, 2010). Furthermore,
reports developed and commissioned by Defra at times fail to specify the introduction
pathways associated with the outbreak (Gibbens et al., 2000; Scudamore, 2002; Defra,
2007b). The existing reports address the pathways of exposure responsible for the
introduction of EAD. However, as most reports are inconclusive, uncertainty remains
on the actual pathways of introduction. Thus, it limits the insights produced on the
source-pathway-receptor relationship and on UK’s vulnerability to EAD introduction
through the same pathways introduction.
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Information on the system behaviour associated with the post-outbreak (post t2) phase
relies on monitoring the activities performed during the disposal of carcasses. Research
evidence is limited for this phase. The option to cull all infected and potentially infect
animals is available for dealing with any EAD. However, reports that review the
activities associated with the disposal of carcasses are limited to those produced during
the FMD outbreak of 2001 (Scottish Executive, 2002; Lowles et al., 2002; Environment
Agency, 2001; Scottish Executive, 2001), published work on carcass disposal through
composting and burial of carcasses (Glanville, 2000; Glanville et al., 2006; Glanville et
al., 2008) and a study on the disposal of fallen stock (Ritter and Chirnside, 1995).
Furthermore, the available information on the environmental impact caused by the
disposal of carcasses is incomplete, as the existing reports on the environmental impact
address a fraction of environmental release sources associated with carcass disposal
activities. Therefore, there are a number of activities associated with the disposal of
carcasses, such as culling on farm, whose environmental impact is unknown. It is clear
that the information available from past events is insufficient to establish a link between
the sources (disposal activities) and pathways of exposure, and the environmental
impact and UK’s vulnerability to a resurgence of the EAD. Therefore, data on the
source-pathway-receptor relationship associated with the post-outbreak (post t2) phase is
limited.
2.1.3 Predictive modelling
Where evidence is available, predictive modelling can be used to estimate the outcome
of an event (Singer et al., 2011). Here we analyse the capacity of existing predictive
models to generate insights on system behaviour, i.e. the source-pathway-receptor
relationship, across all three phases of an outbreak (Taylor, 2003). These models use
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data available from research on EAD agent transmission characteristics and documents
recording past events. From this information, the models calculate the likelihood and/or
impact of exposure (Taylor, 2003; Singer et al., 2011). Predictive models vary in
complexity from highly complex computer based models to simpler expert-based ones
(Taylor, 2003; Singer et al., 2011; Murray, 2002). Despite the differences in modelling
approach, all models aim to provide insights on the activities posing influence in the
source-pathway-receptor relationship. As a result, predictive models are instrumental in
identifying which pathways and transmission modes pose a greater threat for exposure
to an EAD agent. This information presents valuable insights to support strategies to
control exposure of livestock to EAD. Predictive modelling applied to study EAD
outbreaks is associated with risk assessment (RA). This results from their capacity to
assist in identifying the most influential factors and weaker controls to transmission
within the phases of an outbreak (Singer et al., 2011). Table 2.2 contains a description
of terms and concepts used to describe and classify these models.
This review of predictive models applied in RA to study EAD outbreaks focuses on
their capacity to generate insight on the system behaviour for each of the three phases of
an EAD outbreak. A predictive model that contributes to the understanding of system
behaviour involves understanding the full extent of the source-pathway-receptor
relationship and therefore considering all available pathways of exposure and control in
place. Under this definition of system behaviour, the achievements of predictive
modelling and of RA development differ between those that focus on the outbreak
phase and those that focus on the pre-outbreak (pre t0) and post-outbreak (post t2)
phases.
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Term Meaning References
System The source-pathway-receptor relationship (Pearce and Merletti,
2006; Borrett and
Patten, 2003)
System behaviour The interactive relationship between an EAD
agent and the source-pathway-receptor
(Pearce and Merletti,
2006)
Pathways system All available pathways of exposure that form
links between source and receptor for a specific
pathogenic agent
Predictive modelling Studies developed to predict the outcome of one
or multiple events. These model may be
computer-based or expert-based
(Taylor, 2003; de
Jong, 1995)
Expert based model Modelling technique relying on the opinion of
experts to predict the system’s behaviour
(Singer et al., 2011)
Scenario-based model Computer based model focussing on one or
multiple pathways of exposure. These models
use a binomial or an event tree based model to
estimate the likelihood or quantity of the agent
exposed through a pathway
(Vose, 2008; Singer et
al., 2011; Murray,
2002)
Import risk assessment (IRA) Predictive study targeting transmission during
the pre-outbreak phase or pre t0 phase
(Singer et al., 2011)
Disease spread model Predictive study targeting transmission during
the outbreak phase or t0-2 phase
(Dubé et al., 2007)
Carcass disposal assessment
(CDA)
Predictive study targeting the impact of carcass
disposal during the post-outbreak phase or post
t2 phase
(Pollard et al., 2008a)
Risk factor Any form of EAD transmission, e.g. livestock,
meat produce, fomites, vectors, other host)
(Horst et al, 1996,
Defra 2011a)
Hazardous agent Substance or biological entity liable to cause
harm to a receptor: including EAD agents and
other chemical, biochemical and biologic agents
(Haas et al., 1999;
Vose, 2008; Taylor,
2003)
Barrier Any obstacle reducing the chances of disease
transmission, these may be physical and
biological barriers and activities performed
(Murray, 2002;
Morley, 1993)
Bottom-up model Modelling technique, based on the description
of the system where system behaviour and
pathways systems emerges for a series of rules
used to define the EAD agent transmission
characteristic
(Murthy and
Krishnamurthy, 2009;
Dangerfield and
Morris, 1992; Freeze
et al., 2005)
Top-down model Modelling technique, where the assessor or
experts based on their perception of system
behaviour, define the pathway(s) or pathways
system used to estimate the impact of exposure
(Murthy and
Krishnamurthy, 2009;
Dangerfield and
Morris, 1992; Freeze
et al., 2005)
Table 2.2 Review of terms and concepts used for describing predictive models
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2.1.4 Predictive modelling applied to the outbreak (t0-t2) phase
Multiple predictive modelling tools have been developed to estimate the outcome of the
outbreaks and spread of the disease during the outbreak (t0-t2) phase. These include
expert-based qualitative assessments (Wieland et al., 2011; Hartley, 2010) and
scenario-based qualitative assessments focussing on one activity or agent transmission
characteristic (Gloster et al., 2010; Donaldson and Alexandersen, 2002; Donaldson et
al., 1982). The development of predictive tools to study the progression of the outbreak
during this phase recognises the need to apply a systemic approach that develops a
complete understanding of the events driving exposure. Such approach focuses on
assessing all risk factors influencing transmission, all pathways of exposure and
controls preventing it. Specific models applied to analyse the outbreak (t0-t2) phase
generate a comprehensive understanding of system behaviour and estimate the EAD
spread during an outbreak. These are comprehensive disease spread models and the
leading examples are the North American Animal Disease Spread Model, the
AusSpread and the Inter-Spread RAF (Harvey et al., 2007; Dubé et al., 2007; Garner
and Beckett, 2005; Mintiens et al., 2003).
Comprehensive disease spread models are detailed models, which consider multiple
factors influencing disease spread. These factors include manmade activities and trade
that promotes the inter-farm contact, the disease agent characteristics and the
geographical concentration of farms. These are developed to include wind speed and
wind direction to estimate the airborne transmission of the EAD agents (Harvey et al.,
2007; Dubé et al., 2007; Garner and Beckett, 2005; Mintiens et al., 2003). These
models also account for the regulations in place that reduce the likelihood of inter-farm
transmission.
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Model development follows a bottom-up (BU) approach (Murthy and Krishnamurthy,
2009; Dangerfield and Morris, 1992). A BU approach to model development focuses
on establishing a thorough description of the system. This focuses on identifying all
components playing a role in EAD transmission and the characteristics of their
behaviour. These components include farms, manmade activities and the regulations
controlling them. The interactive behaviour of these components and the EAD agent is
characterised by a series of local governing rules that define the interactions between
components in the system (Murthy and Krishnamurthy, 2009). These rules include
farm descriptions, such as farm types, size and the geographical dispersion (Dubé et al.,
2007; Ward et al., 2009). Information regarding manmade activities promoting inter-
farm contacts includes the frequency of movement between farms and movement types
(Garner and Beckett, 2005). Lastly, the EAD agent is characterised by its ability to
remain viable when outside a host by conveying its transmission characteristics, i.e.
direct spread and possible airborne and vector based transmission (Harvey et al., 2007;
Garner and Beckett, 2005; Donaldson et al., 1982).
Computer models estimate the behaviour of the system emerging from these local rules.
This approach to model development is not unique to these disease spread models. In
fact, it is available in other domains such as engineering and finance (Freeze et al.,
2005; Huhn et al., 2011; Takahashi and Terano, 2006). Models developed through this
approach, where the focus is on system behaviour are defined as systemic models.
Systemic disease spread models structure characteristics that provide opportunities to
generate insights to a system’s behaviour. These can prove useful in the support of
intervention strategies (Garner and Beckett, 2005). These are:
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 Develop a system characterisation that includes all factors and components
influencing EAD transmission. This approach acknowledges the possible
complexity associated with disease transmission, which may be difficult to
perceive prior to the assessment (Morris, 1995; Pearce and Merletti, 2006).
Thus, it removes prior judgements and bias based on the perceived likelihood
from model development. This allows for the development of a model that is
equally sensitive to factors perceived as high or low significance. This makes
them an ideal tool to deal with a system where priorities are not easily
identifiable. For example, long tail risks (H.M. Treasury, 2004).
 System behaviour emerges from the local governing rules, allowing identifying
patterns of behaviour where they are difficult to predict. This quality of
systemic models generates insight regarding how disease spread occurs (Murthy
and Krishnamurthy, 2009; Pearce and Merletti, 2006).
 The development of sensitivity analyses to study system behaviour. Protocols
for sensitivity analysis change the local governing rules to measure their effect
on the system’s behaviour. This establishes a link between a system component
and the system’s behaviour that identifies which components pose the greatest
influence on disease spread. Furthermore, this allows testing intervention
strategies targeting specific components generating insight on how best to
control spread during an EAD outbreak (Murthy and Krishnamurthy, 2009;
Carré and Singer, 2008).
Disease spread models as systemic models provide an understanding of the source-
pathway-receptor relationship responsible for disease spread. These models provide an
understanding of the mechanisms responsible for EAD transmission, generating insights
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on system behaviour. These insights support the development of effective policy
interventions to control of future EAD outbreaks. The development of comprehensive
disease spread models depends on the availability of data to characterise the system
(input data) and for validation (Garner and Beckett, 2005). Such information is
available for the outbreak (t0-t2) phase from studies on the transmission characteristics
of EAD agents and studies from past EAD outbreaks.
Figure 2.1 Enumeration of the predictive model used to generate insight on system
behaviour for each outbreak phase and research questions answered by those models
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2.1.5 Predictive modelling for the pre-outbreak (pre t0) and post-outbreak
(post t2) phases
The development of predictive models for the pre-outbreak (pre t0) and post-outbreak
(post t2) phases follows a different approach. No research evidence is published on the
application of comprehensive models to study these two outbreak phases. However,
there are mitigation strategies in place to control the introduction of EAD agents (Defra,
2011a). Similarly, Defra has developed a contingency plan for carcass disposal to
prevent a resurgence of the EAD whilst minimising the environment and health impacts
(Defra, 2009b). Development of these plans and control measures requires an
understanding of the source-pathway-receptor relationship associated with each
outbreak phase. Following is an analysis of the predictive models used to study these
two outbreak phases (Figure 2.1). This review focuses on analysing the capacity of
these predictive models to generate insights on the source-pathway-receptor relationship
associated with the pre-outbreak (pre t0) and post-outbreak (post t2) phases. The review
includes detailed descriptions of the methods used, as well as the scope associated with
the models identified in the research literature. Predictive models developed for each of
these two phases assess two systems with different configurations and behaviour.
Therefore, this review analyses the models developed to assess each phase separately.
However, there are similarities in the modelling approaches, which became apparent
during these analyses. Therefore, a final analysis on the efficacy of these models to
produce insights on system behaviour and information to support the reduction of UK’s
vulnerability to an EAD follows this methodological review.
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2.2 Predictive models applied in the pre-outbreak (pre-t0) phase
EAD transmission during the pre-outbreak (pre t0) phase occurs within a system that
includes complex interactions between multiple components. The system displays a
network like configuration, where the interaction between components creates a large
number of pathways available for EAD introduction. For example, Figure 1.4
represents only a fraction of the entire system. These pathways result from the
interaction between two or more components and the EAD agent describing the
sequence of events leading to the exposure of livestock to an EAD (Defra, 2011a). The
influence of the disease transmission characteristics is described in the list of risk
factors considered for each disease (Horst et al., 1998, Defra, 2011a). The risk factors
(Table 2.2) represent the forms of disease transmission, which include transmission
through meat products, live animals, fomites (e.g. livestock lorries), vector based
transmission or even airborne transmission of an EAD (Horst et al., 1998, Defra,
2011a). Therefore, the system assessed presents complexity generated from interactions
between multiple system components and risk factors (Figure 1.4). This allows for a
nonlinear behaviour, amplification loops and different permutations that increase the
number of pathways of exposure considered within the system (Siu, 1994; Jordán and
Scheuring, 2004; Mitchell, 2006).
The government’s responsibility to implement controls and establish guidelines to
prevent successful transmission extends to managing the pathways allowed within the
network system (Defra, 2011a). Due to the size of the system associated with the pre-
outbreak phase, the government maintains a system of controls consisting of regulatory
bodies and enforcing agencies. These produce and enforce regulations that aim to
detect and eliminate the disease agent before exposure to livestock animals. As a
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system of controls, the regulatory bodies and enforcement agencies are responsible for
controlling all components within the system, i.e. the UK’s livestock industry, on the
border inspection posts, livestock trucks, laboratories, farms, wildlife, and
slaughterhouses (Defra, 2011a). Each one is responsible for supervising and controlling
activities associated with a specific section or node from the network. The design of the
system of controls deliberately places the organisations and groups to create
redundancy, so that along the pathways of exposure multiple successive chances of
detection and elimination are established, i.e. barriers. This defines a multi-barrier
system (Reason, 1997). The multi-barrier setting accounts for protection against
potential failures in eliminating the disease agent, so that in the event that one of them
fails, the subsequent barrier assures that the system is uncompromised (Reason, 1997;
Pidgeon and O'Leary, 2000).
Predictive models applied to study the pre-outbreak phase focus on testing the efficacy
of the multi-barrier system in preventing the introduction of an EAD into the UK (OIE,
2011c; Vose, 2008; Taylor, 2003; Murray, 2002). Predictive models associated with
this outbreak phase are designated as import risk assessments (IRA) (Singer et al.,
2011).
2.2.1 Expert-based qualitative risk assessment
Expert based qualitative assessments represent a type of predictive models used
consistently by governments to develop IRA (Peeler et al., 2006). Governments adopt a
qualitative template for routine assessments, e.g. UK, Australia and New Zealand
(Defra, 2011c; Reed, 2009b; BioNZ, 2006). In the UK, Defra applies qualitative
assessment methods following the notification of an animal disease outbreak in foreign
countries, to assess the threat these pose to the UK (Defra, 2011c). The templates
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follow the principles of the OIE qualitative framework (OIE, 2011c) and provide
estimations of the risk associated with imported commodities and other risk factors
(Figure 1.4). Each assessment compiles information on the geography and extent of an
outbreak, the species involved and characteristics of the infectious agent (Defra, 2011c;
Sabirovic et al., 2005; Sabirovic and Hall, 2004). Expert-based qualitative assessments
help to understand the threat posed by outbreaks in foreign countries by estimating the
individual risks posed by importing individual commodities and movement of people
(Defra, 2011c). Imported commodities and movements responsible for the introduction
of EAD are described as risk factors (Horst et al., 1996). Summaries within these
assessments classify risks factors according to a nominal scale that allows for
comparisons between imported commodities to define priorities for intervention.
Figure 2.2 Nominal ranking scale used by Defra to assessment the risk posed by the
importation of different commodities(t0-t2) (Defra, 2008a).
The documents published in association with the RA are vague in their descriptions of
the elicitation technique producing these results (Defra, 2011c). They state with
certainty, that methods applied use, expert consensus to develop expert rationale; and
classify the commodities according to the nominal scale (Defra, 2011c; BioNZ, 2006).
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The categories considered in Defra’s template are described in Figure 2.2. However,
categories within the scale vary with the template adopted for the assessment (BioNZ,
2006). The expert-based qualitative assessments provide a description and a
classification according to a nominal scale of the commodities and movement of goods
presenting a threat to the UK (Figure 2.2). However, assessments do not consider
specific pathways of exposure or mechanisms associated with the commodities
assessed. Thus, expert based qualitative assessment do not inform on specific barriers
and controls, to communicate the mechanisms involved in EAD transmission or
describe the complexity of the system assessed.
A key characteristic of these models resides in the use of expert knowledge. The
expectation is that these provide guidance where there is a shortage of reliable
quantitative data (OIE, 2011c; Defra, 2011c; Taylor, 2003). However, this means
assessments result exclusively from the experts’ rationale, and are influenced by their
preconceptions, assumptions and concerns (Cooke, 1994; Tversky and Kahneman,
1974). Thus, outputs produced reflect the level of information available to experts and
their preconceptions of system behaviour, limiting the capacity of expert based models
to generate new insights on EAD transmission and system behaviour.
This review of expert based system models reveals that these provide an analysis of the
entire system, however they are limited in the capacity to analyse its complexity and the
exposure pathways. Therefore, expert-based qualitative models fail to specify the
mechanisms responsible for EAD transmission and fail to capture new insights on
system behaviour. As a result, the outputs produced provide limited information to
support improvements to UK’s resilience to an EAD outbreak.
40
2.2.2 Expert-based quantitative risk assessment
Expert-based quantitative assessments improve the qualitative approach by adopting
more complex elicitation techniques, which retrieve expert judgments as quantitative
values (Horst et al., 1998; Horst et al., 1996; Nissen and Krieter, 2003; Gallagher et al.,
2002). The conjoint analysis is an alternative elicitation technique, developed by the
marketing industry to estimate consumer preferences (Horst et al., 1998; Horst et al.,
1996; Nissen and Krieter, 2003; Gallagher et al., 2002). Horst et al. (1996) first applied
the technique to identify the relative importance of imported commodities and other risk
factors in the introduction of CSF into the Netherlands. The conjoint analysis applies an
indirect elicitation process. It involves creating profiles, each composed of different
groupings and ordering of risk factors. Experts compare the profiles in pairs and
express their concerns in terms of relative likelihood or probability beliefs for each
profile pair (Horst et al., 1996; Dalton et al., 2010). A statistical analysis sorts between
the profile comparisons and provides a relative ranking of the estimated influence each
risk factor has in the introduction of CSF. Supporters of the conjoint analysis defend
that ranking of relative likelihoods (in pairs) is a more natural quantity to conceive for
one who is not accustomed to the idea of probability (Dalton et al., 2010). Therefore,
the expectance is an improved accuracy of the outputs (Horst et al., 1996; Dalton et al.,
2010). However, with the caveat that this process is time consuming, thus confining
studies to a limited number of risk factors.
Since then, this approach has been applied by Horst et al. (1998) to estimate the number
of expected primary CSF, FMD and Newcastle disease outbreaks in a five years interval
and by Nissen and Krieter (2003) to expand the list of risk factors assessed to consider
those associated with the EAD introduction and spread. The UK’s approach to expert-
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based quantitative models, involved modelling of FMD introduction to Europe.
However, the exact elicitation technique is not described (Gallagher et al., 2002). This
work expands the list of risk factors to include tourists and emigrants, personally owned
vehicles, natural spread. The model provides a number of outputs from the number of
primary outbreaks expected per region in the EU for a five years interval and assesses
the most likely source of these outbreaks and the risk factors involved in introduction to
the UK (Gallagher et al., 2002).
The expert-based quantitative assessments published, develop an output that is
comparable to that of expert-based qualitative assessments (Horst et al., 1996; Horst., et
al., 1998; Gallagher et al., 2002; Nissen and Krieter, 2003). These models organise
predefined lists of commodities according to their estimated influence in future EAD
outbreaks (Horst et al. 1996). The difference between the expert based qualitative and
quantitative models resides on the elicitation technique used and scale used to
communicate the ranking of risk factors. Here, outputs are presented according to an
estimated probability score, contrasting with the classification according to a nominal
scale. Nonetheless, the quantitative approach also fails to describe and analyse specific
pathways responsible for exposure or the complexity of the system assessed.
This review of expert based quantitative assessments reveals these provide an analysis
of the entire system, however they are limited in the capacity to analyse its complexity
and the exposure pathways. Therefore, expert-based quantitative models fail to specify
the mechanisms responsible for EAD transmission and fail to capture new insights on
system behaviour. As a result, the outputs produced provide limited information to
support improvements to UK’s resilience to an EAD outbreak.
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2.2.3 Scenario-based quantitative risk assessments
Scenario based assessments use a different approach to developing IRA. These
assessments focus on developing detailed analysis of the pathways of exposure
associated with the exposure of livestock to an EAD (Vose, 2008; Peeler et al., 2006;
Murray, 2002). These are applicable to the same risk factors considered in the expert
based assessments. However, scenario-based models analyse in detailed the efficiency
of the controls in place. The outputs of these assessments provide an estimation of the
likelihood of failure to detect and eliminate the disease agent before exposure to
livestock to an EAD (Morley, 1993).
Scenario based assessments apply modelling techniques which focus on the
representation of the pathways of exposure. The models recreate in detail the sequences
of events and failures in the controls in place, resulting in the release and exposure of
the livestock population to an EAD (Vose, 2008; Murray, 2002). Descriptions of the
methods for building scenario-based models are available in the published literature
(OIE, 2011c; Vose, 2008; Murray, 2002). The assessments apply models rooted in the
development binomial models. The binomial model quantifies the outcome of the
pathways (Singer et al., 2011). Risk analysis selects the scenarios to assess based on the
objectives of the assessment. For example, studies assessing the risk of importing FMD
through the importation of live animals address different scenarios from those assessing
imports of deboned beef (Yu et al., 1997; Martinez-Lopez et al., 2008). The definition
of the scenario to assess influences the development of the binomial model.
The definition of a scenario and thus the development of the binomial model, considers
three steps: (i) characterise the source, (ii) define barriers to transmission, and (iii)
estimate exposure to receptors. The source considers the presence of a disease agent at
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the origin country and the quantity of commodities imported. The definition of source
includes:
 the volume of imported goods, e.g. live animals, meat products or genetic
material, and
 the likelihood of contamination estimated by the true prevalence of the disease
within the country of origin (Vose, 2008; Murray, 2002).
The definition of barriers includes any activity, control or even biological factors that
contribute to reducing the likelihood of disease introduction.
 These barriers are present at source, during transit and at destination.
Considering the importation of live animals, barriers included at source are
animal selection and veterinary checks (Vose, 2008).
 A variety of barriers are considered within transit. Examples include the
survival of animals from origin to destination for live animal transports or the
possible inactivation of disease agents through the refrigeration of meat products
(Yu et al., 1997; Sánchez‐Vizcaíno et al., 2010).
 Barriers at the destination include the low likelihood of the exposure of livestock
animal through contaminated meat produces and detection through veterinary
controls, i.e. quarantine checks, and blood sampling (Hartnett et al., 2007;
Bronsvoort et al., 2008).
The binomial model estimates the exposure to livestock. The model is a mathematical
formula that considers all probabilistic “what if” estimates that condition the likelihood
of exposure (Morley, 1993). The output of scenario-based models is a detailed analysis
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of the pathways of exposure, which results in an estimation of the likelihood of
introducing the EAD agent.
In total, 13 quantitative end-point IRAs were identified in the research literature (De
Vos et al., 2004; Morley, 1993; Yu et al., 1997; Martinez-Lopez et al., 2008; Sánchez‐
Vizcaíno et al., 2010; Hartnett et al., 2007; Bronsvoort et al., 2008; Hoar et al., 2004;
Jones et al., 2004; Wahlstrom et al., 2002; Astudillo et al., 1997; Martínez-López et al.,
2009; Weng et al., 2010). The histogram displayed in Figure 2.3 shows a comparison of
assessments based on their scope.
Figure 2.3 Analysis of the 13 scenario based assessment based on scope
[KEY] The analysis focuses the number of pathways of exposure (scenarios of
introduction) and risk factors (commodity groups) assessed.
The majority of the assessments consider multiple pathways of exposure (Figure 2.3 -
first column pair). However, one change to the sequence of events analysed generates a
new scenario and a new pathway of exposure. Thus, although these assessments address
multiple pathways, their scope is limited to variations of the same scenario (Vose, 2008;
Murray, 2002). From the twelve assessments focusing on multiple pathways, eight
analyse variations of the same scenario. For example, Jones et al. (2004) when the
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estimating risk of importing Brucellosis from EU countries, focuses specifically on two
disease sources, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Although the risk factor
and the sequence of events remain unchanged, each new source represents a new
scenario. The same is true for changes in receiving regions (Martinez-Lopez et al.,
2008; Hoar et al., 2004), or changes in the series of barriers along the pathways, e.g.
infection before or after vaccination (Weng et al., 2010). As a result, these scenario-
based assessments produce analysis with a narrow scope, where focus is limited to the
pathways of exposure associated to a single risk factor.
Four scenario-based assessments focus on multiple risk factors, all published since 2004
(Figure 2.3- second column pair). Within this group, three authors adopt the binomial
model. Weng et al. (2010) presents one tree representing the legal movement of pets
across the border, and a second tree for illegal movements. Similarly, Bronsvoort et al.
(2005) considers risk factors in separate trees, i.e. the import of live breeding animals,
semen, returning livestock trucks and legal and illegal meat imports. The work
developed by De Vos et al. (2004) presents a model considering all risk factors within
the same event-tree to assess scenarios combining multiple risk factors. This
assessment considers the role played by exogenous and endogenous sources, e.g. wild
boar population and laboratory releases. The modelling approach used is rooted in the
same principles as conventional scenario-based models, however it analyses an
increased number of risk factors and pathways of exposure. The development of
scenarios based assessments focussing on multiple risk factors, suggests these develop
comprehensive analyses of the source–pathway-receptor relationship. However, these
models analyse one or a small number of pathways for each risk factor (De Vos et al.,
2004; Bronsvoort et al., 2005; Weng et al., 2010). As a result, these models maintain a
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small scope, which focus on a small number of scenarios of EAD introduction,
considering all pathways of exposure available in the system (Figure 1.4).
The remaining scenario-based assessment focussing on multiple risk factors, adopts a
different modelling technique (Hartnett et al., 2007). This is an agent-based model and
represents an alternative to conventional binomial models. It follows a systems
approach to modelling the disease incursion. This approach focuses on representing the
system as a network of connections, where pathways arise from a rules governing
network behaviour (Murthy and Krishnamurthy, 2009; Newman, 2003). Hartnett et al.
(2007) explores the concept of exogenous and endogenous pathways in a study
dedicated to assess the influence of illegal meat imports in the introduction of FMD into
the UK. It differs from the conventional IRA approach by describing the system,
represented as a network, to simulate the events taking place within UK borders that are
responsible for exposure of livestock to FMD. This study focuses on illegally
introduced meat products (one risk factor), however once these are released into the
country it acknowledges that exposure depends on a wider range of risk factors, such as
wildlife population, swill feeding and humans as fomites (Hartnett et al., 2007). This
approach presents the potential to develop a truly comprehensive analysis of the system
associated with pre-outbreak (pre t0) phase. However, as the assessment focuses on
illegal imports of meat products alone, it fails to achieve this.
This review of the scenario-based models published reveals these develop analysis with
a narrow scope, focussing on a small number of pathways. This results from the need
for quantitative data to inform on the quantity of the EAD agent and on the barriers to
transmission considered by the binomial model. Considerable effort is necessary to
collect these data, making the development of such models time consuming (Taylor,
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2003; Peeler et al., 2006; Singer et al., 2011). Furthermore, it compromises the
development of assessments for pathways of exposure for which high quality data is
unavailable (Taylor, 2003; Peeler et al., 2006). Thus, this characteristic of scenario-
based models restricts their focus to one or a small number of risk factors and an
equally reduced number of pathways of exposure. Whilst, these models produce a
detailed assessment of the likelihood of EAD introduction, they analyse a fraction of the
pathways of exposure available in the system (Figure 1.4). As a result, mechanisms of
exposure identified as influential for a specific pathway may not correspond to a similar
influence in system behaviour. Thus, the outputs produced provide limited information
to support improvements to UK’s resilience to an EAD outbreak.
2.2.4 Insights on system behaviour developed by the IRA
The IRA published to date to study can be defined into three categories base of the
technique used to develop the predictive models (Table 2.3). Here, there is a clear
distinction between the expert-based and scenario-based assessments. Expert-based
models include expert-based qualitative and expert-based quantitative models.
Scenario-based models include scenario-based quantitative assessment and an agent-
based model. Table 2.3 describes the result of this analysis the focus on the assessments
reviewed.
Expert-based assessments developed scoping exercises of the system. These develop an
overview of the system, which sacrifices the level of detail with which pathways are
described (Defra, 2011c; Sabirovic and Hall, 2004; Horst et al., 1998). Therefore, these
assessments fail to specify the pathways and the mechanisms responsible for exposure
(Table 2.3). Furthermore, prioritisation of risk factors results from the experts and
assessors preconceptions of system behaviour. In doing so these models fail to analyse
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the system in sufficient detail as to provide new insights on the system behaviour or to
identify clear solutions for policy interventions that to reduce significantly UK’s
vulnerability to EAD outbreaks.
Analysis of the
entire system
Pathways of
exposure assessed
in detail
Provides insights on
S-P-R relationship
Expert-based
qualitative assessment
Yes No No
Expert-based
quantitative
assessment
Yes No No
Scenario-based
quantitative
assessment
No Yes No
Table 2.3 Analysis of the IRA according to the scope of the assessments
[Key] S-P-R stands for source-pathway-receptor
The scenario-based assessments focus on assessing, in detail, specific pathways of
introduction, however focusing on a small number of them (Table 2.3). However, their
narrow scope means that insights of system behaviour result from incomplete analysis
of the system. Thus, the priorities identified relate only to the pathways assessed and
may not be significant to UK’s vulnerability to EAD, providing little insight on the
system behaviour.
The conclusion from this analysis is that the predictive models, whether expert-based
and scenario-based assessments, produce incomplete analyses of the system. Expert-
based models sacrifice detail by not describing mechanisms involved in exposure and in
contrast, whilst scenario-based models favour detail sacrificing the relation between the
pathways of exposure assessed and system behaviour. Therefore, all IRA published to
date provide incomplete insights on system behaviour to support policy improvements
to UK’s resilience against an EAD.
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2.3 Predictive models applied in the post-outbreak or post-t2 phase
The post-outbreak phase considers a system that includes multiple environmental
releases of hazardous agents (Figure 1.6). These releases are associated with the
different activities associated with “stamping out” and “vaccinate to kill” policies
(Pollard et al., 2008b). These include culling on farm, transporting carcass to the
disposal system, processing the carcass and management of residual products from the
processing of the carcass. The system involves all releases associated with all disposal
options available for the disposal of carcasses (Defra, 2009b). This means a large
number of exposure pathways are available.
It is the government’s responsibility to implement controls and establish guidelines to
prevent the resurgence of the EAD following disposal activities and to minimise their
environmental and health impacts (Marsland et al., 2003; Lowles et al., 2002; Pollard et
al., 2008a; DH, 2001). Defra provides guidelines for disposal activities where these are
necessary (Defra, 2009b). Moreover, it adopts exiting directives for the disposal
options that have them. For example, the disposal of carcasses through fixed plant
incineration (Defra, 2009c). Predictive models test the existing protocols and guidelines
regarding their impact to the environment and on the health of livestock and human
populations. The models associated with this outbreak phase are defined as carcass
disposal assessments (CDA)
The majority of CDA are UK based in consequence to the BSE, FMD and HPAI
outbreaks. These include CDA developed for the BSE crisis in the 1990s’ (Spouge and
Comer, 1997b; Gale, 1998; Gale et al., 1998; Gale and Stanfield, 2001), the FMD crisis
of 2001 (DH, 2001) and the HPAI international crisis (Pollard et al., 2008a). Curiously,
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each crisis is associated with a particular RA technique. The BSE crisis is associated
with scenario-based quantitative assessments, FMD crisis with an expert-based
qualitative assessment and the HPAI crisis with an expert-based semi-quantitative risk
assessment. Therefore, the review will address the RA methods by analysing each of
the pre-mentioned crises.
2.3.1 Scenario-based quantitative risk assessments
BSE is a prionic disease, associated to the cause of the Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease in
humans (IFST, 2004; Brown, 2001). In contrast with the majority of the diseases
included in the notifiable diseases list, which are caused by viruses, bacteria and
parasites, BSE results from a mutated protein, the prion (IFST, 2004). These are highly
resistant to inactivation, withstanding temperatures in the order of 600oC, and surviving
long periods in the soil (Brown and Gajdusek, 1991; Brown et al., 2004; Cooke and
Shaw, 2007). The development of the CDA followed the identification of a probable
link between CJD and BSE, therefore focussed mainly in the possible exposure of
humans to prions (Smith and Bradley, 2003; Morley et al., 2003; Bradley and
Wilesmith, 1993). The crisis lasted for more than a decade, whilst the number of
animals “disposed of” remained below 200,000 (VLA, 2009). This allowed restricting
the disposal options used to highly controlled ones, which in turn reduced the likelihood
of a severe health impact resulting from the destruction of carcasses (Spouge and
Comer, 1997b). Therefore, CDA of BSE focused on the disposal of possible infected
livestock through rendering, incineration and landfill and the risk of environmental
contamination and human exposure to BSE prions.
A review of all risk assessments developed during the BSE crisis is available in the
work developed by Grist (2005). These predictive models represent the pathways of
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exposure using event-tree diagrams. Event tree diagrams represent binomial models,
which are used to calculate the flow of the prions. Thus these provide an estimation of
the environmental contamination and of subsequent exposures (Spouge and Comer,
1997b; Gale et al., 1998; Gale and Stanfield, 2001; Spouge and Comer, 1997d; Spouge
and Comer, 1997c; Spouge and Comer, 1997a; Gale, 2005; Huntly et al., 2002;
Cummins et al., 2002).
CDA develop through scenario based models use an event-tree to describe the exposure
pathways from source to environmental release. Exposure is characterised by the
infective dose 50 (ID50) load present at the end of each pathway. Through the
pathways, sequential proportional reductions to the initial load of ID50 are estimated
which correspond to the controls in place to mitigate transmission. Scenario-based
quantitative assessments produce a dose-response model estimating the quantity of
prions released into the environment and subsequently estimate the risks to the human
population (Spouge and Comer, 1997b; Gale et al., 1998; Gale and Stanfield, 2001;
Spouge and Comer, 1997d; Spouge and Comer, 1997c; Spouge and Comer, 1997a;
Gale, 2005; Huntly et al., 2002; Cummins et al., 2002). CDA developed for BSE were
marked by the assessments developed by the Der Nordske Veritas (DNV) and by Paul
Gale (WRc NSF, Tilehurst). The aim of the DNV models was to determine whether the
use of rendering, incineration and landfill for the disposal of BSE infected carcasses was
safe for the UK human population. Thus, this assessment analyses multiple pathways of
exposure associated with carcass processing activities, where the total ingestion of
ID50s provides a measure of that risk to the English and Welsh populations (Spouge
and Comer, 1997b). Contrastingly, the “Gale assessments” focus on the risk posed by
one individual pathway (Grist, 2005). For example, the contamination of water
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discharged from the rendering process, the potential contamination of an aquifer and
exposure to human through ingest of water from the aquifer (Gale et al., 1998).
Independently of the modelling technique used, all models developed for BSE are based
on a similar modelling approach. Combined, these models analyse the exposure
pathways associated with the processing stages of a small number of highly controlled
disposal options. Therefore, considering the number of disposal options available
(Pollard et al., 2008) and the multiple stages of disposal considered within each option,
these models address a fraction of the release sources included in the system (Figure
1.6). The narrow scope of these assessments, results in a failure to assess the system of
disposal options in its entirety. In short, these CDA provide an incomplete analysis of
the source-pathway-receptor relationship, thus producing limited information to
improve the existing protocol for safe disposal of carcasses.
2.3.2 Expert-based qualitative risk assessment
The Foot and Mouth crisis of 2001 was catastrophic. Overall, it involved the
destruction of more than 6 million animals, including cattle, sheep, pigs and deer
(Scudamore et al., 2002). At the height of the outbreak, the weekly disposal rate was
over 600,000 animals, overcoming the available capacity for preferred disposal options.
This resulted in the adoption of less contained methods of carcass disposal (Anderson,
2002; Scudamore et al., 2002). The department of health (DH, 2001) developed a
qualitative assessment to evaluate the safety of the disposal options available to process
the carcasses of infected animals. The assessment focused on the activities performed
during the processing stage alone. The document published includes a description of
the sequence of exercises performed during the elicitation. However, information is
limited on the actual elicitation technique (DH, 2001). The model follows the
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conventional template for qualitative assessments, composed of hazard screening
exercises and an exposure assessment for each disposal option (OIE, 2011c). The
results presented for each disposal option are comprised of: (i) collection of the
hazardous agents of concern selected from a list that included biological, chemical and
biochemical agents, (ii) enumeration of exposure pathways deemed as influential, and
(iii) ranking of the disposal options according to the estimated risk of exposure (DH,
2001).
This CDA focuses on the processing stage of five disposal options and considers a large
number of hazardous agents, including pollutants and a range of pathogenic agents,
exotic and not (DH, 2001). However, the model disregards the releases of hazards
associated with activities taking place before and after processing of the carcasses. As a
result, the model focuses on a fraction of the activities considered within the system.
Furthermore, whilst it enumerates a small number of pathways of exposure, it fails to
analyse in detail the events leading to exposure or the controls in place to prevent it.
This CDA develops an incomplete analysis of the source-pathway receptor relationship
and fails to identify the mechanisms responsible for exposure. Thus, the model
produces limited information to improve the existing protocol for safe disposal of
carcasses.
2.3.3 Expert-based semi-quantitative risk assessment
The semi-quantitative assessment provides a different approach to study the
environmental impact caused by carcass disposal activities. Pollard et al. (2008a)
published a model focussing on the disposal of carcasses that strikes a middle ground
between expert-based qualitative and scenario-based quantitative assessments. This
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model develops the first comprehensive assessment of carcass disposal activities
(Pollard et al., 2008a).
The scope of the assessment includes a wide range of disposal options including all
activities performed during disposal of carcasses. For example, the model includes an
analysis of the activities performed on premises. The potential impact of these activities
is mentioned in the Drummond report, published before 2001 and their environmental
impact was recorded during the 2001 FMD crisis (EA, 2001; Drummond, 1999).
However, previous assessments failed to address it. The model also analyses the
activities associated with transport and reception of carcass at the disposal site. The
model represents these disposal activities through a disposal chain, normalising all
disposal options into five stages. As the assessment focused on considering all
environmental releases of hazardous agents that result from carcass disposal activities, a
total 65 release sources were assessed (Pollard et al., 2008a). Modelling the
environmental impact of carcass disposal was prioritised over the potential resurgence
of the disease. Therefore, each release considered a large set of hazardous agents
associated with environmental pollution alongside the HPAI virus.
The format of the assessment allows for the comparison between the different disposal
options and the disposal activities within each disposal option. The disposal chain
considers five independent stages, each representing a disposal activity and an
environmental release of hazards. In each stage, 38 pathways of exposure represent the
environment. The model includes a description of the pathways but not a graphical
representation or consideration for the sequences of process composing them. Instead,
expert knowledge was used to assess each pathway individually by using a ranking
scale ranging from (0) for a non-existent pathway, and (1) to (4) from negligible to high
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risk. Thus, the outputs published are based on ranking scores that result from the
aggregation the pathways scores. In doing so, it fails to identify the pathways of
exposure that are influential during each disposal stage.
Pollard et al. (2008) produces an analysis of the entire system by considering all
independent release sources considered within it. However, whilst the modelling
approach is based on the assessment of the pathways of exposure available during each
stage, the outputs produced fail to communicate it. Therefore, the model fails to
produce a complete analysis of the source-pathway-receptor relationship and thus to
identify the mechanism driving exposure. As a result, this assessment produces limited
information to support policy interventions and improve the existing protocol for safe
disposal of carcasses.
2.3.4 Insights on system behaviour developed by the CDA
This review defines the predictive models used in the post-outbreak phase or CDA into
three categories. These categories enclose all RA methods applied so far to develop
insight on the mechanisms responsible for the resurgence of an EAD and the impact on
the environment and health for the disposal of carcasses. The outputs produced are in
line with the research needs present at the time of their development. However, these
CDA generate incomplete insights on system behaviour and on the mechanisms
responsible for transmission. Thus, providing limited information to support policy
interventions and that improve protection against the resurgence of an EAD following
disposal of animal carcasses. Table 2.4 describes the results of this analysis the focus
on the assessments reviewed.
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Analysis of the
entire system
Pathways of
exposure assessed
in detail
Provides insights on
S-P-R relationship
Scenario-based
quantitative
assessment
No Yes No
Expert-based
qualitative assessment
No No No
Expert-based semi-
quantitative
assessment
Yes No No
Table 2.4 Analysis of the CDA according to the scope of the assessments
[Key] S-P-R stands for source-pathway-receptor
The scenario-based quantitative assessments produced a detailed analysis of the
pathways exposing humans to BSE. These assessments provide an analysis of the
barriers to transmission present in these pathways. Therefore, they present the potential
to identify those barriers where failure results in a significant increase in the likelihood
of exposure to BSE (Table 2.4). However, their focus is limited to the processing of
carcasses through incineration, rendering and disposal in landfill (Spouge and Comer,
1997d; Spouge and Comer, 1997c; Spouge and Comer, 1997a). Moreover, the
assessments focus on BSE and ignore all by-products resulting from the disposal of
carcasses. In short, these assessments fail to develop a comprehensive analysis of the
disposal options available in the system. Thus, scenario-based assessments produce
limited insights on the source-pathway-receptor relationship and limited information to
improve the disposal hierarchy.
The expert-based qualitative assessment developed for FMD presents an incomplete
analysis of the system, which results from focusing on the processing stages for five
disposal options (Table 2.4). Furthermore, it fails to describe the pathways causing
exposure of livestock and human population to hazardous agents. Thus, its output
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provides limited insights on the source-pathway-receptor relationship and limited
information to improve the disposal hierarchy.
The expert-based semi-quantitative model provides an assessment of all environmental
releases from carcass disposal considered in the system (Table 2.4). Furthermore, the
model analyses an extensive number of hazardous agents, which include EAD and by-
products of carcass disposal activities (chemical, biological and biochemical) (Pollard et
al., 2008). However, its output does not disclose the pathways responsible for exposure.
As a result, the model does not specify the mechanisms involved in environment
contamination and exposure of livestock and humans to hazardous agents. Therefore,
this assessment produces limited insights on the source-pathway-receptor relationship
and limited information to improve the disposal hierarchy.
The conclusion from this analysis is that the predictive models applied to the post-
outbreak (post t2) phase, whether expert-based and scenario-based produce incomplete
analyses of the system. The expert-based semi-quantitative model sacrifices detail by
not describing mechanisms involved in exposure and in contrast, scenario-based models
favour the detail sacrificing a comprehensive analysis of all source of hazardous agents
included in the system (Table 2.4). Therefore, all CDA published to date provide
incomplete insights on system behaviour to support policy improvements to the disposal
options and the safety of the activities performed during the disposal of carcasses.
2.4 Insights produced on system behaviour for the pre and post
outbreak phase
This review analyses the predictive models developed to study the pre-outbreak (pre t0)
and post-outbreak (post t2) phases. The review focussed on the models individual
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capacity to provide insights on the source-pathway-receptor relationship and their
capacity to develop information to support policy intervention that reduce significantly
UK’s vulnerability to EAD.
The predictive models revised produced limited insights on system behaviour. This is
an expected conclusion as generating such knowledge is outside the scope of these
models (Section 2.2 and 2.3). Specifically, these models present a trend in their failure
to produce insight on system behaviour (Table 2.3 and Table 2.4). The predictive
models developed for both the pre-outbreak and post-outbreak phases demonstrate the
following trend.
 Expert-based assessments consider the full-scope of the system, however fail to
analyse the pathways and the mechanisms responsible for exposure to an EAD
(Table 2.3 and Table 2.4). Consequentially, expert-based models fail to
establish a link between the pathway and barriers to transmission, and the
system’s behaviour. Therefore, they fail to produce significant insights to
support improvements to the system’s behaviour.
 Scenario-based models analyse exposure in detail by assessing specific
pathways and the barriers composing them. However, these models focus on
one or a small fraction of the pathways available in system (Table 2.3 and Table
2.4). As a result, the barriers where failure significantly increases the likelihood
of exposure through the assessed pathway may not represent a significant
increase to UK’s vulnerability to an EAD. Consequentially, scenario-based
models also fail to establish a link between the barriers considered in the
pathways assessed and the system’s behaviour.
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This trend agrees with findings from previous reviews of predictive models used to
study animal health related issues (Taylor, 2003; Peeler et al., 2006; Singer et al., 2011).
These reviews suggest that expert-based qualitative models produce a global analysis of
the system. In contrast, scenario-based quantitative models produce a local analysis of
the system by focussing on specific pathways of exposure (Taylor, 2003; Peeler et al.,
2006). Thus, these produce differing perspectives on the causes of exposure, a global
and a local perspective.
In addition, this review reveals a common approach to model development - with the
exception of the agent-based model developed to study the illegal introduction of meat
products (Hartnett et al., 2007). All models follow a top-down approach to model
development. This is the approach conventionally used to develop risk models
(Dangerfield and Morris, 1992), including those applied to study EAD transmission
(Vose, 2008; Defra, 2011c; Murray, 2002). However, this approach limits the models
capacity to develop insight on system behaviour. In conventional “top-down
approaches, end-point consequences are postulated and then the mechanisms by which
these states may be reached are considered” (Freeze et al., 2005). This means that this
approach to model development depends on a prior understanding of the system’s
behaviour. Therefore, a limited understanding of its behaviour influences the quality of
the outputs produced.
Limited understanding of system behaviour influences both expert-based and scenario-
based models. Expert-based qualitative models rely on the expert’s preconceptions of
system behaviour to develop the rankings produced (Defra, 2011c). Therefore, these
models are unable to produce new insight on system behaviour. Scenario-based
assessments “adopt certain characteristics of event tree analysis, but systematically
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limit the number of (...) combinations” (Freeze et al., 2005). This means selecting a
fraction of the pathways available in pathways system (Vose, 2008; Murray, 2002),
narrowing the focus of the assessments and thus failing to ensure a comprehensive
analysis of the system. Furthermore, the risk assessor selects which pathways of
exposure to consider prior to the assessment (Vose, 2008; Murray, 2002), suggesting
that preconceptions of system behaviour influence pathway selection and the output
produced. Consequentially, models developed by a top-down approach are limited from
the start in their capacity to generate new insights on system behaviour and to inform
strategies to reduce vulnerability to EAD.
The collective review of IRA and CDA reveals that the predictive models used to study
the pre-outbreak and post-outbreak phases were destined to fail at the task of generating
new insights on system behaviour. The scope of these assessments is inadequate to
develop that insight and the model development approach limits the capacity to generate
new insights on system behaviour.
2.5 The collective insight of predictive models on system behaviour
Taylor (2003) and Peeler et al. (2006) suggest it is possible to overcome the individual
limitations of the analysis produced by expert-based and scenario-based assessments.
The solution relies on the collective insight produced by the predictive models.
Therefore, combining the global perspective of expert-based models and the local
perspective of scenario-based models, one can produce a comprehensive analysis of the
system (Taylor, 2003; Peeler et al., 2006).
This approach assumes that the insights gained through the application of expert-based
and scenario-based models are complementary. Therefore this approach is defined here
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as the “complementary approach” to produce comprehensive analysis of a system. It
entails expert-based assessments to screen the system at a global level and define
priorities that need addressing. The scenario-based assessments investigate those
priorities, generating knowledge at a local level. This second assessment tier increases
the level of detail gained regarding the influential pathways of exposure (Taylor, 2003;
Peeler et al., 2006). Thus, applying the complementary approach to the pre-outbreak
and post-outbreak phases may expose the source-pathway-receptor relationship,
however scenario-based assessments study only the most influential pathways of
exposure.
For the IRA and CDA analysed in the review we can state that complementary approach
is not applicable for the post-outbreak phase, as the scenario-based model predates the
expert-based ones. Therefore, these models fall outside the paradigm of the
complementary approach. In contrast, it is applicable to the pre-outbreak phase.
The complementary approach merits consideration as it states a logical sequence of
analysis that can provide for a deeper understanding of the system behaviour and its
vulnerabilities. However, the approach presents flaws in its logic (Zio, 2009), which
result from the top-down approach used to develop the predictive models. The
approach supports its argument on the capacity of expert based assessment to provide an
accurate analysis of the high-level priorities at a global level. Thus, it assumes that the
available knowledge and expert’s opinions are sufficient to provide a correct analysis of
system behaviour. However, if this is not the case, and expert-based models fail to
develop an accurate assessment, then the priorities developed may not reflect those of
the system. As a result, analyses of the system based on such an approach may
overlook important risk factors of disease transmission or highlight less influential ones.
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The misleading priorities trickled down when used to define the scope of scenario-based
models, thus overlooking the pathways of exposure associated with those overlooked
risk factors. As result, the complementary approach can produce incomplete or
inaccurate insights on system behaviour and priorities.
The complementary approach suggests that the individual limitation of the expert-based
and scenario-based models can be overcome by using their collective knowledge to
inform on system behaviour (Taylor, 2003; Peeler et al., 2006). However, the flaws in
logic presented above allow for the argument that as source of information, it may not
be reliable with a significant risk of producing misleading results. Thus, priorities
defined using this approach may overlook significant activities and controls where
improvement can significantly reduce UK’s vulnerability to EAD.
This review of predictive model states that their use to overcome the limitations of the
available data has not been entirely successful. IRA and CDA, used individually or
combined produced incomplete analysis of the system and do not allow to identify, with
authority, vulnerabilities in the system. Thus, uncertainty regarding the system
behaviour during the pre-outbreak and post-outbreak phases of an EAD outbreak
remains (Section 2.1.2).
2.6 Research opportunities associated with the pre-outbreak and post-
outbreak phases
This review of the documents associated with the pre-outbreak and post-outbreak
phases reveals an insufficient volume of information to produce insight on system
behaviour. It results from the limited information developed through the analysis of
past outbreaks (Section 2.1.2) and the production of predictive models that are
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inadequate to produce a comprehensive understanding of the system and its behaviour
(Sections 2.4 and 2.5). Consequentially, there are knowledge gaps in the understanding
of the mechanisms responsible for exposure associated with both pre-outbreak (pre t0)
and post-outbreak (post t2) phases.
For the pre-outbreak (pre t0) phase, the information available is insufficient to detect and
identify all available pathways of exposure. For example, the risk pathways and
countermeasures report, prepared by Defra (2011a) reveals the concerns regarding a
particular type of pathways. Defra suggest investigating the “risks from low/medium
probability risk pathways (...) to identify and assess potential high impact scenarios (if
a sequence of low probability events occur), taking into account current levels of risk
management”. These sequences of low probability events (LPE) present an unknown
level of threat, although such pathways have been suggested as a possible cause for past
EAD outbreak in the UK (Gibbens et al., 2000; Sharpe et al., 2001; Defra, 2007c;
Scudamore, 2002). Thus, these expose a gap in the understanding of the system and its
behaviour.
For the post-outbreak (post t2) phase, the information available is insufficient to
evaluate all release sources associated with carcass disposal activities. The data
published on the risk of EAD transmission associated with the disposal of carcasses
fails to address the influence of activities performed prior to carcass processing on the
overall risk of exposure posed to humans and livestock, e.g. culling on farm and
transporting of carcasses to the disposal site, and on solutions to minimise that
exposure. However, a report on the environmental impact of the 2001 FMD crises,
identifies 3 of the 4 class four incidents to be associated with activities performed on
farm (Environment Agency, 2001). Thus, the lack of information associated with such
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carcass disposal activities exposes a gap in the understanding of the system and its
behaviour.
2.7 Furthering understanding of system behaviour for an outbreak
Efficient decision-making depends on the quality and quantity of the information
available (OIE, 2011c). These information gaps present a discrepancy on the insights to
systemic behaviour across the three outbreak phases. Therefore, it is logical to conclude
that decision making for policy interventions associated with the outbreak phase (t0, t2)
is privileged in comparison to the remaining two phases. This highlights the need to
strengthen the current level of information associated with EAD transmission in the pre-
outbreak (pre t0) and post-outbreak (post t2) phases. Achieving this involves a conjoint
effort to improve documentation on past outbreaks and improving predictive models to
provide comprehensive analyses of the two systems. Efforts to improve the records of
pathways of exposure associated with EAD outbreaks involve a long-term commitment
to detect and record the pathways of introduction in future EAD outbreaks. This
presents the most accurate source of information but it may take time before it proves
fruitful.
Whilst the information available through recording the EAD outbreaks remains
insufficient to inform on system behaviour for the pre-outbreak (pre t0) and post-
outbreak (post t2) phases, systemic predictive models can present an alternative solution
(Section 2.1.3).
Systemic models focus on developing a comprehensive analysis of all pathways of
exposure included in the system. However, they require extensive data to characterise
the behaviour of the components in the system. The conventional source of information
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is the data published on the EAD transmission characteristics and information collected
from past events. For example, disease spread models find support in the data collected
from previous EAD outbreaks to characterise the system components behaviour (Garner
and Beckett, 2005; Donaldson et al., 1982; Kiss et al., 2006). Therefore, the scarcity of
data associated with the pre-outbreak (pre t0) and post-outbreak (post t2) phases can
compromise the development of systemic predictive models. Here, expert knowledge
can provide an alternative source of information (OIE, 2011c). This is an established
source of information, used to generate information on systems where data in the
research literature for characterisation is limited. There are challenges to the
development of an expert-based systemic model associated with managing the experts
and ensuring high quality data, e.g. managing expert biases (Cooke, 1994; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974). However, it does provide the opportunity to develop models that are
based on the most current data therefore, providing the most up to date insights on
system behaviour.
This review describes a need to improve the understanding of disease transmission
during the pre-outbreak (pre t0) and post-outbreak (post t2) phases of an EAD outbreak.
Improvements involve strengthening the information sources currently available to
improve control and reduce UK’s vulnerability to EAD. Future work is likely to require
an improvement in the capacity to record the trajectory and causes of future EAD
outbreaks. This information will provide an accurate portrayal of system behaviour and
of the mechanisms responsible for exposure of livestock to EAD. Currently that
information is not available with sufficient quantity and quality to provide the necessary
insight to support decision-making. Therefore, an immediate solution is in the
development of systemic models. These are predictive models focussing on generating
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comprehensive analyses of the system. Thus, these models may provide insights to
support decision-making that improves protection and reduces UK’s vulnerability to
EAD.
2.8 Conclusions
This review explored the methods by which information is collected and analysed to
support the decision-making process and the development of strategies to control EAD
outbreaks. The review resulted in the acknowledgement that EAD outbreaks
incorporate three phases of disease transmission, with each phase presenting a different
behaviour and posing a different impact associated with EAD exposure (Section 1.2).
Furthermore, each outbreak phase corresponds to specific configuration of the system,
requiring specific information to inform on the causes and impact of exposure. All
phases play an important role in the progression of the EAD outbreak, which highlights
the need to control them. The development of this review demonstrates the following
insights:
1. From the perspective of a policy maker, an EAD outbreak considers three
phases. The outbreak progresses through the pre-outbreak (pre-t0) phase, the
outbreak (t0-t2) phase and the post-outbreak (post-t2) phase. Each phase presents
a unique behaviour in transmission of an EAD. Therefore, specific solutions for
control of EAD transmission are necessary for each phase of an EAD outbreak.
2. The information available to inform on the system behaviour is not consistent
for all phases of an EAD outbreak. The information available to inform
decisions for the pre-outbreak (pre-t0) and post-outbreak (post-t2) phases is
limited. This creates knowledge gaps, as expressed by the LPE for the pre-
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outbreak (pre-t0) phase, and by uncertainty regarding the environmental and
health impact posed by culling activities performed prior to carcass processing
for the post-outbreak (post-t2) phase.
3. Improving the information on the pre-outbreak and post-outbreak phases is
likely to improve the capacity to intervene in these systems, increasing UK’s
overall resilience to EAD outbreaks.
4. Considering the options available to improve the information on the pre-
outbreak (pre-t0) and post-outbreak (post-t2) phases, the immediate solution lies
in the development of systemic models focussing on generating insight on
system behaviour.
5. The data currently available in the research literature are insufficient for the
development and use as input in a systemic model. However, expert knowledge
provides an established source of information that can help overcome the
scarcity of data associated with the pre-outbreak and post-outbreak phases.
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RESEARCH OBJECTIVES3
A review of the research to date shows that examples of systemic approaches to
modelling the transmission of EAD and its exposure to livestock are associated with the
outbreak (t0-t2) phase of an EAD outbreak. The systemic models, by presenting a
comprehensive analysis of the source-pathway-receptor relationship, which develops
information on the mechanism of exposure and system behaviour, present information
to support decisions that aim to optimise EAD control within this outbreak phase. The
review of research to date also demonstrates that there is limited information on the
source-pathway-receptor relationship associated with the pre-outbreak (pre-t0) and the
post-outbreak (post-t2) phases. Furthermore, it reveals that the predictive models
applied to these stages develop partial analysis of the pathways system, resulting in the
failure to identify all drivers of risk associated with these systems. This review suggests
that the development of expert-based systemic models may produce the information
needed to overcome the scarcity of information associated with those two phases that
limits the understanding of system behaviour.
Based on the arguments stated in the literature review, the work developed and
presented in this thesis focuses on the following research objectives:
1. The experimental development of systemic models to study the behaviour and
risk drivers associated with the pre-outbreak (Pre-t0) and post outbreak (Post-t2)
phases. This involves developing, for each stage, a model that considers the
specific source-pathway-receptor relationship, and respecting the rules for
developing systemic models (Section 2.1.4).
2. Identify for the pre-outbreak (pre-t0) and the post-outbreak (post-t2) phases,
system vulnerabilities where intervention is likely to reduce significantly system
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vulnerability to exposure of receptors to an EAD, and provide insights on the
behaviour of the system and how best to improve its resilience.
3. Analyse the performance of the systemic models, based on the outputs produced
in comparison with those produced by the assessments included in literature
review and their capacity to inform on the research opportunities identified.
Figure 3.1 describes the outline of the thesis from Chapter 4 to 11. The work is
presented in the order by which it was undertaken, as opposed to following the normal
development of an outbreak. This resulted in the systemic model developed for the post-
outbreak (Post-t2) phase being presented in Chapter 4 and 5, followed by the pre-
outbreak (Pre-t0) phase, in Chapter 6 to 10, and discussion Chapter 11. Presenting the
work in this order allowed for including in the narrative the lessons learned from a first
application to study exposure associated with carcass disposal activities and their
contribution to improve a second application to study the introduction of EAD into a
disease free country (the UK).
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Figure 3.1 Outline of the thesis
[Key] The figure displays the two planned experiments – post outbreak (post t2 -
green) and pre-outbreak (pre t0 - blue) phase and the discussion (red). The numbers
identify the chapters where each subject is addressed
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PART 1 – SYSTEMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
POST OUTBREAK (POST t2) PHASE
Part 1 addresses the experimental development of an expert based systemic model to
study the environmental release and possible exposure of receptors resulting from the
disposal of animal carcasses during the resolution phase of an EAD outbreak. The
model aims to assess all environment release sources and pathways of exposure
associated with the options available for carcass disposal to the government for
managing the outbreak. This project follows the need expressed by the Defra to
appraise the options available for the disposal of animal carcass to support policy
decisions on EAD outbreaks, specifically to “establish (...) a transparent and logical
methodology, which formed the basis of an effective decision support tool”. The expert-
based systemic model aims to improve the existing understanding on the pathways of
exposure and through it presenting the opportunities for improving protection against
the resurgence of an EAD or harm posed to the human and animal population from the
agents released during disposal activities.
Model development adopts a similar approach to that developed by Pollard et al. (2008)
to study the environmental and receptor exposure to hazardous agent associated with
HAPI infected carcasses (Chapter 4). This systemic model expands the application of
the model to consider a wider range of disposal option and disease agents. This is
followed by an extensive analysis of the output, resulting in the development of a
comprehensive analysis of the system. This experiment includes a second model,
developed to address the analytical limitations identified in the first model (Chapter 5).
The combined output of both models produces a comprehensive analysis of the system,
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generating insight on its behaviour and on the drivers of exposure to EAD. A summary
of the findings produced by the research presented in Part 1 is presented in Section 5.5
Figure 3.2 Part 1 – Systemic analysis of the post outbreak (post t2) phase
[Key] The green boxes display research objectives of the experiment. Numbers display
the chapters
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INTERVENTION STRATEGIES FOR CARCASS4
DISPOSAL – PARETO ANALYSIS OF EXPOSURES
FOR EXOTIC DISEASE OUTBREAKS
Published in Environmental Science and Technology Journal:
Delgado, J., Longhurst, P., Hickman, G. A. W., Gauntlett, D. M., Howson, S. F., Irving,
P., Hart, A. and Pollard, S. J. T. (2010), "Intervention Strategies for Carcass Disposal:
Pareto Analysis of Exposures for Exotic Disease Outbreaks", Environmental science &
technology, vol. 44, no. 12, pp. 4416-4417 - 4425
4.1 Introduction
Increased prevalence of exotic animal disease (e.g., foot and mouth disease, avian
influenza, Newcastle disease, classical swine fever, African swine fever, swine vesicular
disease) is a strategic threat to industrialised and developing countries and their
economies. Most control strategies are based on a ‘stamping out’ policy and involve
culling of affected livestock and the safe disposal of the carcasses. The extent of
carcass disposal operations during outbreaks challenges the waste management
infrastructure of the country concerned, posing risks to animal and public health and to
the environment (Scudamore et al., 2002; Salminen and Rintala, 2002; Arvanitoyannis
and Ladas, 2008). The policy level analysis of these disposal risks (evaluated as
potential exposures to human, animal and environmental health) adopts a generalised,
qualitative tone, in which hazardous agents inherent to carcass disposal are tracked
through a series of unit processes (and associated exposure pathways) to sensitive
receptors, be these animal stock, the public or the wider environment (Figure 4.1). Our
research (Pollard et al., 2008a) has sought to enhance the utility of generalised policy-
level exposure assessments (referred to by Andrews et al. (2005) as (‘macro studies’)
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and, by informing contingency planning, improve the pollution control strategies
employed during outbreaks, thus reducing the environmental, social and economic
burden of these events.
Figure 4.1 Key determinants considered in this generalised exposure assessment for
animal carcasses.
[Key] Interventions may prevent release or intercept secondary pathways to receptors.
Generalised exposure assessment at the policy level cannot evaluate ‘harm’ (receptor
components) in that exposures are not site-specific, nor contextualised locally in time
and space.
We have previously described the policy and international context for our research and
published a methodology for generalised exposure assessment, illustrating it for the
avian influenza virus (Pollard et al., 2008a). Exotic animal disease outbreaks feature as
a key strategic risk within Great Britain (Cabinet Office, 2008), an island nation with a
high population density where carcass disposal occurs in close proximity to
communities within close public and media view. When outbreaks do occur, large
numbers of carcasses require rapid and responsible disposal to avoid the onward
transmission of disease to animals and humans, and to prevent environmental harm.
Given the challenges of managing this in practice, Great Britain has developed a
hierarchy of disposal options that retains some flexibility over the specific choice of
waste processing options. This said, without targeted risk management, social and
economic costs escalate rapidly. The Anderson, (Anderson, 2002) report, for example,
estimates the costs to the UK government alone of the 2001 foot and mouth disease
outbreak to be £3bn, employing 1800 vets and 2000 military personnel at its peak.
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During disposal, the range of hazardous agents requiring active management extends
well beyond the agents of disease to include all hazards associated with a carcass, it’s by
products, and the infrastructure of disposal (detergents, disinfectants, veterinary
medicines, other pathogens, odour and noise). To be cost-effective, risk management
must tackle the most potent hazardous agents, be focused upon exposure pathways that
exhibit the greatest availability to the significant hazards and address susceptible
receptors; being targeted at critical control points (CCPs) where harm reduction can be
most effective (Figure 4.1). Used as part of good contingency planning and a
preventative risk management approach, such an approach can improve the direction of
resources and the quality of management responses on the ground when outbreaks
occur.
Here we present an improved exposure methodology, expand its application to a wider
range of disease agents, and present a Pareto analysis of the critical exposure pathways
for onward control. The revised method addresses some of the practical shortcomings
inherent to eliciting expert knowledge in exposure workshops, especially given that for
policy analysis, quantitative exposure data is frequently not available (risks are not
spatially nor temporally contextualised at this level). Carcass disposal is a multistage
process chain, with elements in common with other multistage processes (e.g. food
manufacture) where opportunities for intervention must be risk-informed. Clear
differences also exist, notably with respect to the open, heterogeneous nature of the
natural environment, compared to the closed, batch or continuous manufacturing
environment of a food processing plant. Nevertheless, the desire to identify risk-critical
exposure pathways is a shared objective so to inform preventative controls.
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4.2 Method
4.2.1 Methodological Developments
A general exposure assessment has been described for high pathogenic avian influenza
virus. It adopts a heuristic assessment of the relative availability of exposure pathways
for each significant hazard using a nominal 1-4 scale. Availability ‘scores’ are
surrogates for the relative likelihood of a significant hazardous agent accessing that
specific exposure pathway. So a ‘score’ of ‘1’ indicates a plausible pathway, but one of
negligible to very low availability; ‘2’ represents a plausible pathway of low
availability; ‘3’ represents a possible pathway for which there is accepted evidence and
medium availability; and ‘4’ represents a probable, direct pathway of high recognised
availability (Pollard et al., 2008a). Though admittedly constrained by this nominal
classification of relative exposure probabilities, the approach supports decision-makers
and presents exposure information in a simple, defensible format, reflecting the
complexity of the problem and richness of the supporting elicited evidence. It has been
successfully used to direct detailed quantified risk assessments towards particular
exposure scenarios on the ground in the heat of an outbreak.
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Figure 4.2 Suite of processes considered for carcass disposal.
[Key] Disposal is envisaged as a multistage process from on-premises collection to the
elimination of residuals (column headings). Individual disposal options (boxed
numbers) adopt individual configurations comprising these stages. Options 1) do
nothing, 2a) on-farm storage and 2b) off farm storage were excluded from the figure as
they do not adopt the five step disposal. The figure considers the following disposal
options chain 3) on-farm burial; 4a) on-farm pyres; 6a) windrow composting on
premises; 8a) on–farm in-vessel composting; 4b) off farm mass pyres; 5) mass
burial/inert controlled landfill; 6b) windrow composting off-premises; 9) air-
curtain/mobile incinerators; 7) non-hazardous/hazardous controlled landfill; 8b) off-
farm, biogas/anaerobic digestor/in-vessel composting; 10) pressurised or atmospheric
rendering or alkaline hydrolysis; 11) gasification and pyrolysis, licensed controlled
incinerators
The revised methodology was developed using an expert workshop held at Cranfield
University, in January, 2008. The workshop considered a fuller range of notifiable
exotic animal diseases (the original approach was limited to avian influenza), including
foot and mouth disease (FMD), classical swine fever (CSF) and Newcastle disease, and
incorporated some methodological improvements. Technical domain specialists (e.g.
veterinary specialists, public health experts, environmental exposure assessors, waste
technologists, hydrogeologist, air quality experts) were assembled from Defra, the
On premises Transport Reception ofcarcasses
Processing of
carcasses
Elimination
of Residuals
4b 4b 4b 4b
5 5
7 7
8b 8b 8b
3
6a
8a
4b,5,6b,7,8b
,9,10,11
3, 4a, 6a, 8a 3, 4a, 6a, 8a
6b, 9
9 9
6b
C
ul
lin
g
4a
5, 6b, 7, 8b
9, 10, 11
4a
3, 4a
8a
6a
6a,8a
3
6b
10,11
11
1010
11
On Farm
Disposal
Off Farm
Disposal
80
Animal Health Agency, the Environment Agency, the Scottish Environment Protection
Agency and the Health Protection Agency, alongside the research team. The research
agenda within the workshop was concerned with: (i) improving the record of decision
on the hazard screening exercise for various diseases; (ii) distinguishing between
impacts for animal health, public health and the environment; (iii) collating waste
technologies into categories that allowed greater consistency of treatment in the
exposure assessment (Figure 4.2), which is an extensive combinatorial exercise; and (iv)
reviewing the metrics of the exposure assessment with a view to improving the utility of
the data for contingency planning.
The workshop structure uses a sequence of expert elicitations. Expert knowledge on the
likelihood of exposure for the significant agents along individual process chains was
secured and presented within the workshop for a critical comparison of each process
chain (Figure 4.2). Quality checking of all pathway scores was undertaken for the
common stages of each pathway (Figure 4.2), and then for the total pathway score; first
by the experts within the workshop and then independently off line in order to check
consistency within and between process chains. Using this approach, experts contribute
individual domain expertise and also to a collective view for each disposal pathway,
with an independent ‘arm’s length’ quality audit being completed shortly after the
workshop. A full hazard screen for significant hazards (Table 4.1) and initial exposure
assessment was completed on 14th-15th January 2008. Subsequently, a sub-group met
to finalise the exposure assessment and recommend improvements to the presentation of
the exposure metrics which were held in an Excel™ spreadsheet. The quality audit was
undertaken on the metrics (February 2008) by members independent to the research
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team. Recommendations from this audit were implemented and a final exposure
assessment prepared that:
 modified the hazardous agents list in order to comprise a wider set of etiological
agents, including avian influenza (control against initial methodology),
Newcastle disease (poultry), (foot and mouth disease (cattle, pigs, sheep),
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (cattle), scrapie (sheep), swine vesicular
disease and African and classical swine fever (pigs);
 specified which receptor (animal health, public health, the environment) the
hazard was likely to present significant concern to, redefining animal health
impacts as solely for domestic and livestock animals (Table 4.1);
 specified for which receptor exposure was most likely to be of concern; and
 formally captured qualifying comments from the expert group (Table 4.1).
Having identified the significant hazards of carcass disposal, the methodology does not
attempt to distinguish further between the toxicological/pathogenic potencies of those
hazards deemed by experts to be significant (Table 4.1), though the relevance of the
potential harm posed to animal health, public health or the environment was considered
by reference to the availability of the pathway to these receptors.
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Biological agents
Foot and mouth disease Y A) Y Y
Classical swine fever Y A) Y Y
Newcastle disease virus Y A) Y Y
Salmonella spp. Y A/H) Y
Y
A/H
)
Present in UK pigs, cattle and sheep. Prevalence falling in
recent years but still an important pathogen. Control of
salmonella strains in poultry very good)
Bioaerosols actinomycetes, aspergillus
spp.) Y Y Y
Influenza H5, H7) Y A/H) Y Y High mortality zoonoses with poor penetration
Influenza other A strains) Y A/H) Y Y Generally low mortality / morbidity in humans
Campylobacter spp Y A/H) Y Y Prevalent pathogen; several pathways, low dose exposurecauses disease in animals and humans
Coxiella burnetii Q-fever) Y A/H) Y Y H) Recently recognised zoonotic potential. Association withslaughter and disposal.
African swine fever Y A) Y Y
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy prion Y A/H) Y Y E) Assume controls are in place; treated as a chemical duringBSE 1996-2001, hence environmental relevance
Cryptosporidium spp. Y A/H) Y Y Often of limited morbidity
Scrapie Y A)
Y
A
)
Y E) Assume current controls are in place
Swine vesicular disease Y A) Y Y
Chemical agents
Ammonia, ammoniacal nitrogen and
nitrates Y Y Y
Present naturally and in high strength leachate from decaying
carcasses. Significant potential impact on water bodies,
especially ground waters.
Detergents phosphates, LAS) Y Y Y From cleansing and disinfection - potential impact on aquaticenvironment through percolation/runoff.
Disinfectants formaldehyde, phenols,
hypochlorite, peroxide, QAS-salts, FAM30,
Virkon S)
Y Y Y
Used routinely on poultry units for biosecurity, but in the
event of an outbreak of avian influenza usage will increase.
Carcasses will be sprayed with disinfectant prior to disposal.
Most disinfectants contain listed priority substances and
should not be discharged to controlled waters.
Biochemical oxygen demand BOD) Y Y Y
Veterinary medicines in carcase; e.g.
pesticides, antibacterials, coccidiostats,
barbiturates)
Y Y Y
If poultry are killed before they would normally have been,
there is a possibility that veterinary products may be present
in the body at elevated levels within the normal withdrawal
period). If killing is by lethal injection there may be
barbiturates present – potential impact on the environment
Methane Y Y Y
NOx Y E) Y Y Derogation of local air quality
Particulates Y Y Y Amenity and public health impact on local communities
Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons Y E) Y Y
SOx Y E) Y Y Derogation of local air quality
Kerosene and other accelerants e.g.
Feedol) Y E) Y Y
Breakdown products e.g. pesticide
residues, metabolites)
Y
A/H/E) Y Y
Heavy metals Pb, As) Y Y Y
Dissolved organic carbon, total organic
carbon Y Y Y
Extreme of pH Y Y Y Mostly from use of disinfectants
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Table 4.1 Table of hazards and process of hazard screening used by experts to selection
4.2.2 Exposure Assessment and Pareto Analysis
The processing of large numbers of elicited pathway availabilities for multiple agents
and associated hazards may introduce inconsistencies in expert views as they apply their
domain knowledge between similar unit processes for each disease. In short, the task of
processing multiple combinations of hazardous agents and exposure pathways for
human, animal and environmental receptors becomes highly complex for participants
because of the large number of combinations involved. Improvements were made to the
exposure assessment methodology for ease of data processing and visual of the key
drivers of exposure within the spreadsheet: (i) the introduction of a benchmarked ‘base
case’ for each process chain against which each process could be evaluated; (ii)
restructuring the model to collate each of the disposal options and present them as a
single worksheet, allowing pathways (Table 4.2) to be directly compared, securing a
greater level of consistency; (iii) presentation of individual pathway scores within the
model to allow a direct comparison of the exposure metrics for each disposal route.
Benzene, toluene, ethylbenzenes, xylenes Y Y Y Combustion by-products – potential impact on air quality.
Wood resins and chemicals in wood
preservatives e.g. PCP, CCA) Y Y Y
Poor combustion could release hazards – impact on air
quality and ash quality.
Dioxins, furans, PCBs Y Y Y
Insecticides permethrins,
organophosphates) Y Y Y
Amenity, nuisance impacts
Odour Y Y Y Amenity and public health impact on local communities
Noise Y Y Y Amenity and public health impact on local communities
Derived products litters, slurry, manures) Y Y Y High BOD
Milk / treated milk Y Y Y High BOD
Smoke Y Y Y Amenity and public health impact on local communities
Ash Y Y Y Public nuisance effects and TSEs if low temperature
Waste treatment / wastewater treatment
residues e.g. alkaline hydrolysis residues;
sludges; residual farm shop wastes)
Y E) Y Y Even with controls in place concerns regarding wasteresidues
Organic fertiliser and soil improvers Y E) Y Y
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Table 4.2 Full suite of exposure pathways considered
Effective risk management infers the capacity to intervene at critical control points, thus
using resources wisely for targeted optimal risk reduction. Here we evaluated pathways
Pathways Abbreviation
Deposition onto crops &
consumption
AG dep crop cons
Direct contact AG dirc cont
Ingestion AG ing
Inhalation AG inh
Noise (nuisance) Noise
Odour (nuisance) Odor
Smoke (nuisance) Smoke
Wild animal consumption AG wild cons
Wild animals (spread) AG wild sprd
Consumption of animals SW anim cons
Crop irrigation & consumption SW crop irr
Direct contact SW dirc cont
Fish or shellfish consumption SW Shellfish
Ingestion of water SW ing
Inhalation SW inh
Inhalation of irrigation water SW inh wtr
Leaching from SW to GW SW to GW
Consumption of animals (Private) GW anim cons (p)
Crop irrigation & consumption
(Private)
GW crop irr (p)
Direct contact (Private) GW dirc cont (p)
Fish or shellfish consumption
(Private)
GW shellfish (p)
Ingestion of water (Private) GW ing (p)
Inhalation (Private) GW inh (p)
Inhalation of irrigation water
(Private)
GW inh wtr (p)
Consumption of animals GW anim cons
Crop irrigation & consumption GW crop irr
Direct contact GW dirc cont
Fish or shellfish consumption GW shellfish
Ingestion of water GW ing
Inhalation GW inh
Inhalation of irrigation water GW inh wtr
Consumption of animals GS anim cons
Crop irrigation & consumption GS crop irr
Direct contact GS dirc cont
Fish or shellfish consumption GS Shellfish
Ingestion of water GS ing
Inhalation GS inh
Inhalation of irrigation water GS inh wtr
ABOVEGROUND
SURFACE-WATER
GROUNDWATER
GROUND TO
SURFACE-WATER
Medium
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contributing most to the overall exposure using a Pareto analysis (Craft and Leake,
2002). The approach has been described in the management literature by Frakes and
Fox (1996), Fox et al. (2010) and Omachonu and Ross (2004), and exemplified for
multi-barrier systems comprising multiple unit processes within the food industry by
Arvanitoyannis and Savelides, (2007). By convention Pareto charts consist of
histograms, the lengths of which are proportional to the arithmetic mean exposure (y
axis), organised from left to right from highest to smallest contribution (x-axis). The
right hand y axis represents the cumulative contribution to overall exposure. Consistent
with the Pareto principle, a nominal threshold value was set at 80% (black vertical line),
where the group of pathways to the left of the line is responsible, in aggregate, for 80%
of the exposure pathway availability, as ranked by workshop experts.
4.3 Results and discussion
4.3.1 Analysis
Table 4.1 presents the list of significant hazards identified by the expert workshop.
Figure 4.2 provides a map of the unit processes, many of which are common for the
range of disposal options considered. Table 4.2 presents the full set of exposure
pathways considered in this analysis across all disposal options and unit processes.
Using exposure pathway ‘availabilities’ elicited in the expert workshop, a set of a
Pareto charts were constructed for each of the processes represented in Figure 4.2
(numbered) by reference to the distribution of exposures at each of the 5 stages (Figure
4.3), and then by the individual exposure pathways associated with each of the 5 stages
of carcass disposal (Figure 4.4). This allows screening and prioritise to be applied at
two different levels: (i) at the process chain level, prioritising process chains according
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to the potential risk of exposure, and identifying critical control points for managing
exposures along the process chain; and (ii) of key exposure routes within each process
step, allowing pathways to be considered irrespective of disposal route.
Figure 4.3 Screening and prioritising carcass disposal steps, independently of process
category
[Key] Process categories are 3) on-farm burial; 4a) on-farm pyres; 6a) windrow
composting on premises; 8a) on–farm in-vessel composting; 4b) off farm mass pyres; 5)
mass burial/inert controlled landfill; 6b) windrow composting off-premises; 9) air-
curtain/mobile incinerators; 7) non-hazardous/hazardous controlled landfill; 8b) off-
farm, biogas/anaerobic digestor/in-vessel composting; 10) pressurised or atmospheric
rendering or alkaline hydrolysis; 11) gasification and pyrolysis, licensed controlled
incinerators
Consider Figure 4.3 summarising those processing stages contributing most to exposure
across the full set of carcass disposal options. The waste processing of carcasses using
on-farm pyres option 4b) presents the greatest potential for exposure, followed by the
collection of carcasses on farm for onward burial or pyre disposal. This approach
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represents a conceptual move towards a modular, ‘object-oriented’ approach to the
exposure assessment. Here, 80% of the total availability of onward exposures to
human, animal or environmental receptors is represented by the 16 processes including
and above Process 7 in Figure 4.3; being dominated by on-farm collection and carcass
processing, demonstrating the necessity of effective controls during the early stages of
culling and waste processing.
Next consider Figure 4(a) to (e) which, in concert, allows a visual comparison of the
importance of all those exposures represented in Table 2 across each stage of disposal in
turn (Figure 2) for the disposal option of mass pyres (option 4b). Ground- and surface
water exposure pathways dominate on premises, with noise and odour nuisance
prevalent for mass pyres, consistent with the experience that contamination can have
origins in multiple sources in the early stages of disposal (Ritter, 1995; Environment
Agency, 2001; Cumby et al. 2004). These pathways are candidates for control and map
across to experiences during outbreak management. By illustration, among the specific
environmental impacts reported part-way through the 2001 foot and mouth disease
outbreak requiring effective management (Environment Agency, 2001a, b), were (i) a
large number (ca. 200) of reported water pollution incidents from the surface run-off of
blood and carcass fluids early on in the crisis, when culling rates outstripped disposal
capacity; though few of these resulted in significant water pollution (ca. only 3 high
category pollution incidents from slurry spill and disinfectant run-off); (ii) the
generation of large quantities of ash from constructed animal pyres (typically 15 tonne
ash per 300 t pyre) required onward containment and disposal; (iii) localised, short-term
decreases in local air quality during pyre burning (Lowles et al., 2002; Department of
Health, 2001).
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Contrast this analysis with the Pareto charts prepared for fixed plant thermal treatment
options evaluated in concert as gasification, pyrolysis and licensed controlled
incinerators (Figure 4.5a) to e)). The exposures generated whilst carcasses are gathered
on premises remain with a reduction in exposure in the later stages of disposal
compared to the mass pyre option, e.g. reception and processing of carcasses and
elimination of residuals, can be observed. In the UK, waste incineration installations
must operate within standards required by the waste incinerator directive (Defra,
2009c). The WID sets benchmark criteria for reception and processing of waste and
through the landfill directive the elimination of residuals. The tougher controls imply
that “incineration plants” present a higher level of technical sophistication and
protection (Defra, 2009b). Despite this, aboveground exposure pathways, smoke and
noise are worthy of consideration.
4.3.1 Communicating Risk and Designing Interventions with Policy
Experts.
This work represents the next stage in the chronological development of methods used
to communicate the extent and significance of exposures during carcass disposal. The
visual of conceptual models of exposure and of summary data for policy level decisions
are critical if compelling arguments for policy improvements are to be justified. Early
communications (2001) adopted qualitative reasoning and summary schematics to
compare the waste technologies used for carcass disposal. Rapid qualitative risk
assessment, backed up by selective quantitative background studies on air pollution, for
example, was used to compare the number of exposure pathways associated with
specific disposal options (DH, 2001); Figure 4.6; the number of pathways acting as a
surrogate for the extent of public and environmental risks. Since (Pollard et al., 2008a),
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we have move beyond a discussion of waste technology in isolation and have
considered the full process chain of disposal, ranking the relative availability of
exposure pathways, and allowing a qualitative comparison of the distribution of
exposure for hazards associated with avian influenza from farm through to the disposal
of residuals (Pollard et al., 2008a). Here, we now offer an object-oriented approach that
seeks to present, semi-quantitatively, the distribution and contribution of exposures both
across the process chain and by environmental pathway irrespective of the unit process,
so allowing environmental regulators to focus on specific environmental receptors
during an outbreak. We also extend the analysis to a broader suite of exotic diseases.
The Pareto charts demonstrate the level of exposure associated with each stage of
disposal (Figure 4.3) and with specific pathways considered for each stage (Figure 4.4
and 4.5). Thus the charts assist in the synthesis of these generalised, policy-level
exposure assessments and acts as an important communication tool for policy makers,
allowing for the comparison between the level of exposure expected between discrete
waste processing options, but importantly, also along the length of disposal chains
(Figure 4.2). Qualitative comparisons can, for example, be observed between exposures
associated with collection on premises / transport and active carcass processing /
residuals management (Figure 4.4 and 4.5). By making the distribution of exposure
availabilities visible, we bring an improved level of understanding on exposure across
the process chain to the debate, allowing policy officials to direct risk management
efforts accordingly and communicate a rationale for intervention priorities. Of course,
decision-makers must integrate the analytical insights that exercises such as this
generate within the context of UK, European Union and International standards and
norms. The relationship between analysts and decision-makers and the associated
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challenges of risk-informed policy design and delivery are well characterised (Sawicki
and Craig, 1996; Andrews, 2002). This said, these analysis offers a firm, evidence
based assessment of the disposal options required in a modern policy and regulatory
environment. The principal policy benefit from this work has been in operationalizing
Defra’s contingency plans during outbreaks. Whilst these are published and regularly
reviewed, the majority of stakeholders and interested parties read them only in the event
of an outbreak when it impacts on their own operational activities. Defra has used this
research to support its stated position that the risks to human health, animal health and
the environment from our chosen disposal routes are minimal. This research has
provided an evidence base to support a single disposal hierarchy in Defra’s published
plans. Without this, it would have been difficult to state, with any authority, whether
existing controls were adequate. Defra is now considering extending the principles and
practice communicated in this work to the development of a framework for assessing
the risks of carcass disposal for new and emerging diseases. Defra believes the research
also has relevance to the evaluation of other putrescible wastes that may need to be
disposed; such as, for instance, during a terrorist attack or accidental discharge in a
chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) incident. The research clearly
highlights the large number of high risk pathways during the initial phases of carcass
disposal and during the collection and loading of carcasses on farm. This has resulted
in a review of operational guidance and modifications to the guidance on selection of
culling sites, rapid removal of carcasses, containment of wash water and the loading of
carcasses into leak-tested trucks. Defra has also used this research to develop a 'landfill
protocol' for the disposal of carcasses in permitted landfill sites.
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Figure 4.4 Pareto charts (for illustration) of the mass pyre disposal chain.
[Key] Five charts are displayed, one for each step, presented top-down: a) on premises;
b) transport; c) reception of carcasses; d) processing of carcasses; and e) elimination of
residuals. The horizontal axis presents the abbreviated reference for each of the
pathways (see Table 4.2).
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Figure 4.5 Pareto charts for illustration) of the controlled incineration disposal chain
[Key] Five charts are displayed, one for each step, presented top-down: a) on premises;
b) transport; c) reception of carcasses; d) processing of carcasses; and e) elimination of
residuals. The horizontal axis presents the abbreviated reference for each of the
pathways (see Table 4.2).
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These implementation benefits are encouraging. The tools developed in this research
embody well recognised limitations and are but one way of communicating multiple
contributions to exposure in a complex decision environment. Our selection has been
made by reference to various alternative tools, some of which have been discarded on
the basis that either they were not appropriate for the study context and/or because the
data produced during the elicitation workshop was not of the relevant format for correct
application of the tool. These, other options, for reference, include the consideration of
so-called Ishikawa (fishbone) diagrams, which emerged from the discipline of
production management, adopted as quality control tools within the manufacturing
sector (Francisco, 1991; Richard, 2007). However, they are perhaps best suited to
closed engineered systems where defined product lines, process flow sheets and
pathways are characterised by materials flow in formalised product lines or via
contained (e.g. piped) infrastructure. Here, rather, we were concerned with the release
of hazardous chemical and biological agents at process points within an open
heterogeneous system (the environment) and in assessing multiple exposures to a range
of receptors along a process chain interacting with the wider environment. In this study,
the distribution of opportunities for exposures of differing probability (Figure 4.6) is
critical hence the selection of the Pareto chart. In closed systems by contrast, as
(Arvanitoyannis and Savelides, 2007) displays for food manufacture and the
contamination events that might spoil food products, there is the potential to adopt both
tools in a single study. With concerns about the methodological biases inherent to the
use of risk tools designed for closed systems being applied to open environmental
systems, we discarded application of fault and event tress in this particular case,
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although others have adopted these, say for BSE prion exposures via environmental
pathways (Comer et al., 1998).
Figure 4.6 Contribution of multiple sources of hazards, pathways and receptors to an
exposure pool for onward Pareto analysis
[Key] The picture describes the generic carcass disposal chain, where the ♯ symbol 
describes the same suit of pathways for all stages of disposal (Table 4.2).
In our study, 38 exposure pathways (Table 4.2) had to be assessed for each of 35
disposal steps defined (Figure 4.2); this requiring the assessment of more than 1300
pathways of exposure. Even with a nominal ranking approach, workshop facilitators
needed to work to ensure that expert fatigue from processing the sheer number of
combinations did not influence negatively the quality of the results. With these choices
made and as configured, the format of the output does not yet allow analysts to: i) infer
the importance of one individual hazardous agent above another; ii) identify the source
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of the hazardous agent; iii) evaluate the harm to human receptors, animals or the
surrounding environment. These are requirements of site-specific risk analysis in the
operational setting that can be informed by high level analysis but not determined at this
macro-level.
Notwithstanding this critique, the limitations and the availability of other tools that
might also be applied to communicate these messages, we believe this to be the first
application of Pareto analysis to generalised policy-level exposure assessments. We
reassert the view that risks to receptors during carcass disposal activities are not
confined to the waste processing of animal carcasses in isolation, but rather present
from farm until ultimate disposal of residuals. Pareto analyses can be used to prioritise
exposure pathways according to their contribution to the overall exposure potential
across the disposal chain (Figure 4.6) and can assist in communicating the complexity
of a multi-attribute problem to decision-makers. Adopting an object-oriented approach
allows efficiencies to be secured in both the analysis itself and in the design of risk
management measures that have common features irrespective of the waste processing
option. Measures that address priority pathways during disposal are likely to be most
effective when a range of disposal strategies is applied from a hierarchy of options
which is a necessity in Great Britain given the structure of the waste management
sector, the legislative constraints on certain options and the intense and close public and
media scrutiny that accompanies disease outbreaks. These are important considerations
for national policy makers and international organs seeking to develop guidance on the
processing of animal carcasses (International Organization for Standards, 2010).
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MODELLING THE ENVIRONMENTAL RELEASE AND5
EXPOSURE OF HAZARDOUS AGENTS RESULTING
FROM CARCASS DISPOSAL ACTIVITIES
5.1 Introduction
Globalisation and the intensification of trade have heightened the vulnerability of
developed countries to exotic animal diseases (Otte et al., 2004). As a result, it is
estimated that developed countries are no more protected today than they were two
decades ago from the threat of an exotic animal disease outbreak (EFSA, 2006). The
damaging social and economic impacts of these outbreaks are the reason to ensure
preparedness against such events (Anderson, 2002; Scudamore et al., 2002; Morgan and
Prakash, 2006). The UK could adopt a stamping out policy to accelerate the process of
disease eradication, thus minimising the duration of trade restrictions (Otte et al., 2004;
Scoones and Wolmer, 2006). Stamping out policies involve culling all infected animals
as well as dangerous contacts alongside the disposal of animal carcasses (Scudamore et
al., 2002; Defra, 2009b; Defra, 2007b). This can lead to the destruction of millions of
carcasses and release of harmful products to the environment (Defra, 2011b; EA, 2001;
Marsland et al., 2003; Lowles et al., 2002). In practice governments accept
responsibility for coordinating the disposal activities to minimise environmental and
health impacts (Otte et al., 2004; WHO/FAO/OIE, 2004).
Delgado et al. (2010) developed a model to study a wide range of carcass disposal
options and identify the release and exposure pathways of greatest concern for each,
thus informing policy development and consideration of mitigation measures. As with
all elicitation models, there was a trade-off between the resources available for
elicitation and modelling detail that could be achieved. The model used a semi-
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quantitative template to enable a quick elicitation process. However, at the expense of a
detailed output, resulting in that the model does not specify the hazards released and
those exposed by each pathway. This chapter presents a model that compliments this
output by specifying the hazards exposed for each individual pathway. This represents
an exploratory exercise to identify the hazardous agents that pose a risk of
environmental contamination and disease transmission. The model aims to overcome
information gaps left by the previous assessment which challenge the interpretation of
the results (Chapter 4) (Delgado et al., 2010). A failure to capture the expert rationale
and assumptions used to assess exposure generated these gaps. These omissions include
failures to specify the activities considered for each stage of disposal, the hazardous
agents released by those activities and the hazards considered for the evaluation of each
individual pathway. The additional information produced by this model adds context to
the semi-quantitative score previously produced. Risk contextualisation enables the
development of hazard specific risk management solution as opposed to generic ones
addressing any one hazard included in the hazard list.
5.2 Method
The process of development was designed to ensure synergy between the outputs
produced from this model and the work performed in Chapter 4 (Delgado et al., 2010).
Thus ensuring accessible and complete information is presented to a decision making
body. The model presented here adopts the same object oriented framework, however
using a different modelling approach to study the fate of the individual hazards. Here
the approach diverges from the conventional methods of developing expert based
qualitative models (OIE, 2011c; Pollard et al., 2008a; DH, 2001) and instead applies a
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hybrid model, using expert judgement and computer based modelling. Conventional
qualitative approaches require an extensive amount of input data. This increases the
costs and time necessary to complete the elicitation exercises and can overburden
experts thus compromising the quality of the data due to tiredness (O'Hagan, 1998;
Liou, 1992). Instead, this model reduces expert involvement to a minimum, whilst
respecting the objectives and framework of the original assessment. This was achieved
through the association of expert knowledge with object oriented computer
programming, where experts were used to verify the hazards profiles, instead of
assessing each individual pathway.
5.2.1 Summary review of Delgado’s model
This section presents a summary of the framework presented in Chapter 4 (Delgado et
al., 2010), to explain the selection of the model and the output format adopted here. The
framework applied uses basic building blocks, as follows:
 The assessment studied 27 disposal options, with each option containing 5
disposal stages (Figure 4.6). Similar stages were aggregated to reduce the
number assessed from over 100 to 35 (Figure 4.2).
 The same 28 release and exposure pathways were assessed for each disposal
stage (Table 4.2).
 A list of hazardous agents was considered when assessing the each pathway for
potential release and exposure to receptors (Table 4.1).
Results were presented at two levels:
 First level output - ranks the disposal stages considered for each option (Figure
4.3).
100
 Second level output – ranks the pathways for each disposal stage (Figure 4.4 and
Figure 4.5).
5.2.2 The model and previous work
The main challenge for modelling the environmental fate of hazardous agents arises
from the diversity of agents considered. Chemical, biochemical and biological agents,
behave differently when released into the environment or in contact with receptors,
Table 5.1. To accommodate these differences in hazardous agent behaviour, the model
adopts a qualitative template that is associated to the computer model. All models
including those that are computer based are simplifications of complex realities. This is
defined as abstraction, which delivers control to the assessor to tailor programmes
according to the output needs and/or available data (Frantz, 1995). The computer model
replaced complex expert judgments characterising the fate of multiple agents.
Consequentially, it facilitated moving away from a demanding and generic elicitation
process to one that focuses on a small number of specific hazard variables. By
focussing solely on a qualitative character of the hazardous agents and environmental
releases, instead of assessing each pathway individually, it simplified and reduced the
quantity of input data necessary.
Smart application of information allows for quicker and less costly assessments.
Similarly, managing the model’s output was an important step to control input data.
Since this model compliments existing results, it focuses solely on the identification,
e.g. presence/absence, of hazards at the end of each pathway. This approach allows us
to exclude more comprehensive models that require further detailed data, such as
multimedia or mechanistic models (Vose, 2008; Mackay et al., 2001).
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5.2.3 Computer Modelling
Developing a computer model requires a clear and unambiguous description of the
problem. The OIE guidelines were followed when describing the system (OIE, 2011c;
Stirling and Scoones, 2009). The framework is described under the following terms: i).
The Environment refers to the state of the environment from the location of hazard
release to the area where harm may be expected. The environment is represented by
pathways of exposure (Table 4.2). ii). The hazards represent harmful substance
released into the environment. iii). The environmental releases describe the activity that
triggers the interaction between the agents, environment and the receptors (Figure 4.6).
The methodological boundaries of the model ensure that the output remains useful and
accurate within the needs of the decision makers. The model was developed with
consideration of the assessments objective and the terms described above.
A pathway represents one scenario of release and exposure of the hazardous agent to
receptors; these are separated in to four groups according to the exposing medium;
above-ground, groundwater, surface-water and ground to surface water pathways, where
the intervention from several factors, such as carrier and vectors are accounted for.
Each media is considered for multiple pathways. These are represented by a series of
filters through which hazards can either overcome or be captured, depending on their
physical/chemical properties. Each pathway is therefore defined by a unique
combination of filters which influence successful exposure to receptors.
The hazards represent the harmful substances released onto the environment. The data
collection focuses on characterising the hazards chemical and/or biological properties,
in relation to the barriers defining the environment. Table 5.1 displays the input data
entered into an Excel TM spreadsheet and contains the information: Column one displays
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the hazards list, where each row represents single hazards or a cluster of hazards. The
table contains a profile of each hazard, according to its physical/chemical properties.
The first nine columns represent the properties associated with each individual or
agglomerate of hazards. From the left to the right the first four columns describe the
capacity to migrate through media, (soil, water, air and resurfacing for an aquifer
groundwater to surface water). The following two columns describe animal
transmission modes: vector or bioaccumulation. The seventh, eighth and ninth columns
represent the exposure to receptors: direct contact, ingestion and inhalation.
The environmental releases resulting from the activities performed within each stage of
disposal are represented by the remaining columns (Table 5.1). Columns from the 10th
to the 14th characterise environmental releases in the disposal chain, considering all five
disposal stages. It was assumed that the same activities are performed in all considered
on-farm stages. Therefore, these share a single profile (tenth column). A similar
assumption was made for the transport and reception stages. Columns twelve and thirty
display the profiles for all considered transport and reception stages respectively. In
contrast, the processing and residual stages present an array of activities associated the
disposal option selected, therefore these are characterised by specific profiles,
displaying different environmental releases. In the input-sheet, these were captured in
the remaining columns.
Data were recorded using a binary system, where (1) represents hazard progression
against the respective barrier (failure to contain) and (0) represents containment of that
hazard containment). The hazards profiles where generated based on the information
gathered for governmental databases regarding chemical and disease agents (OIE,
2011b; ATSDR, 2010; NPI, 2010). Due to the significant influence of qualitative input
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and assumption when developing the disease profiles, experts were used to complete
and verify the input data. Furthermore, uncertainties over success/failure to overcome a
particular barrier were recorded though the introduction of a third class, where (2)
represents an uncertain parameter. This class assumes a worst-case scenario, thus in
doubt the hazard overcomes the barrier. Uncertainty was identified in the output by a
monochromatic (scale grey) in the output frame, Table 5.2 and Table 5.3.
Table 5.1 The input spreadsheet used in the model
[Key] The left column contains the list of hazards considered for the assessment; the
upper row describes the characteristics of the hazardous agents and their
presence/Absence, 1 and 0 respectively, in the considered sources (a third class, 2 is
used to describe a hazard for which information is limited for a characterisation thus it
characterises the hazard as present, however flagging uncertainty in that judgement.
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Environmental release of hazards triggers the interaction between the hazards and the
environment. Successful exposure depends on the characteristics of the hazard being
able to overcome all the barriers considered for the pathways, these are represented as a
succession of open/close or succeed/fail functions.
5.2.4 Process
The model was coded as macros written in Visual Basic for Applications, for use within
Microsoft® Excel (Office’2007). Once the input information is complete, the program
is executed directly through the macros. 35 worksheets are contained in the workbook:
Hazards process: This first sheet documents all available data in literature supporting
the hazardous agent profiles. This is used to justify the assumptions applied for hazard
characteristics, to ensure transparency and allow the model to be updated and revised
(OIE, 2011c; Stirling and Scoones, 2009; Ahl, 1996).
Input: Input data displayed in Table 5.1 is included in this sheet.
Output [1 – 33]: The remaining 33 worksheets display the model output. Figure 4.2
provides a map of the unit processes, many of which are common for the range of
disposal options considered. The output is organised according to the data-computing
sheet (Table 5.1). For each column refereeing to a stage of disposal, e.g. farm,
transport, reception, all process and all residual elimination, present in the table. Each
sheet includes a list of the predefined 28 pathways (Table 5.2 and Table 5.3). These are
represented by their abbreviations on the left column; the key for pathways
abbreviations is available in Table 4.2. Following the abbreviated name is the list of
hazardous agents present at the end of that particular pathway.
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5.2.5 Output
Clear communication of results is a critical requirement if the project is to be successful,
as poor engagement with decision makers can result in misinterpretation or even
dismissal of the results. To better inform risk managers, a broader context of the
decision to be made must be appreciated to convey how uncertainties and weaknesses in
the assessment may influence stakeholder perceptions (Thompson and Bloom, 2000).
The output produced by this model is complementary to that presented in Chapter 4
(Delgado et al., 2010). Therefore, the format of the output reflects the Pareto charts
developed previously to improve communication, complementing for each pathway
assessed an enumeration of the hazards at risk of exposure. Therefore discussion of the
results will include those presented here (Table 5.2 and 5.3) and those presented in
Chapter 4 (Figure 4.4)
5.3 Results and discussion
The results presented in this paper follow the framework and output presented in the
Chapter 4 (Delgado et al., 2010). Therefore, one table, as exemplified by Table 5.2 and
Table 5.3, was produced for each of the 35 Pareto charts representing a disposal stage.
Each disposal stage considers the same list of exposure pathways included in Table 4.2.
The result is a list displaying the hazards present at the end of each exposure pathway in
a particular disposal stage for a specific disposal option. An example of the results is
shown for the disposal option off-farm mass pyres code 4b (in Figure 4.2), with Table
5.2 presenting the on premises stage and Table 5.3 the processing stage.
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Table 5.2 Risk assessment of the on-farm stage for disposal option 4b) off-farm mass pyres
[Key] Each row represents an exposure pathway, abbreviation of the name on the left followed by the hazardous agents released. Uncertainty,
characterised by 2 in Table 5.1, in the results is highlighted (Grey). For the abbreviated reference of each pathway, see Table 4.2.
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Table 5.3 Risk assessment of the processing stage for disposal option 4b) off-farm mass pyre
[Key] Each row represents an exposure pathway, abbreviation of the name on the left followed by the hazardous agents released. Uncertainty,
characterised by 2 in Table 5.1, in the results is highlighted (Grey). For the abbreviated reference of each pathway, see Table 4.2.
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The work developed by Delgado et al. (2010) identifies that off-farm mass pyres are the
disposal option posing the highest risk of environmental contamination. Figure 4.4
displays a Pareto analysis of all five stages of disposal. The riskiest stages of disposal
refer to the on-premises and the processing activities, which are represented in the
Pareto analysis by Figure 4.4 a) and 4.4 d) respectively. These are corresponded by
Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 respectively. For example, in Figure 4.4 a) (Chapter 4) the
highest ranking pathway of exposure is ingestion of groundwater (GW ing - see Table
4.2). Table 5.2 enumerates the hazards that are likely to be exposed by that pathways of
exposure, including hazards, such as ammonia, chlorine heavy metals, Yersinia. All
pathways of exposure considered for the stages of disposal are represented in both
Pareto charts and tables provided in this chapter.
Focussing on the results, the on-premises activities are dominated by the contamination
of surface and groundwater. The agents exposed through these pathways are
enumerated in Table 5.2. Agents identified are associated with cleansing and
disinfection (C&D) activities, e.g. ammonia, chlorine and iodine, organic compounds,
e.g. hydrogen and nitrogen sulphide, and potential release of pathogens, e.g. Salmonella
spp and Yersinia spp. These results are in line with previous reports regarding the
contamination of water resulting from the disposal of carcass. Here we highlight the
contribution of overspill of C&D products and manure in high impact contamination
events recorded during the FMD crisis in 2001 (EA, 2001). In contrast, the analysis of
the processing stage enumerates a different of set of hazardous agents (Table 5.3).
During this stage surface water and air contamination dominate. Air contamination is
associated with fly ash (PM10), resulting from the large quantities of ash produced by
animal pyres and products of combustion (PCB and PAH) (Lowles et al., 2002).
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Surface-water contamination from animal pyres acknowledges the possible run-off of
fuel (benzene and toluene) and heavy metals, as well as organic compounds.
5.3.1 Exploratory study
The work presented in this chapter focused on increasing the quality and quantity of
data available for making decisions regarding the safe disposal of carcasses in the event
on an exotic animal disease outbreak. The previous model addressed gaps in literature
regarding the environmental and health impacts resulting from the disposal of animal
carcasses and furthered the existing knowledge (Delgado et al., 2010). Moreover, it
moved from a conventional qualitative approach to RA development, presenting a
comprehensive template based on semi-quantitative judgements (Delgado et al., 2010).
The format used to communicate the output progresses communication from one
dimensional communication tools, such as ranking lists and risk descriptors (Pollard et
al., 2008a; DH, 2001), to a more comprehensive tool providing information in
sequences. The format for communicating outputs includes: (i) a higher level aimed at
defining priorities across all disposal options, distribution of risk; and (ii) a detailed
level aimed at identifying the critical control points within a specific unit process,
contribution to risk. The model provided the template to select between disposal
options with regard to their potential impact and provided the information necessary to
improve future implementation of chosen disposal options. Here those findings were
complemented by describing the list of hazards released at the end of each exposure
pathway. This represents the next step in furthering the available information on safe
disposal of animal carcasses, by identifying the hazards released at the end of each
pathway, providing context to exposure.
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The method presented here addresses the limited research evidence available on carcass
disposal activities, by acknowledging where information is lacking (highlighted as grey
in the output), developing a framework that allows selecting experts with a narrow but
specific backgrounds and provides the opportunity to update the input data as new
information becomes available. The advantage of object-oriented methods is the
reduction in volume of input data, thus improving efficiency by reducing the burden put
to experts in comparison to conventional RA templates (Pollard et al., 2008a; DH, 2001;
Delgado et al., 2010) and reducing the time and resources necessary to develop a
comprehensive assessment. A further advantage of adopting an object-oriented
methodology is flexibility, which is the capacity to update the output, as new relevant
information is available (Ahl, 1996). For example, new insight on hazardous agents,
disposal options performance and changes in disposal policy. The object-oriented
method allows for updating the existing hazard profiles and for adding new ones, thus
allowing updates to the model as new information becomes available. Flexibility allows
for a gradual increase in efficiency and accuracy of the output as new information
arises.
The application of two risk assessments to produce one single output is unconventional
but necessary to complete the existing information. This was made possible by the
adopted object oriented methodology. The development of the model, considering the
same framework allowed generating a synergetic communication process, uniting the
models and resulting in an improved understanding of the drivers of exposure across the
disposal chain. The development of these two models generated information regarding
an area of knowledge where information is scarce. Through the culmination of both
models, the existing body of knowledge moved from understanding a fraction of the
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risks associated with the available disposal options, to a structured body of information
that enables the selection from a full range of disposal options and improving them in
order to minimise the risk to the environment and human and animal populations.
Decision-making has changed alongside the ease with which information becomes
available to the general public and media. Standing examples are the 2001 foot and
mouth disease outbreak or the more recent HPAI outbreaks (BBC News, 2001; BBC
News, 2008; BBC News, 2007). This means decisions are scrutinised by the media,
increasing the need for swift and accurate decision making. Therefore, policy makers
have a vested interest in being presented with complete knowledge when dealing with
an animal disease outbreak or when revising emergency and preparedness plans, to
ensure that the adequate controls are in place. Nonetheless, the current economic
climate may limit the resources available to perform studies that support decisions, e.g.
the planned cuts to Defra budget (Alistair, 2010; BBC News, 2010). Furthermore,
governmental emergency guidelines and emergency response plans, although updated
and revised systematically, are tested sporadically when animal disease outbreaks occur.
Therefore, risk assessments play a signification role in testing those controls to ensure a
safe and effective response in time of crisis.
The model produced an extensive output, where the tables presented in this paper
represent a fraction of it (Table 5.2 and Table 5.3). To the authors’ knowledge, the two
models combined present a new perspective over the carcass disposal process,
contributing to expanding the available literature. Nonetheless, the model does present
limitations, which in part result from the qualitative nature of the assessment. This
reflects in the models inability to provide an estimate of the quantities of hazardous
agents released by each exposure pathway. However, providing quantitative outputs
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involves a site-specific approach that considers the number of carcass disposed of, their
composition and state of decay, soil composition, topography and existing fauna, thus
relying on information that may not be available in literature. Moreover, such an
approach compromises the generic approach adopted, with increase costs in time and
resources. Most importantly, the combined application of distinct expert based models,
using independent sets of experts makes impossible to ensure consistency over the
assumptions and rationale used. This approach can produce contextual inconsistencies
between models, which affect the quality of the output. Therefore, the presented set-up,
using combined models is a solution of recourse and future work must consider
recording expert assumptions and rationale in a fashion that allows its inclusion as
integral part of the output. Nonetheless, the combined models provide general
guidelines for improving the currently available options for disposal of infected animal
carcasses. In doing so supports swift and informed decisions made to minimise the
chances of unforeseen consequences.
5.4 Conclusions
The model presented here progresses the use of expert knowledge and computer-based
modelling alongside the information available for disposing infected animal carcasses.
To the author’s knowledge, combining two models in this way is a unique approach to
understanding the issue of carcass disposal, resulting in significant improvement to the
information base available. The model presented here:
 Represents an exploratory effort to improve the efficiency in the use of expert
knowledge, through the use of computer-based modelling in combination with
profiles that characterise hazardous agent behaviour and environmental releases.
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 Complements the output presented in Chapter 4 (Delgado et al., 2010), by
adding an extra tier of information, which describes the hazardous agents release
through the assessed exposure pathways, thus providing context to the semi-
quantitative output (Delgado et al., 2010).
 In combination with the model presented in Chapter 4 (Delgado et al. 2010), this
model allows the analysis of the disposal activities through a progressively more
detailed perspective. A first tier ranks the stages of disposal that pose the greater
risk and a second tier identifies the riskiest exposure pathways within each
disposal stage. Lastly, a third tier identifies the hazardous agents released by
each exposure pathway, providing contextual of the events driving risk.
 This research highlights the need to ensure that qualitative risk assessments
communicating risk hierarchies through simple ranking scales capture and
communicate the rationale and assumptions supporting the rankings produced.
Its inclusion as an integral part of the output adds transparency (Ahl, 1996) and
can provide information useful for developing policies and risk strategies.

115
5.5 SUMARY OF THE FINDINGS FOR THE POST-OUTBREAK
(POST T2) PHASE
The research presented in Part 1 of this thesis, develops a comprehensive analysis of
exposure associated with the disposal of carcasses during the post-outbreak (post t2)
phase of an EAD outbreak. The research applies a model based on the work develop by
Pollard et al. (2008). Here, model application is improved to ensure an analysis of all
pathways of exposure thus considering pathways of exposure excluded for assessments
in the prior art (Section 2.2). Specifically, it focuses on the identification of activities
and pathways presenting a significant risk exposure and in expanding the current
understanding of system behaviour. Claims of novelty presented within these chapters
are associated with insights gained and vulnerabilities identified to support policy
interventions in carcass disposal activities (Chapter 4 and 5). Whilst, claims of novelty
associated with the application of systemic models are discussed further in Chapter 11.
The comprehensive analysis of carcass disposal activities generated new insights that
resulted in the identification of the cause of exposure. An analysis of the outputs
suggests the following:
 The systemic model expands the quantity of data available, by analysing
disposal options and disposal activities excluded in the analysis available in the
prior art.
 Form all the disposal options and disposal activities analysed, exposure from
carcass disposal activities (Figure 4.3) is most likely to result from uncontained
reception and processing of carcasses, and activities perform on farm (culling of
livestock).
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 The model identifies the pathways of exposure and hazardous agents
contributing the most to exposure for each stage of disposal (Figure 4.4, Figure
4.5, Table 5.2 and Table 5.3). Thus, it provides insights to support informed
policy interventions that focus on an efficient use of the available resources.
This research adopts a new format to communicate output (Section 5.3).
Communication of the outputs follows a format composed of a sequence of
progressively more detailed analysis of the system. A first analysis compares the
contribution to exposure presented by the different disposal activities (Figure 4.2) and a
second analysis identifies the pathways of exposure associated with disposal activities,
presenting CCP for efficient intervention in the system (Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5).
Lastly, a third analysis describes the hazardous agents associated with the CCP to
provide information regarding the causes for barrier failure (Table 5.2 and Table 5.3).
This format of communication provides access, for the first time to risk analysts and
policy makers to the full range of disposal options and causes of exposure associated
with them. Thus, allowing priorities to be set and policy interventions defined better.
The research presented in Chapter 4 and 5 develops a comprehensive analysis of the
mechanisms of exposure and preventative controls associated with the exposure of
livestock to hazardous agents. The insights generated by this research expand the
knowledge available to support policy decision, reducing the gaps in knowledge
associated with literature from past outbreaks (Section 2.1.2) and predictive models
available in the prior art (Section 2.4). Furthermore, the research has successfully
generated insight on the knowledge gaps associated with the research objectives
presented in Section 2.6 (Chapter 4 and 5). The information, now available to risk
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analysts and policy makers provides insights to improve the existing protocols and
policies associated with the disposal of carcasses.
The research developed provides added insights on the development of systemic
models. Work presented in Chapter 5 addresses the limitations of the systemic model
(Chapter 4). The outputs produced provide context to the numerical rankings,
improving the insights available to risk analysts and policy makers to support policy
interventions. Nonetheless, the approach used – a combination of two models –
presents vulnerabilities:
 Application of distinct expert based models, using independent sets of experts
make it impossible to ensure consistency over the assumptions and rationale
used. This approach can produce contextual inconsistencies between models,
which affect the quality of the outputs (Section 5.3.1).
Therefore, the presented set-up, using combined models is a solution of recourse and
future applications of systemic models to EAD must consider improving recordings
expert assumptions and rationale, to present as an integral part of the output.
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PART 2 –SYSTEMIC ANALYSIS OF THE PRE-
OUTBREAK (PRE t0) PHASE
Part 2 involves the experimental development of an expert-based systemic model to
inform on the events creating opportunities for the introduction of EADs into the UK.
Model development follows the need expressed by the Defra to improve the current
understanding of the drivers of exposure associated with the introduction of EAD into
the UK. Specifically, it addresses the Recommendation 21 of the Risk Pathways and
Countermeasures report (Defra 2011a), which states “analysis of risks from low/medium
probability risk pathways (…) to identify and assess potential (...) scenarios (if a
sequence of low probability events occur), taking into account current levels of risk” .
Model development adopts an approach that enables identification of all pathways of
exposure, this includes pathways identified in past outbreak alongside currently
undetected pathways. This involves departing from conventional methods used to
develop risk assessment models, which rely of information from past outbreak to select
the pathways of exposure considered and instead adopt a method that generates those
pathways of exposure, which have yet to be identified and compares them against
known ones. The expert-based systemic model develops a comprehensive analysis of
the source-pathway-receptor relation associated with the pre t0 phase of an EAD
outbreak. It improves the existing understanding on the available pathways of exposure
and through it, presents the opportunities for improving the efficiency of the system of
controls preventing the exposure of livestock to an EAD agent.
The development of the expert-based systemic model draws support from a TAG,
composed of experts in EAD and policy advisors, and from the modelling insights
acquired through the development of the model to study the post t2 phase of an EAD
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outbreak, particularly the use of context (Chapter 5). This helped to steer the
development of a transparent and logical method, which provides an effective decision
support tool. A caveat of this approach is the requirement to model each disease agent
independently and therefore this study includes two applications to modelling the
incursions of CSF and FMD. This characteristic however, provides the opportunity to
compare the outputs. This model produces a comprehensive analysis of the drivers of
risk associated with the pre t0 phase, providing information to support decisions that aim
to improve UK resilience against future EAD outbreaks.
Part 2 includes the description of a novel method to develop a systemic assessment of
the mechanisms responsible for the introduction an EAD into the UK and to identify
vulnerabilities in the preventative controls in place (Chapter 6). This chapter also
includes a discussion of its advances in comparison with the prior art, and critique of its
use to support policy decisions. A second methodological section describes the
approach developed to retrieve expert opinions (Chapter 7). A first application of the
method to study CSF is presented in Chapter 8. This chapter includes an extensive
analysis of the outputs, resulting in the development of a comprehensive analysis of the
system and concludes with a discussion of its contribution to expand the quality and
quantity of information now available to risk analysts and policy makers (Section 2.7).
A second application to study FMD focus on improving method application based on
comments from the TAG meeting (Chapter 9). Similarly, this chapter includes an
extensive analysis of the output, and discussion of the insights gained. The insights
generated from both applications (CSF and FMD) are analysed further to detect trends
in vulnerabilities and to analyse the influence of low probability events (LEP) in UK’s
vulnerability to EAD (Chapter 10). This chapter includes comments on the best
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approach to control LPE. A summary of the findings produced by the research
presented in Part 2 is presented in Section 10.7.
Figure 5.0.1 Part 2- Systemic analysis of the pre outbreak (Pre t0) phase
[Key] The blue boxes display research objectives of the experiment. Numbers display
the chapters
Use of expert opinion
as a source of
information
( 4, 5, 6, 7)
2.10 Develop expert-based systemic
models to improve policy development
across all phases of an EAD outbreak
Pre-outbreak (pre t0)
phase
Post-outbreak (post t2)
phase
A model that develops a
comprehensive analysis of
the entire (Post t2) system
(4)
Indentify opportunities to
strengthen the system
(4)
Provides guidance to
support decisions aiming
to improve the system
(4 and 5)
Addresses the identified research
opportunities: Understanding hazard
releases for all stages of carcasses
disposal
(4)
A model that develops a
comprehensive analysis
of the entire (Pre t0 )
system (6)
Indentify opportunities to
strengthen the system
(8 and 9)
Provides guidance to
support decisions aiming
to improve the system
(8 and 9)
Addresses the identified research
opportunities: Influence of LPE in
the exposure of livestock to an
EAD
(10)
Discussion
Critique of systemic models
(11. 2)
Comparison with disease spread models
(11.6)
3-tier format for communicating the output
(11.3)
Comparison of models
(11. 5 )
Modelling with limited data
(11.7 )
Maximising the available expertise
(11. 4)
Improving policy development associated with EAD outbreaks
(11.7 )
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A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO THE RISK ANALYSIS OF6
EXOTIC ANIMAL DISEASE I: CRITIQUE OF
METHODS AND NETWORK MODEL DESCRIPTION
This chapter presents the method to develop a systemic analysis of the UK’s
vulnerabilities to an incursion of an exotic animal disease. Here, the method and
modelling approach are described in detail. Furthermore, the methods theoretical
advantages and disadvantages are discussed in comparison with the methods
conventionally used to study risk of disease introduction.
Submitted to Risk Analysis Journal:
Delgado, J., Pollard, S.T.J., Snary, E., Black, E, Prpich, G., Longhurst, P., “A systems
approach to the policy level risk assessment of exotic animal disease: network model
and application to classical swine fever” (Submitted to Risk Analysis Journal on 24
January 2012).
6.1 Introduction
Expanding free markets and unmitigated globalisation have increased countries’
exposure to exotic animal disease (EAD). Prevention of EAD incursion is complex and
requires the dynamic management of potential entry points, pathways and preventative
barriers. Understanding the interactions between these is a focus for governments
managing the risks of EAD (Defra, 2011a). Conventionally, risk assessments (RAs)
have been used to assess the risk and impact of an EAD in a specific time and place, and
inform management practice (Defra, 2011c; Taylor, 2003). Both qualitative and
quantitative risk assessment methods have been employed. However, in the search for a
comprehensive picture of systemic knowledge of disease incursions, these approaches
are often limited. Here, we evaluate the current methods for assessing the risk of
exposure to an EADs and offer an analysis of the merits and limitations of established
tools. Building on this, we present an alternative method aimed at improving EAD risk
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assessments that are specifically required at the policy level. The proposed framework
assesses the risk of incursion at various critical control points (CCP) across a country’s
disease management plan and has been developed within the context of EAD protection
within the UK.
6.1.1 Exotic animal diseases
EADs are transboundary hazards, owing to the capacity to spread substantial distances
and cause a significant impact (e.g. direct and indirect economic loss to farmers and
governments) on a local, national and international level (Otte et al., 2004; Morgan and
Prakash, 2006). The concern over transboundary animal diseases is long-established
and exacerbated by the intensification of the agricultural sector and the expansion of
global markets. Recent examples of EADs in the UK include the 2001 and 2007 foot
and mouth disease (FMD) and 2000 classic swine fever (CSF) outbreaks (Anderson,
2002; Gibbens et al., 2000; Sharpe et al., 2001; Scudamore, 2002; Anderson, 2008),
while avian influenza (AI) and the bluetongue (BT) pandemics represent international
examples (Defra, 2007c; Thiry et al., 2006; Defra, 2008c). The prevention of EADs
provides extensive economic benefit, and developed countries expend considerable
effort in preventing and mitigating EADs to maintain an economically favourable
‘disease-free’ status (WHO/FAO/OIE, 2004), much of this devised at the policy level
and requiring intimate knowledge of systemic risk and its reduction. The threat of an
EAD incursion is relentless, requiring governments to maintain vigilant management
practice. Interaction between the pathways of introduction, multiple stages of exposure,
subsequent impacts and barriers of management are highly complex. Management
therefore requires a broad understanding of the systemic risks, at a policy level, in order
to derive cost-effective programmes adapted to high-level protection and national
125
preparedness (Otte et al., 2004; WHO/FAO/OIE, 2004). This contrasts with the bulk of
risk assessment practice that, to date, has focused on analysing the trajectory and
consequences of specific outbreaks.
6.1.2 The UK multi-barrier defence system and failure to prevent outbreak
The UK framework for the prevention and control of exotic animal diseases integrates
the combined efforts of multiple government agencies (e.g. local authorities, Animal
Health Agency, Meat and Hygiene Service, HM Revenue and Customs and the UK
Borders Agency (Defra, 2011a)), each of which holds specific management roles and
responsibilities. Mutually independent, the functions provided by these agencies create
a complex network of distinct protection barriers that operate as a whole system.
Described as a ‘multi-barrier system’, imbedded redundancies protect against the
inherent imperfections of even the most effective barriers in place (Reason, 1997). The
system acknowledges the occurrence of rare events that may compromise barrier
efficacy and it guards against situations where a single barrier failure may lead to a
disease outbreak. However, system failures do still occur, and may be due to a rare
coincidence of successive failures in multiple defences, which creates pathways for
hazardous agents to reach susceptible animals. The more robust the defence network,
the more unlikely an incursion is. Nonetheless, incursion is always theoretically
possible (Reason, 1997), which is why understanding the complexity of the system is
vital for the development of effective and risk-informed management systems (Morris,
1995).
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6.1.3 Key issues for improving prevention of exotic animal diseases
EAD outbreaks result from complex interactions between the host, the disease agent,
and environmental conditions (e.g. human activities) (Kuiken et al., 2005).
Understanding the role each of these aspects plays is central to identifying any
weaknesses in the management system (Morris, 1995). The introduction of an EAD is
influenced by a disease agents’ unique characteristics influencing the route of import
(for a summary of transmission mechanisms see the Royal Society’s report “Infectious
Disease in Livestock” (The Royal Society, 2002)) and the complexity of interactions
between the environment, hosts (e.g. wildlife and livestock), trade routes, and the level
of biosecurity provided by animal production systems (e.g. extensive vs. intensive).
This complexity generates a large number of possible release and exposure pathways
(Morris, 1995). Though multi-barrier systems harbour some redundancy that could
improve protection, the efficacy of these systems remains vulnerable to human factors
(Reason, 1997; Kuiken et al., 2005; Reinach and Viale, 2006). Improving these systems
is difficult as evidenced by the investigation of past outbreaks, which are frequently
inconclusive on root causes (Defra, 2010b; OIE, 2010) (Figure 6.1). Consequentially,
true system failures are difficult to detect and therefore performance levels for controls
are poorly documented (Wieland et al., 2011; Defra, 2010b). Understanding the
relationship between opportunities for transmission provided by EAD characteristics
and environmental complexity against the efficiency of risk management controls is
therefore central to enhancing the national level of preparedness.
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Figure 6.1 Analysis of the epidemiological reports develop by the OIE (2010) for CSF and
FMD outbreaks from 2008 up to 2010 according to the success or failure to detect the
responsible pathways of introduction
6.1.4 Import risk assessments
Import risk assessments (IRA) are used to assess the likelihood and consequence of an
EAD incursion, usually at a specific location in space and time. The objective of the
IRA is to gain further understanding of the likelihood of a disease incursion, say to a
specific pig herd, and the interactions between a disease agent and the protection
system. Guided by international standards (OIE, 2011c; Taylor, 2003; Murray, 2002),
IRAs employ a range of qualitative and quantitative risk assessment methods,
depending upon the objective and context of the decision at hand. Table 6.1 presents a
summary of conventional approaches to IRA, along with an evaluation of their
respective strengths and weaknesses. The methods employed are well established.
However, we argue they have lesser value when applied at the policy level and, in the
context of increased system complexity, may fail to provide a systematic analysis of all
the introduction mechanisms, and so the subsequent threat of EAD releases.
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Table 6.1 Description of the strengths and weaknesses of the import risk assessment (IRA)
methods applied to date; comparison with total system analysis
IRA tools exist in two groups; expert-based and scenario-based. The majority of
expert-based models are strictly qualitative (Peeler et al., 2006) such as those applied by
Advantages Disadvantages
Time (enables quick assessments and are
adequate to find solution in times of crisis)
Repeatability and validation
Cost (do not require specialist software) Results are presented in descriptive terms (high,
medium and low), low level detail of the output
Use all types of data, thus overcoming data
limitations in the research literature
Comparative output
Application to complex open systems Sensitivity analysis cannot be applied
Event-tree based models: detail analysis of
pathways of exposure and exposure
mechanisms
Extensive prior knowledge to select pathways
to be assessed
Binomial probability model Cost and time
In stochastic models, a value for variable
uncertainty and/or variability is provided
Data availability (data is not always available
and assumptions have to be made, that
undermine the value and validity of the model
Repeatability, auditable, and validation
Sensitivity analysis is applicable
Data can be updated to account for changes in
the system represented
Capacity to study large system, represented
through the use of an interaction matrix
Repeatability and validation
Use all types of data, thus overcoming data
limitations in the research literature
Complex process of elicitation
Results are represented as numerical values Comparative output
Contextualization provides a descriptive insight
the mechanism of disease transmission
Pathways described with an intermediate level
of detail, where the multiple mechanisms of
disease transmission have no influence in the
outputRepresentation of all pathways and components It does not allow to estimate uncertainty and/or
variablity
Sensitivity analysis is applicable
Expert-based qualitative model
Scenario-based quantitative model
Model for total system analysis
Note: Difficult to validate all types of RA
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Australia and New Zealand (BioNZ, 2006). Qualitative methods rely on a process of
hazard screening, identification and classification and use qualitative descriptors to
assess the likelihood and severity of the impact of EAD introduction (Reed, 2009b;
Reed, 2009a; AQIS, 1999; AQIS, 2000). The Department for Environment, Food and
Rural Affairs (Defra) in England and Wales currently uses these techniques (Sabirovic
et al., 2005; Sabirovic and Hall, 2004; Taylor et al., 2006). Qualitative methods rely on
multiple sources of information, including expert opinion to develop risk descriptors
and estimate risk (Defra, 2010b). Experts synthesise information from a range of
possible events, often providing a single ‘score’ as a surrogate risk estimate. The
approach is limited in its ability to capture the complexity of the system, but offers a
pragmatic alternative when dealing with events where sparse data exists. This approach
enables rapid assessment, allowing decision-makers to discern priorities and design
management solutions in short time frames. These frameworks are suitable in times of
crisis, for example during the FMD crisis of 2001. Other expert based assessments
apply increasingly complex elicitation methods, such as conjoint analysis (Horst et al.,
1998; Nissen and Krieter, 2003; Gallagher et al., 2002), or quantitative methods that
rely on expert knowledge to support a fuller assessment. These assessments use a more
complex and time-consuming elicitation process, to benefit the accuracy of the elicited
values however without benefit to increased detail. As an example, Horst (1996)
presented an exhaustive list of the importation, release and exposure routes, in order to
prioritise them according to importance. Though extensive in analysis, the output was a
ranked list of risk factors and sources that provided limited analytical depth. Expert
based models are flexible enough to allow the study of large systems (Taylor, 2003;
Peeler et al., 2006). Nonetheless, their highly descriptive nature may fail to provide
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system oversight, reveal system complexity and the full extent of resulting introduction
scenarios. Scenario based modelling includes end-point quantitative models and
mechanistic models which focus on describing specific disease introduction scenarios
using event-trees (Singer et al., 2011). These methods require quantitative evidence to
support the application of mathematical models. The complexity of the models depends
upon the objectives of the analysis, with complexity increasing as analysis moves from
one pathway (Yu et al., 1997; Sutmoller and Wrathall, 1997) to multiple introduction
pathways (De Vos et al., 2004; Hartnett et al., 2007; Bronsvoort et al., 2008; Weng et
al., 2010). Similar complexity can be expected when assessing the impacts to multiple
receptors (Vose, 2008; Murray, 2002). Compared to expert-based assessments,
scenario-based models provide greater diagnostic detail about the likelihood of
introduction. However, this comes at the cost of extensive, time and resource
consuming preparatory work and input data. These costs ultimately restrain the scale of
these assessments (Vose, 2008; Murray, 2002) which produce a narrow view of a
disease introduction, i.e. a small portion of all available pathways.
The consensus among the scientific community appears that the management of disease
incursion using these two IRA perspectives provides an acceptable understanding of
EAD importation mechanisms and associated risks (Taylor, 2003; Peeler et al., 2006).
However, we need to exercise caution about the true extent of our systems
understanding that we claim for. The top-down approach requires the existence of prior
knowledge about the mechanisms involved in creating introduction pathways and the
behaviour of system barriers (Dangerfield and Morris, 1992; Grundke, 2010)..
However, for incidences such as the CSF 2000, FMD 2001 and HPAI 2007 outbreaks,
Defra identified causal pathways resulting from a conjunction of unlikely events.
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Assessing such pathways is beyond the scope of conventional IRA methods, as is the
identification and understanding of the mechanisms involved for creating an incursion
opportunity. Therefore, if conventional methods alone are used to study the risk of
importing EADs, our gaps in knowledge and understanding will remain.
6.2 An alternative methodology for import risk assessments
We are concerned with risk assessments performed to inform and improve preventative
risk management measures at the policy level, and undertaken in the absence of an
active outbreak. The method below addresses some of the limitations identified above
and is achieved through the identification of different pathways that may result in a
susceptible receptor being exposed to an EAD. Critically, for policy level analysis,
these pathways are the result of numerous interactions between system components; for
example, livestock breeding, distribution and food preparation (Defra, 2011a), rather
than through the linear analysis of components in an event tree. Providing an
understanding of system properties and of how elements and controls interact enables us
to predict behaviour better (Murthy and Krishnamurthy, 2009; Pearce and Merletti,
2006; Mitchell, 2006). To achieve this, we propose a method that integrates network
system analysis with features, events and process (FEP) analysis. By combining these
two approaches, we intend to expand the assessment of potential events that may trigger
a barrier failure, so initiating an EAD incursion. Network analysis attempts to
understand interactions between species and the environment. Examples exist in the
epidemiological and disease transmission literature where this has been widely applied
(Bigras-Poulin et al., 2006; Ortiz-Pelaez et al., 2006). Functionally, a network is
comprised of a number of nodes and the connections that exist between them (arcs).
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FEP analysis is used to define relevant exposure scenarios and has been routinely
applied in the development of nuclear waste repositories and proposed for the
geological storage of carbon dioxide (Freeze et al., 2005; Savage et al., 2004). In
addition to expanding the study of potential introduction routes, this approach intends to
unveil new interactions at play that may have been overlooked.
Figure 6.2 Network model of the system
[Key] Nodes represent the features; arcs represent the process. The (Node Third
country) represents the disease source; (Node pig farm) represents the terminal node
(terminating the simulation); the remaining nodes represent components contribution to
disease transmission; and (Arcs) are represented by the arrows corresponding to
movement between two adjacent nodes
6.2.1 Feature, events and processes list application to classical swine fever.
A FEP list (Savage et al., 2004) provides a set of system features, system events and
system processes that when combined, generate an exposure scenario. For our
purposes, ‘features’, the components within the system (e.g. farms, fomites, border
inspection posts, and human or livestock populations) are represented as network nodes
(Figure 6.2). The nodes include the source of EAD, countries without a disease free
Third country
[Source]
Human population
[Feature]
Livestock
[Feature]
Wildlife
[Feature]
Environment
[Feature]
Pig farm
[reception]
Caterer/restaurant
[Feature]
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status, and receptors, e.g. livestock farms. ‘Processes’ represent the opportunities for
disease transmission between adjacent nodes, and are represented in the network as arcs.
Each arc represents a single process and nodes may be connected to several other nodes.
The extent of connectivity between two adjacent nodes is defined as an incidence and is
assigned a value. ‘Events’ are the causes of barrier failure and are not represented
graphically in the network. Barrier failure does not necessarily represent disease
transmission; rather it describes a situation where transmission is possible. Events are
assigned a value that describes the barrier failure rate, reflecting the expert confidence
in barrier efficacy. A complete FEP list is a comprehensive record of all the values
attributed to each process and arc present in the network, and of all the description and
assumptions associated with them.
Figure 6.3 Interaction matrix
[Key] Diagonal cells represent the nodes. Third country as source and pig farm as
terminal are the start and finishing points respectively. The remainder of possible node
connections [the code in the off diagonal cells marks an existing connection, records the
coordinates of the movement]
Third country 0103 0104 0105
Caterer/
/restaurant 0203
Livestock 0507
0302 Humanpopulation 0306
Environment 0406 0407
0603 0604 Wildlife
Pig farm
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6.2.2 Data collection and modelling challenges
Risk assessment favours the use of quantitative supporting data as a reliable and
auditable source of information (Taylor, 2003; Peeler et al., 2006). However, for the
study of incursion and exposure of EAD to susceptible receptors, such data are often
sparse, incomplete and therefore unavailable in the quantities necessary to develop a
comprehensive quantitative analysis of the mechanisms driving exposure (Figure 6.2).
In such circumstances, expert opinion presents an alternative source of information to
overcome the limitations in the research literature (Taylor, 2003; Peeler et al., 2006).
The systemic model relies on expert judgements to inform the model and assign values
to the FEP network. Required from the experts in this case, is an evaluation of:
Incidence: the number of times a connection is attempted, with or without successful
transmission during a predefined time interval. The degree of ‘challenge’ in the system.
Barrier failure rate: the number of times a barrier fails to detect and/or eliminate a
disease agent, versus the number of times a connection is attempted.
Events: a description of the events provoking barrier failure and classification
according to error type - human and/or system error.
6.3 Scenario simulation, pathway calculation and system properties
The model presents an estimation of the likelihood of a pathway being available for the
introduction of a disease agent into the UK. Focus is on providing a comparison
between the availability of pathways for exposure (scenarios) and not in the calculating
the likelihood of infection. Thus, the model takes no account of the likely prevalence of
infection (or frequency of breakdown) at the sources nodes). A scenario is an imagined
sequence of events; for example the sequence of events necessary to allow an EAD to
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come into contact with a susceptible receptor, where a receptor is an animal from
susceptible species to the EAD considered, in a livestock farm. Multiple scenarios
resulting in a system failure (i.e. disease incursion) may exist. We simulate these using
a pre-programmed Excel™ spreadsheet that describes the network as an interaction
matrix (IM; Figure 6.3). Diagonal cells represent network nodes; off-diagonal cells
(where full) represent a connection between two nodes. The off-diagonal cell [i, j]; with
A being row and B the column, represents the connection between the node [i, i] and the
node [j, j], whereas cell [j, i] represents the inverse connection. If an off diagonal cell is
empty, there is no connection between the two respective nodes. When completed, the
matrix represents every possible connection within the system. Using the IM, a
scenario simulation analysis (SSA) generates all possible outbreak scenarios, leading
from a source node to a receptor. A direct pathway contains two nodes and one arc,
whilst indirect pathways contain ࢔ nodes and (࢔ -1) arcs. A pathway length ࢑ refers to
the number of arcs present in the pathway (࢑ = ࢔− ૚). (ܲ) represents the likelihood
of the pathway that resulted in infection. It results from the estimations of the
likelihood of the sequences of transmission between any two adjacent nodes (ܺ)
considered in pathways, where (ܺ௜,௝) is the likelihood of transmission between two
random nodes within the network can be described. For direct pathways, where ݇= 1
the value of ܲ is equal to the value of ܺ for the source and receptor node,
(ܲ௦,௥) = (ܺ௦,௥) ; and (Eq. 1)
for indirect pathways, where ݇> 1 ܲ is calculated using the following equation, which
considers a random sequence of adjacent connections from source to receptor node,
(ܲ௦,௥)∗ = (ܺ௦,௜భ). (ܺ௜భ,௜మ). (ܺ௜మ,௜య) … . (ܺ௜೘ షభ,௜೘ ). (ܺ௜೘ ,௥); (Eq. 2)
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Where,ܲ(௦,௥)∗ is the likelihood of a pathway between a source node (ݏ) and a receptor
node (ݎ) and r݅epresent random adjacent nodes from n network nodes.
Therefore, (ܲ) depends on the likelihood of the adjacent connections. This is calculated
byܺ (௜,௝), where i and j are any two randomly selected nodes in the network, ܿܫ (௜,௝)
represents the value for incidence associated with the process connecting nodes ݅and ݆
and ܤܨܴ(௜,௝) is the value for barrier failure rate.
(ܺ௜,௝) = ூ௖(೔,ೕ)∑ ூ௖(೔,೎)ା೔షభ೎సభ ∑ ூ௖(೔,೎)೙೎స೔శభ .ܤܨܴ(௜,௝) ; for ݆≠ ݅ (Eq. 3)
where݅= 1, … , .݊
The output of the model is a list of all pathways allowing exposure of susceptible
receptors to the disease agent. That list includes a description of all the nodes
composing the pathways and a respective likelihood (ܲ) value.
6.3.1 Sensitivity analysis
In addition to an estimation of the likelihood on disease incursion, system vulnerability
is also evaluated. System vulnerability is represented by the sum of the likelihood of all
pathways. It represents the likelihood of system failure and defines a base case for
system performance. The value represents a snapshot of system vulnerability to the
incursion of an EAD. This value also allows the detection of which arcs and associated
events promoting barrier failure pose a greater influence to overall systemic
vulnerability. This can be achieved by the application of a local ‘one at a time’
sensitivity analysis to the model targeting the behaviour of the barriers associated with
each arc (Frey and Patil, 2002; Hamby, 1995) and is valuable for identifying risk
management interventions that are likely to be most effective in times of risk reduction.
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6.4 Discussion
Globalisation is increasing the movement of people, goods and vehicles within and
across borders while additional controls are put in place to combat new risks. The
increase in system complexity is leading to unexpected interactions that generate less
predictable pathways of EAD introduction. New risk assessment tools are required at
the policy level to address this challenge. Though the majority of these pathways may
be of low likelihood, their increasing presence poses a challenge in maintaining overall
system resilience. Therefore, concern is directed towards the occurrence of a sequence
of low probability system failures that may ultimately result in an incursion incident
(Defra, 2011a; Reason, 1997; Pidgeon and O'Leary, 2000).
We suggest conventional risk assessment methods used successfully at the local
outbreak level, are inadequate to further understanding at the policy level of the causal
relationships between foreign disease sources, susceptible receptors and controls. This
approach combines the information gained from expert-based and scenario based
models to develop such understanding (Taylor, 2003; Peeler et al., 2006). However, it
is susceptible to systemic channelling (progressive narrowing of the scope of
assessment) and offers limited understanding of system behaviours. In practice, this
leads to a focus on a small number of priorities, which in turn may weaken the rationale
for policy intervention and risk mitigation strategies (Dangerfield and Morris, 1992;
Grundke, 2010). The method offered here adopts a bottom-up approach, based on a
firm belief that models emerge as a whole, and cannot be understood properly by the
atomised analysis of constitutive parts (Murthy and Krishnamurthy, 2009; Zio, 2009).
Bottom-up models allow the development of true systemic studies, obtained through the
generation of an abstract representation of reality, presenting the following structural
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advantages: (Pearce, 1996; Murthy and Krishnamurthy, 2009; Pearce and Merletti,
2006; Freeze et al., 2005; Jordán and Scheuring, 2004; Newman, 2003; Zio, 2009;
Scherrer et al., 2008)
a) The model is based on simple local rules that drive the complex behaviour observed
at a global level, understanding the rules governing system behaviour allows for making
predictions. This enables the use of the model to infer on system resilience, simulating
UKs’ overall resilience against a disease introduction.
b) The model allows for interplay between bottom-up and top-down perspectives
through several levels of granularity, allowing the analyst to assess the effects of micro
behaviour in system performance and system weaknesses and these key areas for
intervention, e.g. critical control points (Delgado et al., 2010). These properties make
network models particularly suited to large, complex systems where the role of each
individual component is not altogether clear (Pearce and Merletti, 2006; Newman,
2003).
Here, the pathways are not dictated by the assessor prior to the assessment, but
generated from within the system based on disease agent and system component
interactions. This generates a very large number of introduction pathways, from which
none can be excluded. In contrast with conventional approaches (OIE, 2011c; Vose,
2008; Taylor, 2003; Murray, 2002) , the model does not focus on the effects of
individual pathways but produces an estimation of system behaviour based on the
likelihood of all generated pathways and provides information as to the influence of
components within the system (Newman, 2003). The interplay between macro and
micro perspectives provided by bottom-up models allows us to examine the sensitivity
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of the system to the behaviours of individual components (Murthy and Krishnamurthy,
2009). The model assumes that an individual barrier failure is not exclusive to one
pathway. Nonetheless, increasing control over that failure will decrease the likelihood
across a number of pathways, improving system behaviour. For example, a failure (a)
may provide agent access to two high likelihood pathways, and a failure (b) to
thousands of low likelihood ones. Understanding which failure has greater influence on
system behaviour will lead to better control decisions. The proposed sensitivity analysis
enables a comparison between all components and individual barrier failures thus
allowing for identification of critical control points; key areas where intervention is
likely to produce higher impact (Delgado et al., 2010).
An analysis concentrating on the features (components) allows defining priorities at a
macro level, and a second analysis focussing on the processes/events the identification
of key areas to intervene with regard to those priorities. This provides an indication of
‘where’ to intervene. However as the causes of barrier failure are captured by the FEP
list, it also allows provides added information on ‘how’ to intervene. Latent failures are
a key concept when assessing a multi-barrier system, and reviews on the causes and
consequences of latent barrier failures are available (Reason, 1997; Pidgeon and
O'Leary, 2000; Sonnemans et al., 2010). Barrier performance is influenced by a
multitude of factors, including technological and resource limitations, political and
social issues (EU free market agreement), and human factors. Understanding how these
influence each individual process/event provides insight for the development of risk
mitigation strategies, if intervention is at all possible.
A key feature of our method is its flexibility, which is the capacity of the model to
update input data (OIE, 2011c; Ahl, 1996). The structure provided by the FEP list and
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character of each process/event individually allows for updating sections of the input
data without influencing the remaining system components. Updating can be performed
in light of new, relevant data thus increasing the accuracy of the results. As government
policies change and new intervention strategies are implemented, the ability to update is
valuable for maintaining relevant political and economic context.
The models purpose contrasts with that of conventional scenario based quantitative
methods in that it was developed for use on a regular basis to provide an estimation of
how changes in factors exterior to the system (political economical, new outbreaks)
affect behaviour. For example, Defra is compromised in developing a qualitative
assessment of the risk factors associated with disease import for each new outbreak
detected worldwide (Defra, 2010b). In light of the limitations presented by qualitative
expert based methods in providing system overviews of the risks, we suggest
application of the both models in tandem. This allows confirmation and validation of
the priorities identified, and if necessary, informs on intervention strategies in short
time. Furthermore, it allows for the development of a feedback loop between the two
models, generating increasing accuracy of the results.
In consideration of the exploratory nature of the method developed and the scarcity of
data in literature, particular attention was given here to model validation. The internal
validation process was influenced by publications on IRA good practice (OIE, 2011c;
Murray, 2002; Ahl, 1996). Furthermore, the method development process was closely
followed by a Technical Advisory Group composed of experts from Defra, VLA and
other institutions, whose role was to challenge the approach and provide alternatives to
the model, improving it robustness. The model presents a number of limitations in
comparison with conventional risk assessment method. For example, it focuses
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inwardly and does not account for disease prevalence at source. At its core the model
remains an expert based-assessment and is consequentially susceptible to expert biases.
We suggest to limit the application of the model into providing a comparison between
the several features and process/events considered, their behaviour and influence in
system behaviour; and avoid using the model, in absolute values, such as to predict the
number of years between outbreaks. In spite of these limitations, this represents the
first attempt to develop a model that provides a systemic perspective over the risk
associated with animal disease.
6.5 conclusion
We propose a network model for the examination of systemic risks from exotic animal
disease incursions at the policy level. This model complements the conventional tools
adopted for IRA and allows the identification of system priorities, defining key areas of
intervention for the development of risk mitigation strategies. Its flexibility allows for a
constant update of input data and can be used alongside Defra’s qualitative template to
assess the risk of disease introduction with each new EAD outbreak, outside the UK.
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THE ELICITATION PROCESS7
This chapter describes in detail the elicitation method used to gather information from
experts. This method of elicitation provides the data, to be inputted into the model
described in Chapter 6. Applications of the method are described in Chapters 8 and 9.
7.1 Introduction
The method developed to study the events associated with the incursion of exotic
animal diseases into the UK relies on extensive data to characterise the behaviour of the
various components within the system, particularly when considering that behaviour is
defined by the frequency of movements and the efficiency of the controls between
nodes. Research literature is limited in providing the necessary information to run the
model. Where data is unavailable, to overcome data scarcity, expert knowledge has
been applied with successful results. However, the use of expert knowledge involves
developing a knowledge acquisition protocol and elicitation exercises. This presents a
series of challenges.
There are a variety of knowledge retrieval techniques that have been applied in previous
elicitation exercises. Selecting between these depends greatly on the objective of the
project and the expected output from the elicitation exercise. Selection also depends on
the assessors understanding of the problem, the approach to solve it and of the assessors
understanding of what composes knowledge (Compton and Jansen, 1990).
Consequentially, the development of an elicitation protocol becomes a practical
exercise, which is often guided by a process of trial and error.
The available literature on the practical aspects of developing a knowledge acquisition
protocol is limited. Furthermore, the majority of expert based IRA fail to make explicit
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or even reference the technique used for elicitation (Defra, 2010b; Sabirovic and Hall,
2004), where the exception is the work developed by Horst et al. (1996). The
parameters over which knowledge is elicited are specified, but the exact technique and
interaction with the experts is not described. This is equally true for expert based
studies applied to other fields (Compton and Jansen, 1990). Similarly, method reviews
explain the nature and objective of the exercises but fail to provide a protocol for
gathering expert knowledge (O'Hagan, 1998; Neale, 1988; Cooke and Goossens, 2000;
Olson and Rueter, 1987).
Limitations in the number of experts and in time available with them have to be factored
in (Cooke, 1994; Liou, 1992; Meyer and Booker, 2001). Such limitations play a
significant role in the selection of the method, as failing to complete the proposed tasks
may render the data generated useless and overburdening of experts may compromise
data quality (Cooke, 1994; Cooke, 1991).
7.2 The knowledge acquisition protocol
The development of a knowledge acquisition exercise is more than a theoretical exercise
and the quality of the elicitation depends greatly on the experience of the assessor and
on his capacity to learn from previous failures. As the opportunity for trial and error
with an expert panel was absent, the techniques selected focus on ensuring that an eight
hour workshop was sufficient to provide all the necessary data to run the model.
Unfortunately, the impact of such decisions resulted in discarding complex methods of
elicitation, such as a Delphi, delft or conjoint techniques in favour of a more simplistic
yet time efficient methods (Horst et al., 1998; Brown, 1968; Cooke and Goossens,
2008).
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The knowledge acquisition protocol is represented in Figure 7.1. The protocol includes
two stages of elicitation. The first stage focuses on selecting the components of the
network to be considered, an activity performed in preparation to the workshop. The
second stage of the process involves characterising the behaviour of the individual
components. This was the central activity of the elicitation workshop. The
development of the elicitation exercises was influenced by the procedure guide for
structured expert judgment development by Cooke and Goossens (2000), with expert
selection based in domain expertise, experience and availability (Liou, 1992). A
detailed display of the elicitation procedures follows:
Figure 7.1 Diagram of the knowledge acquisition protocol
[Key] The knowledge acquisition protocol includes a preparation stage and two separate
elicitation exercises
Assessor ExpertOutput
1st Stage
2nd stage
Preparatory
work
Unstructured interview
Network
[nodes]
Expert elicitation workshop
Questionnaire
Training and calibration
Network [nodes
& arcs]
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7.2.1 Stage one – a collection of network nodes
The first stage focuses on developing a list of components that define the system. From
a network perspective, this involves defining them as nodes of the network. This
selection adopts a structure that differs from classic scoping or screening techniques,
where a large number of elements are proposed and subsequently excluded based on
their value and significance to the models objective (Pollard et al., 2008a; DH, 2001).
Instead, the model focuses on developing a comprehensive analysis, where all
theoretical factors and pathways of exposure that may play a role in introducing the
disease have to be included, regardless of significance. The adopted technique follows
two principles:
System boundaries defines the system. Boundary variations are noticeable in the
difference between closed and open systems. Closed systems have defined boundaries
and are isolated from the influence of factors exterior to the system, for example a
manufacturing process (Murthy and Krishnamurthy, 2009). Open systems on the other
hand, have loose boundaries as these systems are influenced by exterior factors, making
it harder to discern between what is to be included in the system and what is to be
excluded. Open systems include most systems that develop organically such as
organisations, ecosystems and most importantly, the system associated with IRA
(Pearce and Merletti, 2006).
System size relates directly to the number of nodes considered in the network developed
(Murthy and Krishnamurthy, 2009; Mitchell, 2006; Newman, 2003). The greater the
number of nodes the greater the detail of the information produced. However, this
comes at a cost regarding information needs, as the inclusion of extra nodes involves
collecting extra information regarding the characterisation of that node’s behaviour and
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of its relation with the network. Consider the following formula determining the
number of variables to be elicited by the experts for the classic swine fever assessment,
which considered two variables assessed per arc. The formula is v = 2n ( n-1), where n
represents the number of nodes and v the number of variables that need assessing. A
network including 15 nodes involves the elicitation of 420 variables. The inclusion of
an extra node increases the number of variables to 480 that is 60 extra variables to elicit.
The aggregation of components, based on behaviour and controls in place, presents the
solution to control the size of the network. Components, that are considered to present a
similar behaviour by experts and which are controlled by the same barriers were
aggregated into a single node, thus maintaining the network at a manageable size while
minimising the compromise to comprehensiveness.
The development of the network involved the elicitation of knowledge through a series
of interviews. These were unstructured but focused interviews with high level officials,
responsible for overseeing different areas of the system, including exotic animal disease
specialists, border controls, animal health and food safety interviews (Cooke, 1994;
Liou, 1992; Neale, 1988). Preparatory work involved collecting an extensive list of
components that may play a role in enabling the incursion of an EAD and of the
available controls preventing EAD outbreaks. Examples are available in the literature
review (Section 1.3). The review was guided by a document published by Defra in
2010, “Exotic Animal Disease - Risk Pathways and Countermeasures: Report” (Defra,
2011a), and complemented by an extensive revision of the IRA, both expert and
scenario based, and epidemiologic reports. The aim of the interviews was to define the
nodes, based on the components and controls identified and complementing them where
an expert felt it necessary. Due to the limited time available with the experts, to
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accelerate the development of a final version of the network, the information collected
in the previous interview influenced the subsequent one and the network diagram was
updated with each interview.
Expert selection focused on developing an informed oversight of the system. Expert
requirements involved characterising the EAD sources, a general understanding of the
system, its components and behaviour, and understanding of farming system associated
with receptors. The expertise selected included:
 Individuals involved in the oversight of controls on international trade and
movement of animal goods across borders.
 Individuals involved in the oversight of movements of animal and animal goods,
veterinary controls and movements with the potential for transmission of the
EAD within UK borders.
 Individuals with a deep understanding of the production systems associated with
receptors to the EAD.
The TAG meeting members played a significant role in identifying individuals to invite
as experts. Similarly, guidance was retrieved from list of experts used to develop
Defra’s Risk Pathways and Vulnerabilities Report (Defra, 2011a). Additional experts
were added if interviewers suggested a specific expertise or individuals who could
contribute to overcoming issues identified. This was the case for the first application to
CSF where David Harris was included following previous interviews. In some cases,
the experts selected for the interview suggested members from within their team to be
integrated. For example, this was the case in two of the four interviews used to develop
the CSF network, which were conducted with two experts simultaneously.
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The output from this exercise was a compilation of network nodes alongside a summary
definition for each (Annex 1 for CSF & Annex 5 for FMD). The nodes and respective
definition form the basis of the work to develop during the second elicitation stage - the
workshop. Following the interviewing stage the developed network was sent to the
experts interviewed for comment. To ensure the validity of the final version, it was then
tested and commented upon by the expert panel in a technical advisory meeting.
7.2.2 Stage two – assessing network connectivity
The second stage of elicitation involves assessing the network connectivity. The first
step in achieving this is the identification of the seed variables (Cooke and Goossens,
2000). These can also be called performance variables, and will be the focus of the
assessment. In this case, they are responsible for characterising the likelihood of
disease transmission between two nodes and are based on two variables. These
variables were defined with the assistance of experts during the interviews aimed at
developing the network nodes and TAG meetings. The first variable describes the
frequency of movements between two nodes. The second variable describes the
efficiency of the control measures in detecting and eliminating the disease agent
between those two nodes. The description of the variable is available in full in Section
6.3. The subsequent activity was the development of two independent ranking scales to
assess the frequency of movements between nodes and the efficiency of the controls in
place. Feedback from a technical advisory group alongside the data collected from the
interviews provided the guidelines for the development of the scales. These are two
independent frequency scales based on a logarithmic progression, which allows
accounting for the high amplitude of values considered (Fleiss et al., 2003; Cobb, 1998).
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The scales used for the CSF workshop are available in Figure 7.2. the complete form is
available in Annex 3.
Table 7.1 Results of the questionnaire put forward to experts, regarding their area of
expertise.
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Expert 1 * * * * *
Expert 2 * * * * * * *
Expert 3 * * * * * * * * *
Expert 4 * * * * * * *
Expert 5 * * * * * * * * * *
Expert 6 * * * * * * * * * * * *
Expert 7 * * *
Expert 8 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Expert 9 * * * * * * * * * * *
Expert 10 *
Expert 11 * * * * * * * * *
Expert 12 * * * * * * *
Expert 13 * * * * * *
Expert 14 * * * * * *
Expert 15
Expert 16 * * *
Expert 17 * * * * * * *
Expert 18
Expert 19 * * * * * * *
Expert 20 * * *
Expert 21 * * *
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The next step in the development of the second elicitation stage is the expert selection.
Expert selection plays a key role in the development of a knowledge acquisition
exercise (O'Hagan, 1998; Neale, 1988; Cooke and Goossens, 2000; Olson and Rueter,
1987). The second elicitation exercise – workshop – involved the development of a
new list of expert needs. Here, the target was “practitioners’ ” expertise, that is
experience in controlling or managing the work in specific nodes of the network (in the
field). The process of selection involved:
 A list expressing expertise requirements for the exercise, by enumerating expert
roles and agencies, was put forward to Defra partners. Based on the criteria a
list of experts was developed by Defra partners and invitations sent (Annex 4).
 Following the definition of a final list of experts, a questionnaire was sent, via
email, containing a short description of the task at hand and a simple question
box to record their node preferences (simple tick the box). The invitational
email is available in Annex 4.
The replies provided data on the experts’ area of expertise. This ensured the availability
of expert knowledge across all nodes considered in the network (Table 7.1). This
information provided the basis for developing the composition of expert groups, which
were the basis of the workshop (Annex 4). Expert availability played a significant
factor in the experts selected for the workshop.
7.3 Classic Swine Fever Workshop - the elicitation protocol
The elicitation protocol was generated from a solution of compromises between the
volume and quality of data, whilst considering expert availability. The 28 experts used
for the CSF elicitation were available for a period of eight hours. During this period
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interactions with the experts included training and calibration as well as the elicitation
of 544 variables. The agenda for the workshop (Table 7.2) describes the activities and
material used during each exercise. A considerable part of the day activities was
devoted to communication with experts using PowerPoint presentations. These aimed
to inform on the task at hand, to help the experts interiorise the concepts of the
elicitation and the aim of the project, and on how to use the ranking scales (PowerPoint
presentations not included in the thesis for brevity).
Calibration exercises followed. The aim of these exercises (performed exclusively in
the CSF workshop) was to accustom experts with the idea that any connection between
nodes, regardless of how unlikely, must be included. These used prints-outs of the
nodes and their definitions and A3 printouts of the interaction matrix (these are similar
to that presented in Figure 8.2, however with the off-diagonal cells blank). Experts
were asked to identify in the matrix all possible connection between nodes. The
collective output of the exercises is displayed in the interaction matrix (Annex 3 –
Figure 17.2). Experts filled the matrix almost in its entirety, which if very unlikely
connections are to be considered was the expected result. The output resulting from
these exercises was not inputted into the model.
Following expert training, experts focused on eliciting the seed variables. Due to the
limited time available with the experts and the limitations in attendance, the technique
selected involved direct elicitation of the variables using group consensus (3 to 4
experts) to ensure discussion between experts. To meet the workshop goals, experts
were separated into two sets of eight groups, therefore the groups were A1, A2... A8,
B1... B7, B8. Each expert was included in one group in set A and one group in set B
(Annex 4). The workshop was set up so that multiple groups could work
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simultaneously and therefore multiple nodes were assessed during the same time slot
(Table 7.2). This allows for quick progress in generating data but involves heavy
preparation work, particularly regarding expert selection and allocation.
The exercise was preceded by a presentation, which reinforced notions on how to fill
the elicitation form and the importance of filling all fields. Each group was instructed
to assess a specific network node and the task proposed included assessing all outgoing
connections from that node. Structure to the process was provided in the form of
guiding questions to completing the exercise form, for each assessed connection. A
projector displayed the guiding questions for the full duration of the exercise. These
were the following:
1) Is the connection between node A to node X possible, where A is the node
allocated to the expert and X any other node present in the network? YES or
NO
2) If YES how frequent are movements between node A and X, using left side
scale? (Figure 7.2)
3) If YES how efficient are the barriers preventing the movement of
contaminated goods between them, using right side scale? (Figure 7.2)
4) Assuming the existing barriers are not 100% efficient, what is in your
opinion the cause for barrier failure, using the comments section? (Figure
7.2)
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Figure 7.2 Elicitation form used in the CSF workshop to retrieve the seed variables from
experts
The values for the variables were elicited through group discussion and expert
consensus. The material used for the elicitation exercises included printouts of the node
collection, documents with node definitions and unfilled printouts of the interaction
matrix (Annex 1). Each group was provided with multiple elicitation forms, which
provided the scales and comment sections necessary to characterise the outgoing
connections detected between the node allocated and all other nodes considered within
the network (with the exception of source nodes) (Annex 3). To aid experts in
maintaining a discussion that was in line with the workshop objectives, mediators (João
and Phil) moved from group to group to ensure the discussion and outputs produced
were of the desired quality. Each group filled multiple forms. Once all groups
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completed the task, all possible connections within the network had been assessed and
network connectivity complete, a network can be mapped. The output of the workshop
is presented in the form of a FEP list in Annex 2.
Table 7.2 Agenda for the CSF workshop
Agenda Task (performer) Expert activity Handout material Objective Resources needed - prior to event
10:00 Introductory
presentation (Edgar
and João)
Listen & question None [Introduction] Explaining the
objectives and key concepts of
the project. Assure concepts are
understood and use of language /
terminology consistent
Powerpoint presentation, Glossary
of terms - poster [A0]
10:25 Edgar, João Divide experts into 5 / 6
working groups
None [Diversity of backgrounds] To
ensure that groups are divers in
background
Group allocations
10:30 Group work (Experts) Using the network diagram
and interaction matrices
[presented] develop
possible scenarios based
on the available nodes
Network node diagrams
in A2 sheet and IM
(A3)provide to each group
& Handout with the
specification of what each
node represents.
[Warm-up & engagement] Start
discussion regarding possible
import routes and division of
those routs through the
presented nodes.
A2 sheets; Node specification; A3
Interaction matrix with embedded
nodes
11:15 Experts Break None Rest / discussion Tea & Coffee booked
11:30 Explain task (João) Listen & question None To ensure that the task is
understood
Powerpoint presentation [above]
11:45 Group work (Experts) Group to sub-divide within
each group - according to
expertise by node
None Ensure the group agree that the
person assessing each node is the
most appropriate
Use earlier powerpoint
presentation
11:50 Individual work Each expert will assess the
likelihood of connection
between nodes.
Copy of the IM filed by
the group the expert was
previously included in &
limited Node Connection
Forms.
Data Collection. Each expert will
assess the likelihood of a
connection between nodes.
Assure that the task is equally
divided be expert of each group.
No expert should assess more
than 15 connections.
Copies of A3 interation matrices,
copy of A3 network map
completed by group; A4 Node
Evaluation Forms (Endless supply)
12:45 Lunch None - Lunch None Rest / discussion Buffet lunch - pre booked
12:45 Preparation during
lunch: João: Develop
a simulation from
one of the group's
output; Facilitator:
prepare copies
None - João preparing
model in background
None Introduce connections into the
interaction matrix within the
spread sheet; Run simulation;
Present output to experts at the
end of the work shop.
Prepare laptop programme - check
with 'dummy run'; Organise copies
of: Completed A3 interation
matrices, copy of A3 network map
completed by group
13:00 Individual work Each expert will assess the
likelihood of connection
between nodes.
Copy of the IM filed by
the group the expert was
previously included in &
limited Node Connection
Forms.
Rearrange expert groups; provide
different node to assess; and
Repeat tast set for [13:15]
Copies of A3 interation matrices,
copy of A3 network map
completed by group; A4 Node
Evaluation Forms (Endless supply)
14:45 Individual work Each expert will assess the
likelihood of connection
between nodes.
Copy of the IM filed by
the group the expert was
previously included in &
limited Node Connection
Forms.
Rearrange expert groups; provide
different node to assess; and
Repeat tast set for [13:15]
Copies of A3 interation matrices,
copy of A3 network map
completed by group; A4 Node
Evaluation Forms (Endless supply)
14:45 Individual work Each expert will assess the
likelihood of connection
between nodes.
Copy of the IM filed by
the group the expert was
previously included in &
limited Node Connection
Forms.
Rearrange expert groups; provide
different node to assess; and
Repeat tast set for [13:15]
Copies of A3 interation matrices,
copy of A3 network map
completed by group; A4 Node
Evaluation Forms (Endless supply)
15:30 Output presentation
(João)
Listen & question none Provide a sense of involvement
to the experts
15:35 Closure (Edgar) Listen & question None
Workshop Agenda
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Table 7.3 Agenda for the FMD workshop the colour scheme
Agenda Task (performer) Expert activity Handout material Objective Resources needed - prior to event
10:00 Introductory
presentation (Edgar)
Listen & question None [Introduction] Explaining the
objectives and key concepts of
the project. Assure concepts are
understood and use of language /
terminology consistent
PowerPoint presentation, Glossary
of terms - poster [A0], Node
specification
10:15 João Divide experts into 5 / 6
working groups
None [Diversity of backgrounds] To
ensure that groups are divers in
background
Group allocations
10:30 Group work (Experts) Using the network diagram
and interaction matrices
[presented] develop
possible scenarios based
on the available nodes
Network node diagrams
in A2 sheet and IM
(A3)provide to each group
& Handout with the
specification of what each
node represents.
[Warm-up & engagement] Start
discussion regarding possible
import routes and division of
those routs through the
presented nodes.
A2 sheets; Node specification; A3
Interaction matrix with embedded
nodes
11:00 Experts Break None Rest / discussion Tea & Coffee booked
11:15 Group work (Experts) Group to sub-divide within
each group - according to
expertise by node
None Ensure the group agree that the
person assessing each node is the
most appropriate
Name tags prepared during brake
11:15 Explain task (João) Listen & question None To ensure that the task is
understood
PowerPoint presentation [above]
11:35 Individual work Each expert will assess the
likelihood of connection
between nodes.
Copy of the IM filed by
the group the expert was
previously included in &
limited Node Connection
Forms.
Data Collection. Each expert will
assess the likelihood of a
connection between nodes.
Assure that the task is equally
divided be expert of each group.
No expert should assess more
than 15 connections.
Copies of A3 interaction matrices,
copy of A3 network map
completed by group; A4 Node
Evaluation Forms (Endless supply)
12:00 Break task expert rank top five
connection random node
Node list with number 1
to 5
Validation and concentration
break
12:05 Continuation Each expert will assess the
likelihood of connection
between nodes.
Copy of the IM filed by
the group the expert was
previously included in &
limited Node Connection
Forms.
Data Collection. Each expert will
assess the likelihood of a
connection between nodes.
Assure that the task is equally
divided be expert of each group.
No expert should assess more
than 15 connections.
Copies of A3 interaction matrices,
copy of A3 network map
completed by group; A4 Node
Evaluation Forms (Endless supply)
11:25 Break task expert rank top five
connection random node
Node list with number 1
to 5
Validation and concentration
break
12:30 Continuation Revise the comments Copy of the IM filed by
the group the expert was
previously included in &
Certification that the comment
section is files
Copies of A3 interaction matrices,
copy of A3 network map
completed by group; A4 Node12:45 Lunch None - Lunch None Rest / discussion Buffet lunch - pre booked
12:45 Preparation during
lunch: João: Develop
a simulation from
one of the group's
output; Facilitator:
prepare copies
None - João preparing
model in background
None Introduce connections into the
interaction matrix within the
spread sheet; Run simulation;
Present output to experts at the
end of the work shop.
Prepare laptop programme - check
with 'dummy run';
13:30 Explain task (João) Listen & question None To ensure that the task is
understood
PowerPoint presentation [above]
13:40 Individual work Each expert will assess the
likelihood of connection
between nodes.
Copy of the IM filed by
the group the expert was
previously included in &
limited Node Connection
Forms.
Data Collection. Each expert will
assess the likelihood of a
connection between nodes.
Assure that the task is equally
divided be expert of each group.
No expert should assess more
than 15 connections.
Copies of A3 interaction matrices,
copy of A3 network map
completed by group; A4 Node
Evaluation Forms (Endless supply)
12:00 Break task expert rank top five
connection random node
Node list with number 1
to 5
Validation and concentration
break
13:40 Continuation Each expert will assess the
likelihood of connection
between nodes.
Copy of the IM filed by
the group the expert was
previously included in &
limited Node Connection
Forms.
Data Collection. Each expert will
assess the likelihood of a
connection between nodes.
Assure that the task is equally
divided be expert of each group.
No expert should assess more
Copies of A3 interaction matrices,
copy of A3 network map
completed by group; A4 Node
Evaluation Forms (Endless supply)
12:00 Break task expert rank top five
connection random node
Node list with number 1
to 5
Validation and concentration
break
14:55 Continuation Each expert will assess the
likelihood of connection
between nodes.
Copy of the IM filed by
the group the expert was
previously included in &
limited Node Connection
Forms.
Rearrange expert groups; provide
different node to assess; and
repeat task set for [11:50]
Copies of A3 interaction matrices,
copy of A3 network map
completed by group; A4 Node
Evaluation Forms (Endless supply)
14:50 Experts Break None Rest / discussion Tea & Coffee booked
15:00 Avian Influenza Listen & question None
15:15 Avian Influenza
elicitation
presentation (João)
Listen & question None To ensure that the task is
understood
PowerPoint presentation [above]
15:30 tasks closure
Closure/Output
presentation (João)
Listen & question none Provide a sense of involvement
to the experts
15:35 Closure (Edgar) Listen & question None
Workshop Agenda
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7.3.1 Foot-and-Mouth Disease elicitations
This project involved studying the introduction of two exotic animal diseases,
specifically classical swine fever and foot-and-mouth disease. There were some
differences in the model developed to study them, which forced modification to the
elicitation protocol. The changes to the model, and subsequently to the elicitation
process, followed a revision of the output produced for CSF by the members of the
TAG. The revision highlighted the benefits of increasing the level of detail with which
the nature of the movements between nodes was recorded and analysed. As a result, the
modelling output changed by allowing the capacity to differentiate between legal and
illegal movements and airborne transmission of the disease agent. The changes to the
model are explained in detail in Chapter 9. These involved the multiplication of the
seed variables by node, which increased from two to five. For brevity, this section
focuses on the differences between processes and does not provide a complete
description of the process of elicitation. The elicitation exercise, in its core remained
unchanged.
7.3.1.1 The elicitation process
The process of expert selection (for both elicitation stages) and the elicitation procedure
used in the first stage of elicitation were similar to those used for the CSF workshop.
Here changes to the collection of nodes reflected the differences between the disease
agent’s transmission characteristics as well as to accommodate criticism from the TAG
group following the first application to CSF. The process for selection and interaction
with experts during the first stage of elicitation followed similar procedures to those
described for CSF. Also, the exercise followed the same objectives and output format
as that produced for CSF. The material presented to the experts to develop the
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exercises is described in Table 7.3. The workshop plan presented for the FMD
workshop reflects the need to provide additional outputs (from two to five variables),
whilst dealing with a smaller number of experts (Table 7.3). As a result, the following
changes were made:
 Network nodes and respective definitions were revised to consider the
transmission characteristic of FMD, and improved clarity in the separation
between source, common and receptor nodes (Annex 5). This resulted in the
expansion of the number of nodes considered in the network.
 Due to the increase in the number of nodes and the smaller number of experts
available for the workshop, the calibration and training exercises were excluded
from the agenda (Table 7.3).
 To manage a smaller pool of available experts, whilst requiring the assessment
of a larger number of nodes, expert groups were composed of 2 to 3 experts
(allocated to assess a node according to the stated node preferences) and each
expert assessed 3 nodes. Each group was provided with printouts of the node
collection and their definitions (Annex 5), and unfilled printouts of the
interaction matrix.
 Groups were provided with forms to record five variables for each connection
(Annex 6). These were incidence and barrier failure rate for legal and illegal
movements and barrier failure rate for airborne transmission. To ensure a
methodical analysis of all outgoing connections, a booklet, containing all
possibly available outgoing connections from the allocated node to the
remaining nodes in the network was presented to the experts. A connection
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deemed impossible was characterised by the phrase not possible in the comment
box. Each group was provided with a booklet tailored for their allocated node.
The output produced is similar to that developed for CSF, however discriminating
between legal, illegal and airborne movement.
7.4 Data verification
Verification and validation of the data is an important step when performing an
elicitation exercise (Cooke, 1994; Cooke and Goossens, 2000). However the limited
time available to perform the elicitation alongside the extensive amount of data to elicit,
meant that validation and verification exercises could not be included in the protocol
developed for the workshop. Consequentially, data verification exercises took place
post elicitation. The assessor verified the gathered data for inconsistencies or missing
data values and comments. The experts responsible for assessing those nodes and arcs
were contacted through telephone conference or if not possible via email, and asked to
confirm or correct registered values.
7.5 Conclusions
Expert knowledge represents the sole source of information used data as input to run the
model. Therefore, the development of the elicitation protocol plays a central role in
ensuring the success of the study involving a trade-off between the large volume of data
to be elicited and the quality of data produced. There is significant information
regarding the necessary exercises to ensure a successful elicitation and the biasing effect
in expert judgement by heuristics (Cooke, 1994; Liou, 1992; Cooke and Goossens,
2000; Slottje et al., 2008). However, it is lacking in their practical aspects, namely the
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development of exercises to retrieve information and experts’ reaction to them. In light
of these omissions, elicitation exercises become dependent on the assessor’s experience.
The elicitation protocol presented is not entirely robust, presenting vulnerabilities
regarding data verification opportunities and in the limited training of experts.
However, given the information available in the literature, the limitations in the
resources available and the assessor’s experience in developing elicitation exercises,
this is the best fitting protocol to ensure the objectives of the model were met.
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A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO THE RISK ANALYSIS OF8
EXOTIC ANIMAL DISEASE II: ILLUSTRATION FOR
CLASSICAL SWINE FEVER
This chapter presents the first application of the method described in Chapter 6, to study
the UK’s vulnerability to the introduction of Classic Swine Fever. Here, its application
is described in detail and the results presented. Furthermore, the methods strengths and
weaknesses are discussed, in comparison with risk analysis developed for CSF using
conventional risk assessment methods.
Submitted to Risk Analysis Journal:
Delgado, J., Pollard, S.T.J., Snary, E., Black, E, Prpich, G., Longhurst, P., “A systems
approach to the policy level risk assessment of exotic animal disease: network model
and application to classical swine fever” (Submitted to Risk Analysis Journal on 24
January 2012).
8.1 Introduction
Globalisation and trade intensification have increased the vulnerability of developed
countries to exotic animal disease (EAD) outbreaks (Otte et al., 2004); so much so that
countries today are no more protected against EAD incursion than they were two
decades ago (EFSA, 2006). Classical swine fever (CSF) is a notifiable animal disease
caused by the CSF virus (CSFv) belonging to the genus Pestivirus of family
Flaviviridae (Weesendorp et al., 2008; Moennig, 2000). Wild and domestic swine are
natural hosts for the disease, and its manifestation varies according to the virulence of
the strain, which may cause a range of mild to acute and sub-acute infections
(Weesendorp et al., 2008; Moennig, 2000). CSF is an example of an EAD that
challenges a country’s defences continually. It remains present worldwide with positive
detections in swine populations within Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas from
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2005 to 2010. CSF is endemic in parts of Europe having been detected in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Hungary and Slovakia in 2010 and in Germany in 2009, (Table 8.1).
Table 8.1 Number of outbreaks and of infected animals worldwide from Jan, 2005 to Jan,
2011; with positive countries within Europe analysed in detail.
Though considered eradicated from the UK since 1966, CSF is highly contagious.
Numerous routes of transmission exist (Table 8.2). The potential introduction of CSF
via multiple transmission mechanisms places considerable pressure on the UK’s
capacity to prevent CSF outbreaks. The diversity and quantity of national and
international animal movements, legal or otherwise, further enhances this increase. For
example, the UK is exposed to the importation of legal and illegal meat consignments,
the movement of people, e.g. tourists and migrant works, and live animal imports,
amongst numerous other potential introduction routes (Defra, 2011a; De Vos et al.,
2004; Hartnett et al., 2007). The detection of CSF in the UK puts in motion a
contingency plan that focuses on containment and eradication of the disease agent.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Bosnia and Herzegovina 40 35 33 324
Bulgaria 5 3 3 1 4
Croatia 13 112 4
Former Yug. Rep. of Macedonia 2 2 4
France 1 1
Germany 24 52 11 2
Hungary 164 27 382
Montenegro (2007-2011) 16
Romania 1075 1438 159
Russia 8 2 7 1 4
Serbia (2007-2011) 18
Serbia and Montenegro (2005-2006) 489 401
Slovakia 4 5 3 24
8 9 10 6 4 3
17 18 18 14 13 10
Year
CSF outbreaks
Number of
animals testing
positive to
CSF per year
in European
countries
European countries reporting at least one CSF
outbreak/year (from 49 countries)
Countries outside Europe reporting at least one
CSF outbreak/year (from 139 countries)
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Measures to prevent disease spread include trade restrictions and the elimination of
potential disease sources through the elimination of livestock (Defra, 2010a). These
measures contribute to the high costs of protection against CSF outbreaks (Morgan and
Prakash, 2006; Saatkamp et al., 2000).
Understanding the risks posed through different transmission routes and the efficacy of
protective barriers to control against introduction offers a means to improve
preparedness against CSF outbreaks. A common approach for understanding the risks
associated with CSF is the import risk assessment (IRA). Conventional IRAs, routinely
used by governments (Defra, 2011c; Sabirovic and Hall, 2004), employ expert-based
qualitative methods to provide an overview of the risks posed by each new outbreak and
(or scenario-based quantitative assessments) to investigate specific pathways of
introduction in detail (De Vos et al., 2004; Bronsvoort et al., 2008). Risk analysts
suggest, as there are limitations to each approach, that a combination of methods may
be necessary to secure a diagnostic understanding of the system responsible for
preventing disease introductions. This in turn would provide valuable insights into the
risk management options (Taylor, 2003; Peeler et al., 2006). Systemic models produce
a more representative analysis of system behaviours, thus enabling risk analysts to
better detect the interplay between improvements to individual components of the
system and the improved protection afforded to the system as a whole. When used for
CSF, these models can improve our understanding of the events that drive the overall
likelihood of livestock exposures to the agent. This information then facilitates failure
analysis (Murthy and Krishnamurthy, 2009; Dangerfield and Morris, 1992; Zio, 2009).
Such assessments are not yet available in the literature, but proposed Chapter 6.
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Transmission
modes
Classic Swine Fever
Proven
in Lab
Disease
Import
References
Animal movements + + (Moennig, 2000; Terpstra, 1987; Elbers et al.,
1999; Artois et al., 2002; OIE, 2002; AHA, 2009;
Stegeman et al., 1997)
Transport vehicles + + (Weesendorp et al., 2008; Moennig, 2000; OIE,
2002; AHA, 2009; Stegeman et al., 1997)
Human contacts + + (Terpstra, 1987; OIE, 2002; Stegeman et al., 1997;
Ribbens et al., 2004)
Meat based food
products
+ + (OIE, 2002; OIE, 2002; Ribbens et al., 2004)
Wild boar + + (Moennig, 2000; Artois et al., 2002; OIE, 2002;
Fritzemeier et al., 2000)
Airborne + - (Elbers et al., 1999; OIE, 2002; Stegeman et al.,
1997)
Other carriers
mechanical vectors)
+ - (Liess, 1987)
Iatrogenic transmission + - (Liess, 1987)
Artificial insemination + + (De Smit et al., 1999; Elbers et al., 1999; Stegeman
et al., 1997)
Vertical transmission + - (Elbers et al., 1999; OIE, 2002)
Table 8.2 The transmission mechanisms for classic swine fever [CSF]
Routes of EAD introduction are the object of considerable speculation and, at times, the
result of the systemic failure from the breakdown of multiple protection barriers, the
combination of which might be considered unlikely. Examples of animal disease
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outbreaks suspected to have occurred through such pathways are the UK’s CSF
outbreak of 2000 in East Anglia (Gibbens et al., 2000) and the avian influenza outbreak
of 2007, in Suffolk (Defra, 2007c). The root causes of both outbreaks remain uncertain
and is attributed to an unspecified “very unlikely occurrence and isolated event” (Defra,
2007c). In light of the uncertainties associated with the pathways of CSF introduction,
and of the roles played by different components of the system, we suggest a systemic
analysis is necessary to provide improved insight at the policy level of potential disease
introduction mechanisms. This work focuses on understanding the sequence of unlikely
events that may result in a CSF outbreak, and the influence these events may have on
compromising the protective barriers in place to protect against an outbreak. We apply
a bottom-up network approach to further our understanding of EAD introductions,
releases and exposure pathways. Knowledge about the vulnerabilities of a country’s
protection system can provide policy officials and decision makers with valuable
insights about where to allocate resources that maximise protection, thus minimising the
exposure to the CSFv.
8.2 Methods
A network model was used to assess the probability of UK swine herds being exposed
to CSFv. Its design was structured to focus on the interaction between components of
the system, represented as nodes, and the controls in place that reduce the likelihood of
CSF exposure (Figure 8.1). To assess risks at the policy level, the model first requires a
definition of the system. This includes several components, including the livestock and
meat industries, facilities for trade, human population and pet shops as well as a mix of
organisations and controls protecting the UK from outbreak (Defra, 2011a). Also
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important is an explicit description of CSFv transmission characteristics that play an
important role in understanding system behaviour.
8.2.1 System definition
Transmission mechanisms for the introduction and spread of CSFv are summarised in
Table 8.2. The first row describes the transmission modes demonstrated under
laboratory condition; the second row describes the transmission modes detected in
epidemiology reports from past outbreaks. The ‘system’ is defined here as the physical
components that enable and prevent an incursion of the CSFv, the known transmission
mechanisms and the regulations and tests used by the physical components to detect an
incursion (Defra, 2011a). The structure of the system is recorded using a list of
features, events and processes (FEP), which provides transparency and serves to record
all assumptions made. The data recorded in the FEP list defines a network of features,
represented as nodes and their adjacent connections, represented as arcs (Figure 8.1).
Further information on network analysis (Borrett and Patten, 2003; Newman, 2003) and
FEP list development (Freeze et al., 2005; Savage et al., 2004) is available. The manner
in which a disease agent (CSFv) and the protective system interact is captured as a
process and included in the FEP list. The term ‘process’ (P) describes the level of
connectivity between two features, as well as the frequency of movement within a
predetermined time interval. This defines an ‘incidence’. The successful transmission
of CSFv between two features depends on an event(s) that enables the agent to avoid
detection and elimination. The nature of this event is recorded and a likelihood
assigned to its potential for occurrence.
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The features (nodes) and their adjacent connections (arcs) constitute the network
(Figure 8.1). Estimations of the likelihood of exposure of livestock to CSFv, whilst
considering the existing controls in place to prevent it, can be achieved using this
system representation. An interaction matrix is one method for codifying a network
model (Borrett and Patten, 2003) (Figure 8.2 for CSF in this study). Here, the diagonal
cells represent the nodes of the network (black) and are described using the features
from the FEP list. The off-diagonal cells are the arcs (white), and include the processes
and associated events of the system. The rows contain all movements outgoing from
the respective node. For example, row 8 represents all outgoing connection from the
node domestic residence, node 08. The columns contain all incoming movements to the
respective node. For example, column 14 contains all incoming movement to the node
domestic and backyard animals, node 14. The movements considered possible, by the
experts, are represented by the filled cells, containing the value for the reduction in
likelihood of system failure associated with intervention in the respective process/event.
The matrix provides for an image of the complete system, form sources to receptors,
and allows a clearer visual of all available connections between nodes.
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Figure 8.1 The network system developed for Classic Swine Fever (CSF)
[Key] Network based on the data recorded by the FEP list: the arc thickness is associated with the influence of that particular arc in system
performance. The outputs of the sensitive analysis define arc influence.
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01 Third
Countries 2.39E-08 2.93E-10 3.65E-14 1.27E-06 4.16E-01 7.38E-13 5.56E-05 1.56E-08 2.51E-07 1.78E-15 4.22E-02 1.64E-05 4.12E-07 5.10E-07
02 EU [Positive]
3.36E-07 3.68E-12 1.27E-06 4.17E-02 7.40E-13 5.58E-06 1.56E-11 2.52E-09 1.92E-14 4.23E-07 1.65E-09 4.14E-08 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 5.11E-06
03 EU
[Negative] 0.00E+00 6.38E-13 2.16E-08 3.65E-13 3.32E-07 7.71E-12 3.71E-09 4.88E-15 2.12E-11 2.55E-11 6.12E-11 2.55E-09 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
04 Border
Inspection Post 6.00E-15 3.57E-12 8.50E-10 0.00E+00 1.92E-07 1.69E-13 2.16E-09 0.00E+00 1.69E-14 1.44E-08 3.53E-11 1.49E-09 1.49E-09 1.49E-09 1.49E-09
05 Laboratories
1.26E-05 4.15E-05 5.55E-05 1.55E-09 2.51E-09 1.91E-14 4.22E-06 1.64E-07 4.12E-08
06
Slaughterhouse 3.80E-12 1.08E-13 0.00E+00 5.47E-12 3.31E-13 6.11E-14 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 4.13E-13 0.00E+00 4.21E-14 3.36E-14 3.38E-12 3.36E-14
07 Livestock
Vehicles 5.55E-07 0.00E+00 5.75E-04 4.83E-13 8.45E-12 3.01E-07 4.13E-11 1.04E-11 3.10E-05 3.09E-07 3.09E-05 3.09E-05
4.52E-04
08 Domestic
residence 2.59E-06 2.35E-03 5.48E-06 3.44E-14 1.50E-03 1.81E-04 4.35E-01 1.81E-02 1.29E-07 1.29E-05 1.29E-07
2.08E-13 1.25E-07 0
09 Petting
zoo/pet shop 6.53E-07 5.89E-09 7.34E-08 9.59E-12 4.13E-08 4.91E-07 1.21E-06
0.00E+00 3.56E-14 2.37E-05 4.57E-10
10 Vet./
fieldsmen 1.12E-11 9.70E-07 1.27E-09 1.89E-05 6.47E-08 1.52E-07 6.70E-03 6.59E-08 6.59E-04 6.59E-04
5.87E-13 3.50E-06 0 0 1.84E-06
11 Waste
disposal plant 0 2.71E-07 1.14E-11
4.36E-12 1.05E-11 1.90E-12 0 2.11E-09
12 Food
markets/
Retailers
3.53E-11 3.03E-09 1.79E-07 4.37E-08 1.86E-05 1.84E-05 1.84E-05
0.00E+00 1.42E-14 0.00E+00 2.89E-10 0.00E+00 3.11E-15
13 Feed factory
1.56E-11 2.11E-15 4.00E-15 2.26E-10 2.26E-07 2.26E-08 2.26E-08
2.15E-07 3.09E-12 9.26E-05 3.03E-04 5.19E-12 4.83E-03 1.10E-07 5.42E-05 7.10E-11
14 Domestic
backyard
animals
3.70E-04 8.92E-04 3.83E-02 2.40E-09 2.40E-05 2.40E-09
1.05E-04 0 1.84E-06 0 0 0.00E+00 1.01E-03
15 Environment
1.67E-13 1.43E-08 0 1.42E-01 1.42E-04
6.06E-12 3.63E-12 2.02E-11 1.01E-09 1.90E-04 1.72E-09 2.13E-08 2.79E-13 1.18E-04 1.43E-01
16 Wildlife
1.46E-07 1.46E-01 1.46E-01 1.46E-04
17 Animal
gathering
18 Farms
Breeders
19 Outdoor
Finishers
20 Indoor
Finishers
Figure 8.2 CSF interaction matrix
[Key] Diagonal cells (black) network nodes, off diagonal cell (white) network arcs: The cell values and colour scheme presents the results of
the local sensitivity analysis, the reduction in likelihood of system failure (Red cell represent a reduction in likelihood on system failure > 10 %;
orange cells a reduction >1 %; and amber cells reduction > 0.1 %,) , where highlighted cells represent specific process/events where
intervention will produce a greater impact in reducing system vulnerability.
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8.2.2 Elicitation process
The literature is incomplete on the causes of failure for the multi barrier system required
for detecting and eliminating CSFv. To overcome this, the model was informed by CSF
transmission data elicited from experts (O'Hagan, 1998; Van der Fels-Klerx et al.,
2002). Twenty-eight experts informed the exercise according to expertise, domain
background, and availability with the aim of providing broad network coverage. The
process of elicitation is described in further detail in Chapter 7. The workshop was 8
hours in duration and included training, as well as elicitation, with senior policy
officials. This was the main information gathering exercise, where the relationships
between the 20 features (nodes) in the network were assessed (Figure 8.1). This
required extensive data input, and to reduce the workload for the experts, small groups
were formed according to expertise (minimum 3 people), and allocated to relevant
nodes. Each group was responsible for assessing all the outgoing connections to the
remaining network nodes. For example, the assessment of node 07 (livestock vehicles)
required assessments of all connections (arcs) adjacent to this node, hence from 0701,
0702, up to 0720. For each cell, experts estimated the incidence and barrier efficacy
(Chapter 7, Figure 7.2) and provided commentary on the causes of failure and the best
and worst case assessment. Incidence is used to represent the number of times a
connection is attempted per week, with or without successful transmission; i.e. the
degree of ‘challenge’ to the system. Barrier failure represents the number of times a
barrier fails to detect and/or eliminate a disease agent by reference to the number of
times a connection is attempted. Two values were retrieved from the experts - a best
and a worst case evaluation of barrier efficacy. The data also included a description of
the events promoting barrier failure and a classification according to error type - human
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and/or system error. Data from the workshop was introduced into an interaction matrix
coded into a pre-programmed Excel TM spreadsheet. The model was used to generate all
scenarios of CSFv introduction, accompanied by a sensitivity analysis to determine the
process/event(s) that had the greatest influence on system performance. Follow up
sessions, via email and telephone conferences, dealt with data verification issues; for
example, missing values, comments and corrections. Results were finally validated by a
sub-group of experts to ensure inputs and outputs were valid and within scope.
8.2.3 Generation of CSF introduction scenarios
Scenarios of CSF introduction are sequences of events that allow CSFv to be exposed to
a UK pig herd. Scenarios were simulated using a pre-programmed Excel™ spreadsheet
that described the network as an interaction matrix (IM, Figure 8.2), and a computer
model that detects any possible sequence of events (to a maximum of successive 5
events) that allow exposure to occur. The likelihood of each scenario is estimated using
the equations described in Section 6.3. The output of the scenario simulation is a list of
all pathways that allow the disease agent to contact the receptor. That list includes a
description of all nodes composing the pathways and a respective likelihood (ܲ)
estimate. The sum of the (ܲ) values from all pathways represents the overall system
performance value, or aggregate likelihood of exposing a pig herd to CSF.
8.2.4 Sensitivity analysis
To analyse the sensitivity of the model’s output to changes in the input, the probability
of transmission in the input parameters was changed using a sensitivity analysis (Frey
and Patil, 2002; Hamby, 1995). The barrier failure rate associated with the
process/events enabling transmission between nodes was nominally reduced by 50%
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(i.e. barriers made less susceptible to failure), simulating an improvement to the controls
of the disease. Two analyses were then performed: a) the effects caused by individual
barrier improvement, using a ‘one-at-a-time’ sensitivity analysis; and b) the
improvement of clusters of barriers associated with the nodes. For each increase in
barrier integrity, a new system performance was estimated and compared to the base
case above. Nodes or arcs presenting higher percentage values represent the greater
influence on network behaviour. At these nodes, policy intervention is likely to have
the greatest impact on reducing the vulnerability of the system to a future CSF outbreak.
8.3 Results
Scenarios comprising a sequence of process/events were used to describe how pig herds
can be exposed to CSFv. These represent pathways of introduction. For this case
study, a single set of core principles was adopted for scenario generation. First, a
scenario was defined as starting in one of the three available source nodes, i.e. 01 -
Third Countries; 02 - EU Positive; 04 – Laboratories (Figure 8.2). Next, the scenario
was deemed to terminate when the disease agent reached one of four termination nodes,
defined as the point where a single domestic livestock pig is infected. The terminal
nodes are 17 - indoor finishers; 18 - outdoor finisher; 19 - farm breeder; 20 - animal
gatherings. Finally, the scope of the scenario was managed by limiting the maximum
length of each pathway (or number of nodes visited) to k = 5, where k denotes the
length of pathway (Borrett and Patten, 2003). This value was chosen based on available
computing capacity. Even with this assumption, the model produced some 56,269
theoretically plausible introduction scenarios (pathways) derived from the three sources.
Each scenario represents a failure to detect and eliminate the disease agent prior to
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exposure to pig herds and thus represents failure of the multi-barrier system. A
probability estimate is presented for each scenario, which ranged from 10-3 and below.
The pathway scores and the overall system performance do not consider on going
outbreaks in foreign countries or the quantity of imported goods at any given moment.
Critically for readers, this does not represent a measure of the current residual risk of
CSF exposure to pig herds (Murray, 2002; Bronsvoort et al., 2008). Rather used
comparatively at the policy level, this analysis provides an opportunity to assess the
influence of exposure scenarios and failure in the barrier between two adjacent nodes in
the exposure to CSF thus enabling the identification of risk drivers.
The interaction matrix presents a systemic risk map of the network indicating the key
network sensitivities. A colour scheme was used to classify the results of the sensitivity
analysis at an arc level and to indicate the influence that process/events have on system
behaviour (Figure 8.2). The columns represent all incoming connections (upstream)
into a particular feature while the rows represent all outgoing connections
(downstream). Upstream interventions represent preventative measures while
downstream interventions represent containment measures. For example, Feature 01
represents a disease source where the only intervention measure is through containment.
Similarly, for features representing receptors, 17, 18, 19 and 20, only preventative
measures are available.
Figure 8.2, the interaction matrix, presents a powerful visual tool to identify key arcs
that exert greater influence in the system. For example, closer review of node 08 -
domestic residence (representing the human population) reveals the movements
associated with the introduction form a of CSF form a third country (node 01) to a
domestic residence and movements from the domestic residence to wildlife (node16),
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e.g. rubbish or scraps in FEP list, are most vulnerable (Red). Also, the matrix identifies
wildlife as posing a threat to multiple livestock production units (nodes 18 and 19) and
thus of exposing livestock to CSFv (Figure 8.2). Figure 8.2 displays the results for the
worst-case sensitivity analysis. Here, the influence is separated according to three
levels, presented in a colour scheme. The process/events presenting an influence higher
than 10% are presented in red. For example, the two arcs P outside EU (node 01 to 08 )
and C wildlife (node 08 to 16) discussed above. In addition to these, process/events
associated with wildlife and environment, from node 16 to 15 (14%), from node 16 to
18 (15%), from node 16 to 19 (15%) and from node 15 to 19 (14%), also present a
significant reduction on risk of livestock exposure (red in Figure 8.2). The interaction
matrix allows easy identification of the most influential nodes in the network.
The results of the node influence analysis are presented in Figure 8.3. This describes
network behaviour, considering a best-case and worst-case scenario of barrier
performance. For both best and worst case analysis, the source node outside EU had
significant influence on network behaviour, creating a reduction in overall performance
of 46% and 49% for worst and best case conditions, respectively. This suggests that
intervention at source may be the best control option. Under best case conditions,
animal gatherings (46%) and domestic animals (44%) also proved influential, while
worst case conditions reveal domestic residences (46%), and wildlife (44 %) as most
influential. Interestingly, the same nodes - animal gatherings, domestic animals, human
population and wildlife - are influential under both best and worst case conditions.
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Figure 8.3 CSF node sensitivity analysis
[Key] the influence of each node is measure by calculating the reduction in percentage
the performance value in comparison with the base case; the chart presents sensitivity
analysis for both best and worst case scenarios
A more detailed analysis of node “05 domestic residence” is available in Figure 8.4.
This focuses on a worst-case assessment of all process/events directly associated with
domestic residences. The movement of goods between countries outside the European
Union (outside EU positive) and the human population were shown to be highly
influential to system performance (42%). Similarly, the link between the human
population and wildlife (represented by the wild boar population) was also shown to be
highly influential (44%). The arc representing the movement of goods from European
countries had only modest influence (4%). The arcs (P) outside EU and (C) wildlife,
represent the specific movements of goods and animals, where intervention results in a
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Outside EU
EU [Positive]
Laboratories
Border Inspection Post
Domestic animal/ backyard farms
Domestic residence
Environment
EU [negative]
Feed factory
Food markets / Retailers / Restaurants/Caterer
Livestock Vehicles
Petting zoo/pet shop
slaughterhouse /meat processing plants
Vet./fieldsmen/ other intervenient
Waste disposal plant
Wildlife
Animal gathering
Farms Breeders
Indoor Finishers
Outdoor Finishers
Sensitivity analysis - effects of reducing node BFR by 50% in
system vulnerability
Best Case Scenario
Worst case scenario
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significant reduction in the vulnerability to future CSF outbreaks. The prefix (P) stands
for preventative measures and represents incoming movement to the target node. In
contrast, C represents containment measures, representing outgoing movements. The
percentage values, for example 44% for C wildlife, means that an intervention that
successfully increases containment reduces the risk of transmission by 50%, produces a
reduction by 44% in the likelihood of a future CSF outbreak. Comparing the outputs
presented, the interaction matrix allows a systemic perspective of the influence each
process/event has in the overall system performance however the sequences of
histograms (nodes and arcs) communicate the output without loss of information.
Figure 8.4 Sensitivity analysis of the node “08 Domestic residence”
[Key] Analysis of the arcs responsible for adjacent connection (upstream and
downstream) to the 08 domestic residence nodes [P] preventative representing upstream
nodes and [C] contingency representing downstream nodes
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Wildlife
Outside EU
EU [Positive]
Animal gathering
Vet./f ieldsmen/ other intervenient
Domestic animal/ backyard farms
Livestock Vehicles
Domestic animal/ backyard farms
Environment
Laboratories
Vet./f ieldsmen/ other intervenient
Outdoor Finishers
Waste disposal plant
Petting zoo/pet shop
Livestock Vehicles
Farms Breeders
C
P
P
C
C
C
C
P
C
P
P
C
C
C
P
C
Sensitivity analysis - 08 domestic residence - worst case
scenario
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8.4 Discussion
Systemic network models allow for an examination of the interplay between the local
and global aspects of a network at the policy level. The histograms provide
stakeholders with a top down analysis of the system, which is consistent with the
approach to developing a better understanding of system behaviour using the
conventional approach to developing risk assessments (Taylor, 2003; Peeler et al.,
2006). This approach captures both expert judgement and scenario development,
common with traditional IRAs. Two independent sensitivity analyses were performed
to assess vulnerability within the system. A first level analysis was performed at the
node level, enabling identification of the features (i.e. nodes) exerting greatest influence
on network behaviour. A second analysis was performed at a process/event (i.e. arc)
level, which enabled understanding of those arcs influencing network behaviour as well
as providing information about interventions. This analysis is useful for informing
interventions that may influence network behaviour, while minimising investment.
8.4.1 Increasing resilience against a future CSF outbreaks
A study by EFSA suggests that in 2006, countries were no less susceptible to an EAD
outbreak than they were 20 years ago (EFSA, 2006). The enormous progress in disease
monitoring, surveillance and diagnostics has been offset by the increase in
communication and contact via global trade. Furthermore, CSF is present worldwide
with 13 countries declaring outbreaks in 2010; 2 of which were EU partners (OIE,
2010). The peril of introducing CSF into the UK remains. Worldwide eradication
stands as the definitive objective when dealing with EADs. Our analysis supports this
concept, with our sensitivity analysis revealing that disease containment in third
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countries produces the greatest increase in system performance and overall robustness.
Nonetheless, eradication of CSF is unlikely to be achieved in the forthcoming decades,
and detection and elimination of outbreaks remain the most viable defence options
(EFSA, 2006). Surveillance is vital and the UK has in place a system for the early
warning and elimination of threats. The system is complex, consisting of multiple
controls, each which may be susceptible to failure. Occasional system failure is
exemplified by outbreaks in 1971, 1986 and 2000; events’ occurring after 1966, the year
the disease was officially eradicated from the UK (Defra, 2006).
In assessing the robustness of the system, the analysis identifies a number of known
threats as well as previously unidentified ones. This was achieved by assessing the
level of influence each individual node has on system behaviour (Figure 8.3). Even
when assigning different weightings to the nodes (assessment under worst and best case
conditions), similar nodes were identified as highly influential, although with variation
in the level of influence. This difference in level results from a different approach to
assessing the efficiency of the barriers preventing transmission of CSF. The results
from the worst-case assessment adopted a conservative mind-set whereby confidence in
the controls, particularly if the general population was involved, is low and this
identified threats such as domestic animals and animal gatherings. In contrast, the best-
case conditions adopted an optimistic mind-set and identified areas where controls are
limited and their effectiveness is unknown; for example wildlife and the environment as
well as domestic residences.
Beyond the capacity to identify the nodes within the network with greater influence
over its robustness, our model provides enough detail to study the effect of specific
events that permit transmission between nodes, thus compromising system robustness.
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The matrix (Figure 8.2) displays the upstream and downstream arcs connecting a node.
This allows the analysis to detect node frailties as well as provide guidance as to where
best risk management resource allocations are made. Concerning disease introduction
from countries outside the European Union, experts were most concerned with
connectivity to domestic residences and with backyard and domestic animals. They
believed that “risk targeted enforcement was unable to check all passengers and
packages and there was a lack of awareness amongst travellers”. With respect to the
exposure of livestock, outdoor farms were deemed most vulnerable, particularly those
with high contact with wild pig populations and the environment. Concerns with
wildlife contact refer to the possibility of a “wild boar entering the unit or of a young
domestic pig escaping from premises into the environment and back [Evidence from
Belgium]”, in FEP list.
8.4.2 A new approach to assessing risk and develop strategies prevent EAD
outbreaks
The objective of this work has been to develop a tool requiring minimal expenditure of
resources whilst providing significant data for the development of guidelines and
strategies for reducing the likelihood of livestock animals to EAD agents at the policy
level. Previous studies have investigated the specific role of most components (i.e.
nodes) in the network investigated here. For example most of the CSF dedicated
qualitative IRAs identify the human population as a driver of exposure as well as
backyard livestock, restaurants, caterers and food markets, wildlife, livestock lorries,
and importation of live animals as risk factors (De Vos et al., 2004; Martinez-Lopez et
al., 2008; Hartnett et al., 2007; Bronsvoort et al., 2008). However, conventional IRAs
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harbour methodological limitations that condition the quantity and quality of the insight
produced. Conventional risk assessments, explicitly scenario-based assessments, rely
on the research literature and on past epidemiological reports to define the pathways of
exposure to be included in the assessment. Such literature is limited regarding the
pathways of introduction and exposure of pig herds to CSF, or to any EAD,
compromising the capacity to deliver a truly comprehensive analysis of the risk of
exposure to CSF. Moreover, given that the cause of most EAD outbreaks remains
inconclusive, a significant portion of introduction and exposure pathways will not have
been previously assessed, which is a distinct limitation. This model provides an
alternative approach, which through the application of a computer model alongside
smart use of expert opinion allows for the generation of the pathways of exposure. This
characteristic enables this model to consider pathways overlooked by previous
assessments applied to CSF and thus overcomes the current limitation in the research
literature. In addition, in scenario-based assessments, pathways of exposure are
assessed in isolation and any mitigation strategy developed based on these assessments
fails to provide an estimation of the systemic consequences of any intervention.
Therefore, by treating all pathways equally, irrespective of likelihood, and considering
how interventions affect the entire network our model considers less likely and
previously unknown pathways, whilst providing an estimate of the impact a particular
measure will have on overall system performance. By addressing the limitations of
conventional IRA methods, we have developed a tool that provides a decision making
body with insight regarding the system behaviour and targeted intervention activity
leading to improved resilience against an EAD incursion.
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In doing so, systemic models strike a middle ground between expert-based qualitative
and scenario-based quantitative assessments. The network model develops a
compromise between assessing the total system and the level of detail with which the
pathways are analysed. The expert elicitation considers the multiple barriers to
exposure available in the pathways. However, it does not allow discerning the influence
these pose individually in reducing exposure. Therefore, the network model produces a
lesser level of detail comparatively to scenario-based models, based on event tree
representations of the pathways. Nonetheless, the model does provide an analysis of all
theoretically possible pathways of exposure. Consequentially the network model
develops an insight on the system, which has so far been out of scope from the
assessments applied to study the introduction of CSF or to any EAD agent.
The large scope of the network associated with the scarcity of information on the causes
for EAD introduction into the UK represent a gap in available information to use as an
input to the model. Therefore, the model relies on expert opinion, where expert
judgements provide the values to incidence, barrier failure rate and a description of the
causes of failure to detect and eliminate CSFv. Expert opinion, as a source of
information exposes the model to the inaccuracies associated with the elicitation of
expert judgments (Cooke, 1994; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Expert biases have a
negative influence in the accuracy of the output produced (Cooke and Goossens, 2000).
Nonetheless, in light of the scarcity of data associated with the events enabling the
introduction of CSFv into the UK, expert opinion stands as the sole source of
information available to perform such an assessment. Furthermore, the expert opinion
represents the most up to date source of information. Therefore, despite inaccuracies
resulting from the capacity to retrieve information from experts, the results produced by
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the systemic model represent the most current assessment of the control measures
applied to prevent the introduction of CSF into the UK.
8.4.3 Validation of the model
The exploratory nature of this assessment, as of most IRAs, signifies that its validation
cannot be undertaken by comparing outputs with known values. The results produced,
as well as the variables elicited, are theoretical and should not be used to reflect actual
system state in space and time. The analysis is used in an exploratory mode and at the
generic, policy level to inform decisions on policy and regulatory options for
intervention. Therefore, it is necessary for the model to be validated by peer review
assuring all assumptions are reasonable and the mathematical computations reflective of
the system (OIE, 2011c; Murray, 2002; Ahl, 1996). The validation adopted here
comprised of development stages where the model was structured using currently
available documents and information. At the end of each stage, the latest developments
were presented to a technical advisory group (TAG) composed of experts from different
modelling and animal disease backgrounds. The objective of these meetings was to
critique the model and suggest alternative solutions where appropriate. All aspects of
the model were discussed, including mathematical modelling, assumptions regarding
disease transmission and feature behaviour, the elicitation process, the data collected
and the presentation of results. This study represents the first application of the method,
therefore, following the elicitation process and alongside a TAG meeting a number of
improvements for future application were highlighted, namely:
1. The network considers both legal and illegal movements of potentially
threatening materials within the same process. The FEP list identifies and
describes the nature of the movement. However, for processes where illegal and
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legal movements are present, the model does not estimate each individual
influence in system robustness.
2. For extraordinary situations where control barriers are not in place and common
sense actions alone prevent events, such as the relation between livestock
vehicles and domestic residences, future applications of the model should
capture the effects of both phenomena.
3. The network considers England alone. Experts suggested a more useful
application could consider the GB (England, Wales, Scotland and Northern
Ireland).
4. Extent of the data to be elicited from experts alongside time and resource
limitations associated with the workshop resulted in selecting best-case and
worst-case approach, as opposed to a more comprehensive format (probability
density functions) (Murray, 2002). Nonetheless, it provides estimates of the
level of uncertainty associated with the barrier failure rates elicited (O'Hagan
and Oakley, 2004).
5. Adoption of a stochastic approach to modelling the network, which incorporates
the level of uncertainty into the outputs produced.
8.5 Conclusions
This is the first illustration of a network model within an import risk assessment context
for EAD at the policy level. The model provides a level of insight not within reach of
established IRA methodologies by providing a systemic perspective, whilst accounting
for the particular events at the root of a potential CSF outbreak. This is a novel method,
that has the potential to contribute to the robustness of England’s defence against a
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CSFv incursion, so generating insight on where to allocate resources, maximising the
reinforcement of those defences..
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A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO THE RISK ANALYSIS OF9
FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE III: ILLUSTRATION
FOR FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE
This chapter presents the revision and application of the method described in Chapter 6.
Here the model is applied to study the UK’s vulnerability to the introduction of Foot
and Mouth Disease. The model increased the level of detail with which the results are
presented (discrimination between legal, illegal and airborne transmission).
9.1 Introduction
Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is an exotic animal disease (EAD) that is classified as
notifiable by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE, 2011a). The disease is
caused by the FMD virus (FMDv), a member of the Aphthovirus genus and
Picornaviridae family (Alexandersen et al., 2003; Grubman and Baxt, 2004;
Alexandersen et al., 2002) with manifestations ranging from acute to mild and sub-acute
forms. Morbidity and mortality will vary according to the species infected and the
virulence of the strain. Infections spread quickly within herds and are characterised by
multiple transmission mechanisms.
Developed countries remain as vulnerable today to the threat of FMD as they did two
decades ago (EFSA, 2006). Outbreaks resulting from this threat can result in severe
economic losses resulting from disease eradication activities, lost market share and
decline in tourism (Otte et al., 2004; Morgan and Prakash, 2006). The UK sustains a
multi-barrier system that aims to prevent the introduction of EADs such as FMD. The
control system is composed of a partnership of multiple agencies and independent
agents, for example, Defra, Local Authorities, HM Revenues and customs, wildlife
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conservation groups and vets (Defra, 2011a). Its design uses redundancy to ensure
protection against the multitude of possible EAD transmission routes. However
outbreaks do occur, such as the outbreaks of 2001 and 2007, which exposed
vulnerabilities in the multi-barrier system (Defra, 2008b; Scudamore, 2002; Anderson,
2008). Since these events, considerable investments to improve technological
measures, e.g. diagnostic testing, were developed. Given these advances and the UK’s
geographic isolation, the likelihood of incurring as FMD outbreak via the import of live
animals, returning livestock vehicles and/or wildlife has been reduced (Defra, 2011a).
However, low probability incidents can still lead to animal disease outbreaks, especially
those that occur in concert with other risk factors thus enabling disease agents to by-
pass or overcome preventive controls (Reason, 1997; Pidgeon and O'Leary, 2000).
Government is responsible for developing and enforcing regulations that aim to reduce
UK’s vulnerability to FMD alongside other EADs (Defra, 2011a). Further
improvement to the existing controls requires the prioritise of the potential failures of
those controls that drive exposure to livestock. Critically, the priorities identified must
reflect those of the entire system. Achieving this insight involves developing a
comprehensive analysis of the interactions between FMD and failures within this
multiple-barrier system. Such analysis is defined as a systemic analysis. Here we
present a systemic risk analysis for the introduction of FMD into the UK. The
objectives of this exercise were to identify vulnerabilities within the multi-barrier
control system and the critical control points (CCP). CCP identify failures of controls
where intervention is likely to produce the greatest improvement to UK’s resilience to
future FMD outbreaks (Delgado et al, 2010). The expectance is that this approach to
develop priorities can better inform decisions about resource allocation for risk
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management solutions (Delgado et al., 2010). In addition, the results of this analysis
inform the role that systemic bottom-up approaches can play within the current context
of import risk assessment. Insights from this approach were compared with
conventional RA methods and the implications of a systemic analysis on the
development of risk mitigation strategies are discussed.
9.2 Method
The study provides a systemic risk assessment describing the vulnerabilities within in
the UK’s FMD protection system. It is based on the application of a network model
developed to study the sequences of events that enable undetected introductions of the
virus to pass into the UK and result in an outbreak. The model analyses the various
controls used to protect susceptible receptors from disease sources and assesses the
influence that individual barrier failures have on the system’s behaviour. The model
uses a network of connections to simulate the British livestock system.
The first step to develop a systemic analysis is to define the system’s boundaries. The
system comprises several components of the livestock and meat industries, facilities for
trade, human population and pet-shops, as well as a range of control processes (Defra,
2011a). FMDv transmission characteristics also play a significant role in system
behaviour and are also accounted for.
9.2.1 Description of the system
The transmission mechanisms influencing the introduction and spread of FMD were
retrieved from profiles of the FMD virus developed by governmental agencies (e.g.
Defra) and the World Organ for Animal Health (OIE) to ensure agreement between the
assumptions made during the preparatory work and the elicitation workshop. The
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profile of the FMD virus and its transmission characteristic are available in (OIE,
2011b).
System boundaries are defined by the (i) entities enabling progression of the FMDv, (ii)
the FMD biological characteristics and transmission mechanisms and (iii) the control
and protocols these entities and stakeholders have to uphold to ensure timely detection
of the disease agent (Defra, 2011a). The system is recorded using a features, events and
processes (FEP) list. Literature on the application of the FEP list to control exotic
animal diseases (EAD) can be found in Section 6.1.4. The FEP list provides a
transparent record of the elicitation process as it records key assumptions made by
experts. Based on these data a network, representative of the system is generated.
Literature on networks and FEP lists is available at (Borrett and Patten, 2003; Newman,
2003) and (Freeze et al., 2005; Savage et al., 2004), respectively.
The interactions between a disease agent and multi-barrier system are responsible for
creating the conditions of a disease incursion. The starting point for system
development drew upon previous work on classical swine fever (Chapter 8), to which
changes were made to accommodate FMD and the differing outputs. The list of
changes introduced to the network is as follows:
 The list of receptor nodes was expanded to include multiple farm types such as,
pig farms indoors, outdoor and breeding units), dairy, beef and breeding cattle
farms, outdoor and breeding sheep farms and mixed species farms;
 The node animal gatherings was removed from the receptors nodes and included
as a node to assess their importance in disease introduction;
 The node domestic residences was redefined to represent the human population;
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 The model was modified to account for the differences between legal and illegal
movements and airborne transmission of the disease (arcs).
A FEP list records the nature of the interactions within the system. Network nodes were
recorded as features and the arcs, representing the incidents driving exposure, were
recorded as processes and events and process. Here, the processes represent the
movements enabling transmission of the disease and the events represent the causes of
failure to detect the disease during that movement. Values recorded in the FEP list are:
(i) incidence value represents the frequency of the process and (ii) barrier failure rate
associated with the likelihood of the event causing barrier failure.
9.2.2 The interaction matrix
The foundation to the study is the development of a systemic network (Figure 9.1). The
network can be described using an interaction matrix (Figure 9.2), which enables an
understanding of how sequences of events create pathways of exposure, connecting
disease sources to susceptible receptors (Borrett and Patten, 2003). Within the
interaction matrix the diagonal cells (black) correspond to nodes and the off-diagonal
cells (white and colour) correspond to arcs. Features from the FEP list populate the
node cells and the associated events populate the off-diagonal cells. The rows contain
all movements outgoing from the respective node. For example, row 10 represents all
outgoing connections enabling transmission from the node “2.7 Domestic
animals/backyard farms” (Figure 9.2). The columns contain all incoming movements to
the respective node. Each node is associated with 3 columns, where the column marked
with an L represents legal movements, the column marked with an A represents
airborne transmission of FMD and the column marked with an I represents illegal
movements (top of Figure 9.2). For example, columns 19, 20 and 21 contain all legal,
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airborne and illegal incoming movements enabling transmission to node “2.7 Domestic
animals/backyard farms”, respectively. The movements considered possible, by the
experts, are represented by the filled cells, containing the value for the reduction in
likelihood of system failure associated with intervention in the respective process/event.
The definition of illegal movements was the subject of great debate during the
preparatory stages of the model. Following expert consultation illegal movements were
broadly defined as “(non-compliant movements, sabotage, negligence, recklessness)”
and experts were given leeway to interpret the concept of legal and illegal within the
context of each individual process.
9.2.3 Elicitation process
Data to populate the model was provided by experts via two elicitation processes
(O'Hagan, 1998; Van der Fels-Klerx et al., 2002). The first stage defined system
boundaries and network nodes and was compiled through a series of interviews. The
second elicitation process involved a one day workshop that involved 24 experts. The
criteria and process for expert selection as well as the process of elicitation are
described in further detail in Chapter 7. The workshop elicited information on the
connections between the 26 network nodes (Figure 9.1). Values of likelihood were
obtained through group discussions and consensus, with experts divided into groups of
two or three according to their expertise. The group exercise involved assessing all
outgoing connections originating from a particular node. These consider legal and
illegal movements and airborne transmission independently (Figure 9.2). Each of these
movements was characterised by its incidence and barrier failure rates and by the
provided comments on the possible causes of barrier failures. Therefore, the elicitation
produced a quantitative character of the network. Verification of the elicited data was
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carried out through follow-up interviews that addressed issues of data quality, missing
values, comments and corrections (Cooke and Goossens, 2000). Care was taken to
maintain the influence of biasing effects to a minimum and to assure the information
gathered complied with data needs (O'Hagan, 1998; Meyer and Booker, 2001; O'Hagan
and Oakley, 2004; Garthwaite et al., 2005).
9.2.4 Modelling scenarios of FMD introduction
Scenarios were simulated using a pre-programmed Excel™ spreadsheet that described
the network as an interaction matrix (IM, Figure 9.2), and a computer model that detects
any possible sequence of events (to a maximum of successive 4 events) that allow
exposure to occur. The likelihood of each scenario is estimated using the equations
described in Section 6.3. The output of the scenario simulation is a list of all pathways
that allow the disease agent to contact the receptor. That list includes a description of
all nodes composing the pathways and a respective likelihood (ܲ) estimate. The sum
of the (ܲ) values from all pathways represents the overall system performance value, or
aggregate likelihood of exposing a livestock to FMD. Sensitivity analyses were used to
identify the features and process/ events that exert the greatest influence on network
behaviour.
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Figure 9.1 The network system developed for Foot and Mouth disease (FMD)
[Key] Nodes starting with 1 represent disease sources (Grey), nodes starting with 2 represent full functioning nodes (black) and nodes names
starting with 3 represent terminal nodes (Grey)
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Figure 9.2 FMD Interaction matrix
[Key] Diagonal Cells (black) represent the nodes (features) and the off-diagonal cells represent the arcs (process events, where L – Legal
movement; A – Airborne transmission and I – Illegal movements). Colour code identifies arcs where an increase in barrier efficiency (50%l)
reduces the likelihood of system failure by >10% (red); > 1% (amber); > 0.01% (yellow). ) b) represents a close up of a section of the matrix.
b
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9.2.5 Results of the scenario generation analysis
A scenario is a combination of process/events that form a pathway, which describes the
contact of FMDv with susceptible receptors. The process of formulating scenarios
follows a set of core principles: (i) multiple sources of introduction exist. These are,
“1.1Third countries” representing all countries where the disease is present, detected
and undetected; “1.2 EU Positive” countries within the EU with ongoing confirmed
FMD outbreaks; and “1.3 Laboratories” representing potential release of FMDv from a
laboratory from within the UK Figure 9.5); (ii) simulation terminates when the FMDv
reaches a group of predefined terminal nodes such as, “3.1 Pig indoor production units”;
“3.2 Pig outdoor production units”; “3.3 Pig breeding units”; “3.4 Dairy production”;
“3.5 Beef production”; “3.6 Cattle breeding units”; “3.7 Sheep Outdoor production
units”; “3.8 Sheep breeding units” and “3.9 Mixed species farms”; (iii) scenario analysis
develops pathways of length k = 4 (Borrett and Patten, 2003). This length was based on
computational capacity and time limitations and resulted in 544,067 possible scenarios.
9.2.6 Sensitivity analysis
Based on the likelihood of each individual scenario a baseline for system performance
was determined. This value defines the system vulnerability relative to an FMDv
incursion (Frey and Patil, 2002; Hamby, 1995) and is used to determine the influence an
intervention at a specific node or arc has on system performance. The adopted protocol
involves the reduction of a barrier failure rate by 50%, followed by calculation of its
effects on the overall system performance. By selecting different arc combinations
multiple sensitivity analyses were produced. Two analyses were performed. The first,
an arc sensitivity analysis was based on a one-at-a-time sensitivity analysis and detected
the influence individual arcs (process/events) have on system behaviour. The results are
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presented in a colour coded interaction matrix (Figure 9.2), here used as a
communication tool. The colour code identifies arcs where an increase in barrier
efficiency of 50% reduces the likelihood of system failure by >10% (red); > 1%
(amber); > 0.01% (yellow). The second sensitivity analysis was a node sensitivity
analysis that was based on a global sensitivity analysis and considered all arcs
representing outgoing movements from a node (Figure 9.3).
9.3 Results and discussion
The results are based on the outputs produced by the sensitivity analysis, which was
used to define the drivers of system behaviour. In addition, this approach provided
multiple perspectives of the system and its risks.
9.3.1 Systemic perspective of system risk
This perspective focused on displaying a complete image of the system under
assessment. The representation of the system using an IM provides a systemic
perspective in which all possible interactions are represented with the riskiest
interactions - within the context of the full network – highlighted (Figure 9.2). Here the
IM describes the results from the arc sensitivity analysis. From the analysis, the human
population plays an important role for introducing the disease agent from foreign
countries within and outside the EU. Driven largely by free trade agreements and free
movement of people within the EU, this interaction is particularly difficult to control.
The human population also plays a significant role in exposing livestock animals to
FMDv. The systemic perspective rules out illegal movements as a significant source of
risk as no illegal movements scored over the 1% threshold.
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9.3.2 Defining priorities through a system of varying perspective from
scoping to detail
This model generates systemic knowledge about the multi-barrier system protecting the
UK against disease incursions and provides insight necessary to inform risk mitigation
strategies and countermeasures. To do so priorities must be defined and key areas of
intervention identified. These provide the basis for which interventions will produce the
most effective results, akin to the critical control points. (Delgado et al., 2010). System
size often complicates this task, the network and interaction matrix representations
provide useful systemic understanding, however these compress knowledge into a
single image resulting in information loss. This results from the large volume of
information included in the picture as each node considers on average 65.3 connections
to adjacent nodes separately including incoming and outgoing movements, legal and
illegal activities and airborne transmission. Compared to the detail provided by
numerical outputs, the communicative power of the interaction matrix is reduced by the
broad categorical intervals used by the colour scheme.
A comprehensive output was developed using a sequence of analyses progressing
towards increasing detail (Section 8.3). The output format results from the planned
sensitivity analyses, which focus on nodes and process/events separately, assessing the
network at different levels of detail. This enables a progressive narrowing of
perspective thus permitting an increase in detail.
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Figure 9.3 FMD node sensitivity analysis
[Key] Representing the nodes of the network in order of importance regarding their
influence in the likelihood of system failure
The first stage of communication is associated with the node sensitivity analysis, which
focuses on the identification of the network nodes possessing the greatest influence on
the likelihood of system failure. Figure 9.3 displays the results of the 26 simulations
with the influence of each node on system behaviour represented by the reduction in
percentage to the base case of network behaviour. Human population (48,9%) and
European countries [positive] (47.4%) had the greatest influence with over 40%
reduction to the base case. This means that an intervention in all process/events (arcs)
associated with these nodes may potentially result in a reduction of likelihood of an
FMD outbreak greater than or equal to 40%. In contrast, other nodes such as waste
disposal (2E-7%), slaughterhouses (8E-7%) and feed factories (2E-9%) have little
influence on network behaviour.
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The second stage of communication is associated with the arc sensitivity analysis. This
communication focuses on the identification of process/events, i.e. movements, between
nodes possessing the greatest influence on the likelihood of system failure, considering
legal and illegal activities and airborne transmission of the disease agent. In contrast
with the systemic representation, which is based on the same arc sensitivity analysis,
this representation focuses on reducing information loss. The output presents the
riskiest movements, associated with a particular node including both outgoing and
incoming movements. Figure 9.4 displays the influence of each of the process/event
associated with the node “Human population”, presenting a selection of the ten highest
influential process/events. A colour scheme differentiates between legal, illegal and
airborne transmission – though is unnecessary for this node as all represented
movements are legal. The arcs were described by the names of the nodes connected
to”2.8 Human population” and the prefix [C] or [P] specified whether it was an
outgoing or incoming connection respectively. Focussing on the two highest ranked,
“[P] 1.2 European Union and trading partners [Positive]” (46.9%) represents the
transmission of FMDv from a country within the EU where FMD has been confirmed
and the British general population through, for example “personal imports of meat
based food products” (comment for expert). The second highest arc “[C] 2.12 Animal
gatherings within UK” (17.9%) represents the transmission of FMDv by the human
population to an animal gathering, that is local markets trading live animals and animal
shows. [P] and [C] provide an indication of the measures to be applied for each
situation with [P] standing for preventative measures and [C] for containment.
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Figure 9.4 “2.8 human population” arc sensitivity analysis
[Key] Representing all process/events associated with the “2.8 human population” node
in order of importance regarding their influence in the likelihood of system failure.
A top-down analysis of the outputs allows for a progression from an overview of the
system to a state of increasing detail. This analysis of the output allows priorities to be
defined at a higher level (node level) followed by the identification of key areas of
intervention to tackle those priorities (arc level).
9.3.3 Disease sources
Outbreak pathways are significantly impacted by the disease source. Within this model
three independent disease sources are considered. Figure 9.5 displays the relationship
between the disease sources relative to their contribution to likelihood of an outbreak.
The greatest threat, with 94.8% of exposure of FMDv to susceptible receptors, is due to
“(EU positive)”. Third countries contribute 5.2% of exposure, while laboratory escapes
provide 0.003% to the overall exposure. These results indicate that free movements of
cargo and people within the EU drive the risk of an FMD incursion thus confirming
worries of international organs regarding the increase international mobility.
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Figure 9.5 Comparison between disease sources
[Key] Relation between the number of pathways and contribution to likelihood of
system failure: Left Y axis representing number of pathways; Right Y axis the
contribution to likelihood of exposure (0 to 1).
9.3.4 Legal, illegal and airborne transmission
The application of the systemic risk model to FMD presents an evolution from the
previous application (Chapter 8). This evolution is based on the capacity of the model
to distinguish between the effects of illegal and legal activities and airborne
transmission on system vulnerability. The network considers 694 process/events from
which 302 represent movements associated with legal activities, 264 represent
movements associated with illegal activities and 128 represent movements associated
with airborne transmission of FMDv. This analysis is based on a sensitivity analysis
targeting each of these movement types. From the results (Figure 9.6), legal
movements have the highest impact on system performance with a 50% reduction of all
BFR from process/events associated with legal movements, which caused a decrease of
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82.7% in system vulnerability to an FMD incursion. In contrast, illegal movements
display the lowest influence on system performance representing an increase in system
resilience of just 0.056%. The increased control over airborne transmission of FMDv
resulted in an improvement to system resilience of 26.3%. The significant difference
presented by legal and illegal movements is difficult to explain. This difference may
result from the adopted definitions to characterise them. The cornerstone of the
character was definition of illegal movements as “non-compliant movements”.
Therefore, in the absence of regulation these movements were considered legal thus
making legal movements comparatively more frequent even though approximately
similar numbers of legal and illegal process/events were available. The data also
suggests that legal controls may be more effective for nodes closer to the source (i.e.
introduction into the UK) though once in the country controls of EADs stop being a
priority.
Figure 9.6 sensitivity analysis of movement types: legal, illegal and airborne transmission
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9.3.5 Pathways length and the likelihood of an FMD outbreak
This analysis provides understanding of the drivers of risk in order to help development
of sustainable risk management strategies. The risk analysis methods applied so far to
develop risk mitigation strategies and improvement of the existing controls were based
on a top-down risk assessment approach involving a combination of independent
qualitative and quantitative models (Taylor, 2003; Peeler et al., 2006). This approach is
defined here as the “complementary approach” as it assumes qualitative and quantitative
models complement each other providing a complete analysis of risk. This involves
using a qualitative model to develop an overview of the system and a quantitative model
to assess specific incursion pathways. For systems that are well understood the
complementary approach is effective in defining high risk introduction pathways, for
example assessment of direct pathways such as live animals and germplasm imports
(Sánchez‐Vizcaíno et al., 2010; Bronsvoort et al., 2008). However, this top-down
approach requires the assessors and experts to possess an understanding of disease
introduction mechanisms (Freeze et al., 2005). Unfortunately, such knowledge is
currently incomplete, as observed by the UK’s 2001 FMD outbreak whose origin has
never been confirmed (Scudamore, 2002). Similarly, of the 66 FMD outbreaks
confirmed worldwide between 2008 and 2010 72% of the epidemiological
investigations returned inconclusive views on the origin of the FMD virus (OIE, 2010).
This significant knowledge gap compromises the insight generated by top-down
approaches, which, may overlook significant pathways of introduction.
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Figure 9.7 Comparison between pathway length and contribution to likelihood of system
failure
Figure 9.7 describes the relationship between groups of pathways organised according
to length and their contribution to FMDv exposure. Shorter pathways represent known
pathways of exposure addressed in previous risk assessments while a void in literature
exists where longer pathways are considered (Figure 9.7). The first column represents
direct pathways of exposure (k = 1). These are direct transmission routes of the disease
agent from source to receptor, expressed through movements of live animals and
germplasm. There are 54 direct pathways identified by the model representing a
contribution to overall exposure to FMD of 4.7E -3%. Based on this value these
pathways are unlikely candidates to be the cause of future FMD outbreaks. In contrast,
the longer pathways considered, resulting from various combinations of events (k=4),
were identified in a larger numbers (512,137). These pathways represent a greater
contribution (50.5%) to the risk of exposure to FMDv. There is a gap in literature
regarding the study of longer pathways suggesting the majority of introduction
pathways and the groups that contribute to them have not been addressed in prior
assessments. This gap in literature may result from a combination of factors. First,
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conventional risk assessments that assess specific pathways of EAD introduction focus
on a small number of pathways and apply resource and time intensive quantitative
models. Considering that our model describes 544,067 pathways, developing a similar
volume of pathways via conventional means would be resource prohibitive. Secondly,
pathways evolved as a result of recent changes in the international panorama regarding
movement of people and goods and therefore are not likely to have been assessed
previously (Otte et al., 2004). Finally, as direct pathways are progressively identified
and addressed the residual risk of exposure is transferred to the remaining indirect or
unacknowledged pathways.
It is arguable that with continuous developments on the international trade panorama the
conventional approach could remain adequate for understanding and assessing the
likelihood of future EAD outbreaks. However, a full understanding of the system by
considering all possible pathways of introduction regardless of likelihood or pathway
size may provide greater value moving forward.
9.3.6 Controlling risk and intervention for improving protection against
FMDv
In the same manner that changes in the international trade panorama have challenged
the capacity to study the risk of EAD outbreaks, so have they challenged the capacity of
countries to improve protection (EFSA, 2006). Conventional risk management focuses
on applying controls to individual pathways. Due to the large number of pathways
available, this process becomes highly inefficient as the targeting of a single pathway
does not consider the effect of that intervention on the system as a whole. Our approach
focuses on the relationship between system vulnerability and pathway components to
reveal new opportunities for intervention. The influence a component i.e.
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process/event, has on system vulnerability results from the quality of the controls and
frequency of the movements associated with it but also from the number of pathways it
is common too. An analysis that ultimately focuses on system vulnerability ensures that
identified priorities reflect those of the system leading to more efficient interventions.
The results presented here focus on developing a list of priorities based on these
principles. The format selected for the output manages the volume of outputs produced
in order to guide a decision making body towards the identification of the
process/events within the network system whereby control measures will produce the
most significant risk reductions. We described these previously as the critical control
points (CCP) of the system (Delgado et al., 2010).
Though the model successfully identified vulnerabilities in the system the development
of a risk management strategy requires consideration of a wider range of factors, such as
current legislation, trade agreements, economical impacts of implementing new controls
and availability to improve control options. Therefore, this model provides yet one
more source of information to support decision makers.
9.4 Conclusions
This is the first application of a system analysis based on a bottom-up approach to study
the risk of introducing FMD in the UK. This involved building upon the systemic
model applied to study CSF to ensure a comprehensive analysis of the multi-barrier
system. This application resulted in the identification of priorities within the system
where intervention is likely to improve UK’s resilience to an FMD outbreak (Figure
9.2). Through comparison with previous assessments, this model provides insight on
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the limitations of conventional IRAs and of the risk mitigation strategies developed
from them. The development of this model successfully:
 Provided a comprehensive analysis of the risks and mechanisms involved in the
introduction of disease agents into the UK. This included an analysis of the
influence of legal movements, illegal movements and FMD transmission
characteristics to overcome the controls currently in place. Furthermore, it
recognised the system’s complexity, described as a network from which several
interconnected pathways arise (Figure 9.1).
 Developed a comprehensive analysis of the interaction between the FMD virus
and the multi-barriers system. This analysis establishes a link between the
failures in individual barriers to FMD transmission and their influence in UK’s
vulnerability to FMD (Figure 9.2). This is a novel approach, which allows to
develop a system of priorities defined as CCPs, where intervention is likely to
produce the greatest improvement to UK’s resilience against future outbreaks.
 The results identified the movements associated with the human population (2.8
Human population and 2.7 Domestic animals/Backyard farms) as those where
improved control can contribute significantly for improving UK’s resilience
against an EAD (Figure 9.3). Furthermore, it displayed that longer pathways (K
=4) pose a greater threat than direct pathways (K=1) (Figure 9.7). This suggests
the current residual risk results from complex introduction pathways, which
involve the human population. These pathways contrast with the focus of
conventional quantitative models (that focus on direct pathways associated with
livestock industry or retail industry, such as import of live animals, germplasm
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and meat goods). Thus, the model identifies pathways of exposure overlooked
by conventional methodologies.
 Provided an argument against the conventional approach to developing IRA and
the mitigation strategies resulting from them. The analysis supported the
development of policies that focus on improving the system resilience to FMD,
as opposed to addressing individual pathways of exposure, provide for
prioritisations that are more accurate. Such an approach provides the insights to
improve further UK’s resilience against an EAD outbreak.
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EAD INCURSION AND LIVESTOCK EXPOSURE –10
APPLICATION TO CSF AND FMD
The analysis of the pre-outbreak (pre t0) phase involves the two applications of the
model to study the resilience of the multi-barrier system against the incursion of CSF
and FMD. Despite the differences in the network model and parameters characterising
inter-node movement, it provides the opportunity to draw conclusions from the output
resulting from both applications. This analysis of the outputs focuses on: (i) the
comparison of outputs to identify the priorities and CCP, which represent vulnerabilities
and opportunities for improving the system that are consistent across diseases and (ii)
develop understanding of the influence of low probability events in causing the failure
to detect and eliminate the disease agent before exposure to livestock.
10.1 Disease incursion trends of CSF and FMD
The expert-based systemic models provide an analysis of the system to allow for the
identification of the movements and features that drive the risk of exposing livestock to
an EAD. The results produced by the model are not consistent with what are apparent
concerns of the animal health community. Using the scenario-based assessments
produced in the last decade as a barometer of these concerns, these show a focus on
issues associated with the livestock industry (De Vos et al., 2004; Sánchez‐Vizcaíno et
al., 2010; Bronsvoort et al., 2008; Martínez-López et al., 2009). The scenario-based
models applied focus mainly on the importation of live animals and other movements
associated with the livestock industry, e.g. germplasm, feed and livestock lorries. The
systemic models display a different trend, which supports that direct movements from
source to farms (Figure 10.1) and through the borders inspection posts, which include
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the trade associated with the livestock industry, pose little influence on system
behaviour (Figure 8.3 and Figure 9.3). Instead, the results display a trend that is in line
with increase in freedom for the movement of people and goods across borders (Otte et
al., 2004; EFSA, 2006). These suggest the greatest sources of risk are associated with
the human population (Figure 8.3 and Figure 9.3). The results also highlight the
emerging role of domestic animals and farm animals not produced for slaughter and of
animal gatherings. Such a trend suggests the controls implemented in the livestock
industry are effective in controlling exposure to an EAD agent and supports the recent
concerns associated with over exposure to EAD, resulting from the free market
agreement (Otte et al., 2004; EFSA, 2006). Therefore, advising the improvement of the
controls on imports not directly associated with the livestock industry is relevant to
improve the current resilience of the multi-barrier system against the incursion of EAD.
10.2 Low probability events
The development of the IRA model addresses Defra’s recommendation to study the
influence of low probability events (LPE) on UK resilience against the incursion of an
EAD and its exposure to livestock. The exact definition of the proposal was the
“analysis of risks from low/medium probability risk pathways (...) to identify and assess
(...) scenarios if a sequence of low probability events occurs, taking into account
current levels of risk management” (Defra, 2011a). The need to define LPE as
sequences of unlikely events is not exclusive to the introduction of EAD. Instead, this
is a common challenge for any disaster prevention system that applies the systemic
property of redundancy as a protective measure against failure of individual protective
barriers (Reason, 1997; Pidgeon and O'Leary, 2000). Recent high profile examples
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associated with LPE are the onset of the financial crisis and BP oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico (BP, 2010; Tanneeru, 2009). A characteristic of LPE is the surprise caused by
failure. However, once analysed its causes may become apparent and future incidents
avoided (Reason, 1997).
10.2.1 Low probability events excluded from the scope of conventional RA
methods
Import risk assessments to date have focused on the application of conventional risk
assessment models (Taylor, 2003). These apply a top-down (TD) approach to model
development. The top down approach creates a dependency of the model to the
assessor knowledge base, regarding the considered scenarios of exposure (Freeze et al.,
2005). This exposes the model to a number of biases in scenario selection. Thus,
making it vulnerable to motivational biases, influencing the assessment to focus on
scenarios that are of the interest of the assessor, and availability which influence focus
on the scenarios that are readily available in the experts mind and excluding less present
ones (Cooke, 1994; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Most importantly, a top-down
approach excludes all scenarios that are unknown to experts. Consequentially,
conventional RA models tend to focus on mainstream scenarios whilst excluding
outliers. This phenomena is observable in scenario-based quantitative import risk
assessments (IRA), where from the 14 models identified in literature six assess EAD
introduction through the importation of live animals to farms (De Vos et al., 2004;
Martinez-Lopez et al., 2008; Bronsvoort et al., 2008; Hoar et al., 2004; Jones et al.,
2004; Wahlstrom et al., 2002). LPE are by definition outliers, therefore conventional
risk approaches fail to assess them.
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10.3 Definitions of low probability events
Within the animal health community, there are two standing interpretations of the
definition of low probability events. A first interpretation is consistent with the work
developed in the area of organisational risk management and systems safety. Here low
probability events represent the coincidental sequence of barrier failure-causing events,
which undermines the redundancy of the multi-barrier protection system. Thus,
allowing for undetected transmission of EAD, leading to its exposure to livestock
(Reason, 1997; Pidgeon and O'Leary, 2000; Reinach and Viale, 2006). This definition
agrees with the research objective set by Defra that suggests focussing on “a sequence
of low probability events” (Defra, 2011a). The influence of such events has been
acknowledged in the hypothesis for the origins of the CSF outbreak of 2000 (Gibbens et
al., 2000; Sharpe et al., 2001).
A second interpretation adopts a definition of LPE assuming exposure as the results
from one isolated barrier failure-causing event that, whilst infrequent has the capacity
to enable exposure of livestock. These are infrequent barrier failures, which may have
the capacity to undermine the efficacy of the protection system, in detecting and
eliminating the disease. Examples of reports referring to low probability events under
this definition are the possible environmental release of FMD from Pirbright in 2007
(Defra, 2007a) or the avian influenza outbreak in Suffolk in 2007 (Defra, 2007c). In
this last case the epidemiologic report, assigns its cause to an unspecified low
probability event: “difficulty in identifying the precise source is probably in part due to
the fact that this is a very unlikely occurrence and an isolated event that occurred
probably in January” (Defra, 2007c).
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10.3.1 Studying sequences of events leading to an EAD outbreak
The network model provides a description of the components included in each pathway,
creating the opportunity to assess the contribution of different exposure scenarios to the
overall risk of an EAD incursion. The number of scenarios of exposure assessed for
CSF and FMD depend on the network generated to represent the system. Due to
differences in transmissions mechanisms existing between CSF and FMD and the
increase detail regarding movement types considered, the network model grew in the
number of nodes and in the level detail associated with each process/event between
applications. As a result, the number of scenarios identified increased from the first
modelled disease (CSF) to the second one (FMD). Increasing from 54,663 introduction
scenarios with a length of up to k = 5 for CSF, to 8,373,788 scenarios up to a similar
length identified for FMD.
The description of the pathways of introduction allowed for discriminating between
pathways of different lengths and comparison against scenarios described in literature.
This resulted in the division of the exposure scenarios into two groups. Network theory
divides scenarios according to pathway length, separating them as direct pathways (k =
1) and indirect pathways (k ≥ 2) (Borrett and Patten, 2003; Newman, 2003).  However, 
considering the existing body of import risk assessments, a different division is
proposed:
Simple incursion scenarios (SIS) include introduction pathways with a length k ≤ 2.  
These scenarios represent activities allowing for direct introduction of EADs into a
livestock farm, such as live animal and genetic material imports or the airborne
introduction of FMD (Donaldson et al., 1982; Martinez-Lopez et al., 2008; Sutmoller
and Wrathall, 1997). Also included as SIS are indirect but simple pathways, such as the
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return of contaminated livestock trucks and accidental virus release to the environment
from laboratories, which involves environmental contamination and subsequent
exposure to livestock (De Vos et al., 2004; Anderson, 2008).
Complex incursion scenarios: (CIS), include longer pathways (k ≥ 3), representing 
scenarios caused by multiple interactions between system components, such as the
scenario put forward as possible cause of the 2000 CSF, 2001 FMD and 2007 HPAI
outbreaks (Gibbens et al., 2000; Sharpe et al., 2001; Defra, 2007c; Scudamore, 2002).
These represent a group of scenarios that due to their complexity are harder to forecast.
Figure 10.1 The contribution to overall risk of exposure regarding pathway length for
FMD (left) and CSF (right)
In the network model, a process/event represents a movement of EAD controlled by one
of a set of imperfect barriers, whose failure can be triggered by an event. SIS represent
scenarios of exposure composed of one or two process/events. Therefore, failure to
detect and eliminate the EAD agent in these scenarios results from the occurrence of
one or two simultaneous barrier failure events. In contrast, CIS represent scenarios
composed of at least three process events. Therefore, failure to detect and eliminate the
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EAD agent in these scenarios results from the coincidental occurrence of three of more
of these barrier failure-causing events.
There is a bias of RA towards focussing on SIS (De Vos et al., 2004; Morley, 1993; Yu
et al., 1997; Martinez-Lopez et al., 2008; Sánchez‐Vizcaíno et al., 2010; Bronsvoort et
al., 2008; Hoar et al., 2004; Jones et al., 2004; Wahlstrom et al., 2002; Astudillo et al.,
1997; Martínez-López et al., 2009; Weng et al., 2010). However, these represent only a
small fraction of all available introduction pathways, more specifically 0.05% and
0.02% of all available scenarios for CSF and FMD, respectively. Thus, suggesting that
the majority of the introduction scenarios remain unstudied. Figure 10.1 displays the
overall risk of exposure presented by pathways with different lengths for the FMD and
CSF assessments.  In both assessments SIS (k ≤ 2) are responsible for ≈ 30% of the 
overall risk of exposure. Where direct pathways of introduction (k = 1) present a
negligible contribution to the risk of exposure, 4.44E-3% for FMD and 2.51E-1% for
CSF.  In contrast, CIS (k ≥ 3) are responsible for roughly 70% of the overall risk of 
exposure in both assessments. The definition of CIS is consistent with that of LPE as a
sequence of events (Reason, 1997; Pidgeon and O'Leary, 2000), which leads to the
assumption that LPE are represented within the group of CIS allowed by the multi-
barrier system. This suggests LPE may be responsible for 70% of the overall risk of
exposure.
10.3.2 The dangers of partial information when developing risk mitigation
measures
The bias towards focussing on SIS may be justified by a combination of factors that
have influence over the development of RA. Firstly, assessors, experts and governing
bodies alike only recently became aware of the existence of LPE (Anderson, 2002;
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Gibbens et al., 2000; Defra, 2007b). This results from the complexity and at times
erratic combination of interactions that compose CIS (Pidgeon and O'Leary, 2000),
which allow the disease agent and the barrier failures that enable them to go undetected
by epidemiological reports developed for past outbreaks. Secondly, these events may
have been exacerbated by the current changes in international policy allowing a free
movement of people and meat goods across borders (Otte et al., 2004; WHO/FAO/OIE,
2004), creating complex pathways that play a significant role in disease introduction
(Morris, 1995). The acknowledgement of LPE as a potential threat represents an
important step in recognising that so far the animal health community possesses partial
knowledge over the causes of EAD outbreaks. The relation between partial knowledge
of the system and the conventional approach to assessing risks explains the bias towards
known exposure scenarios. For example, consider the following comparison between
the SIS and CIS generated by the FMD assessment. The assessment produced 1672
SIS, responsible for 31.5% of exposure risk and 8,373,788 CIS responsible for 68.5%.
The conventional approach guiding the development of IRA focuses on studying
individual scenarios identified as a likely threat. Based on this approach the bias
towards SIS is justifiable as these have on average a greater individual contribution to
risk than CSI (31.55% / 1672 > 68.45% / 8,373,788). However, by understanding risks
based on a systemic perspective, one must acknowledge that, the risk of exposure
results from the occurrence of any one scenario allowed by the system. Considering
this, the CIS pose 2.17 times greater risk than pathways included as SIS and by
consistently overlooking them, risk assessments have ignored the current greatest
contributor to the residual risk of exposure.
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10.3.3 Developing risk managing strategies that tackle the risk posed by
CIS
The acknowledgement of CIS as a threat expands the available insight regarding the
scenarios of incursion responsible for the introduction of EADs into the UK.
Furthermore, it symbolises a more profound understanding of system behaviour and of
exposure scenarios. This expansion in knowledge acknowledges a system that is both
larger and more complex than previously considered (Morris, 1995).
RAs influence risk management strategies. Therefore, strategies and policies supported
by the insights produced with conventional RAs present the limitations that arise from
their narrowed perspective. Thus, these strategies and policies can overlook
characteristics of the system, resulting in a failure to manage significant drivers of
exposure. In contrast, the models developing a systemic perspective take into
consideration SIS and CIS, moving the understanding of risk from focussing on isolated
scenarios of introduction to focusing on a network of connections encompassing a vast
number of scenarios. A network entails that the large number of pathways result from
the interaction of a smaller number of components, where each component or even each
interaction between components may participate in multiple exposure scenarios (Murthy
and Krishnamurthy, 2009; Pearce and Merletti, 2006; Newman, 2003). This allows
moving from addressing individual scenarios with disregard for their effect on system
behaviour to addressing multiple scenarios based on the effect the common components
have on system behaviour. Consequentially, risk prioritisations resulting from these
models reflect the needs of the system and address all scenario types described by the
model, i.e. SIS and CIS, simultaneously.
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10.4 Low probability event as an infrequent but high-impact events
The alternative definition of LPE describes them as isolated infrequent barrier failure-
causing events, which have a significant impact over UK vulnerability to the system.
There is no reference in literature regarding the existence and influence of such events
in multi-barrier systems. In fact, we suggest the example provided alongside the
definition (Section 10.3), the epidemiologic report developed for the HPAI outbreak of
2007, incorporates an erroneous interpretation of the LPE (Defra, 2007c). In the report,
the conclusions produced hold responsible an isolated event for causing the outbreak.
However, this same document describes that scenario of exposure as involving an
import of turkey breasts with an undetected contamination, complacent waste disposal
in the transformation plant and the influence of wild life in the exposure of farmed
animals. Thus, although the conclusion highlights one isolated event, the scenario
described includes that event into a sequence of events that is consistent with the
definition of CIS.
Nonetheless, if isolated LPE exists, an approach to develop priorities that based on the
influence process/events have on system behaviour, as presented by the presented
model, will detect them and prioritise them in comparison with the remaining
process/events driving exposure.
10.5 Tackling low probability events
The formats developed to communicate focuses on the influence process/events have on
system performance. This approach detects influential events whether this are part of a
wider sequence of events, SIS and CIS. Defining priorities according to these
parameters allows exposing opportunities to improve system resilience, and controlling
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the effect of LPE, independent of definition. Therefore, it represents a systemic and
cost-efficient approach to develop priorities.
10.6 Conclusions
The expert-based systemic models develop a comprehensive analysis of the multi-
barrier system. These models consider the entire system and all pathways of exposure
associated with the introduction and exposure to of livestock to EAD. In doing so, the
model allows for the detection of vulnerability and trends in transmission, which are
beyond the scope of qualitative models, as these do not consider specific pathways of
exposure and models focussing on one or a small number of exposure pathways. The
application of the expert-based systemic models achieved the following:
 The identification that pathways of exposure, that are not associated with the
livestock industry but that play a significant role in the introduction of EAD into
the UK and may play a significant role in future EAD outbreaks.
 It develops an analysis of LPE and of the influence this pose in system
behaviour. This resulted in the division of pathways of exposure into SIS and
CIS, where LPE are include in the latter category. Furthermore it identifies that
the introduction of CSF or FMD into the UK through any one CIS is two times
more likely than the introduction through a SIS. Thus, it suggests that LPE pose
influence in the behaviour of the system and are a likely to play a role in the
future EAD outbreaks.
 These results suggest that conventional risk assessment methods have been
effective in controlling exposure. However, at this time exposure of livestock to
an EAD results from complex pathways of exposure, which are not directly
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associated with the livestock industry. Therefore, these are often difficult to
predict and thus excluded from conventional assessments, confirming the need
for a systemic assessment to improve further the resilience against the incursion
of EAD into the UK.
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10.7 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS FOR THE PRE-OUTBREAK
(PRE T0) PHASE
The research presented in Part 2 of this thesis, developed a comprehensive analysis of
pathways of introduction for CSF and FMD incursion into the UK. The work focuses
on analysing transmission during the pre-outbreak (pre t0) phase of an EAD outbreak.
Specifically, analysed transmission and exposure of livestock to CSF or FMD. Claims
of novelty presented within these chapters are associated with insights gained on the
cause for EAD introduction (Chapter 6, 7, 8, 9 10). Whilst claims of novelty associated
with the application of systemic models are discussed further in Chapter 11. From this
research, we claim the following.
The research developed and applied a novel method, to identify vulnerabilities in the
multi-barrier system to prevent EAD introduction and exposure to livestock. The
models consider all pathways of exposure available in the network that can cause the
exposure of livestock to CSF or FMD (Chapters 8 and 9, respectively). It achieved this
by applying a computer model to generate the pathways of exposure that enables the
model to consider pathways of exposure excluded for risk assessments available in the
prior art (Section 2.2). Thus, it generated new insights to support the development of
policy interventions.
The comprehensive analysis of the multi-barrier system generated new insights that
resulted in the identification of EAD transmission trends and vulnerabilities in the
system. The outputs suggest the following:
 The current risk of exposure is linked to pathways not directly associated with
the livestock industry (Section 10.1). The identification of this trend supports
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the current concerns with the free movement of people across borders and
personal imports goods and animals (Otte et al., 2004; EFSA, 2006). This is
supported by the result of the first level of the sensitivity analysis presented in
Figures 8.4 and Figures 9.3.
 The most significant vulnerabilities in the system are associated with
movements concerning the human population. Model application identified
specific vulnerabilities in the system for CSF (Figure 8.5) and FMD (Figure
9.4). This represent the CCP of the system, and describe specific process/event
where intervention is likely to improve significantly UK’s resilience to future
EAD outbreaks
 The analysis between legal and illegal movements and airborne transmission of
FMD (Figure 9.6), present legal movements as a key concern (82.7%) whilst
illegal movement present minimal influence in the EAD introduction (0.056%).
This suggest that to further improve protection, the focus should be in improving
the policies currently in place as opposed to improving their enforcement.
The development of this research provided insights on the influence of low probability
events (LPE) in UK’s vulnerability to EAD.
 The outputs produced by the models provide insights on the multi-barrier
system’s vulnerability to LPE. These are introduced as complex incursion
scenarios (CIS), representing complex sequences of process/events establishing
a link between an EAD source and livestock animals. The output reveals that
introduction through a specific CIS is unlikely, however due to the large number
of them available in the network, the introduction of CSF or FMD through any
one CIS is more likely than by any one simple introduction scenario (SIS) – SIS
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are the pathways of exposure conventionally assessed by scenario-based models
(Chapter 10). Thus, the work develop identifies LPE pose significant influence
in the exposure of livestock to EAD.
This research adopts the same format to communicate the output presented in Chapter 5
(Section 5.3). The outputs are communicated through a format composed of a
progressively more detailed analysis of the system. A first tier ranks the features posing
the greater influence in the transmission of EAD (Figure 8.4 and Figure 9.3) and a
second tier identifies process/events presenting CCP for efficient intervention in the
system (Figure 8.5 and Figure 9.4) . Lastly, a third tier exposes the context associated
with the CCP to providing information regarding the causes for barrier failure (Section
8.4.1). This format of communication provides access to risk analysts and policy
makers to the outputs. These are organised to provide an easy identification of the
drivers of exposure and causes of barrier failure, thus providing the information to
support the development of decision that improve protection against the livestock
exposure to an EAD agent.
Lastly, this research provides insights on efficient strategies to improve the performance
of the multi-barrier system. This research suggests the development of strategies that
do not address specific pathways of introduction, but instead supports the development
strategies that focus on process/events with a significant influence on system behaviour.
This is supported by the approach used to develop the study of the multi-barrier system
(Chapter 6), the results presented in (Figure 8.5 and 9.4), and specifically by the new
insights on how to control the influence of LPE in UK’s vulnerability (Section 10.5).
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The research presented in Chapter 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 develops a comprehensive analysis
of the mechanisms of incursion and preventative controls associated with the
introduction of EAD into the UK. The outputs produced have expanded in quantity and
quality the insights available in data and literature from past outbreak and predictive
models available in the prior art (Chapter 8 and 9). Furthermore, the research has
successfully generated insights on the knowledge gaps associated with the research
objectives presented in Section 2.6 (Chapter 10). Thus, it is safe to assume the insights
generated by this research have expanded the knowledge available to support policy
decision (Chapters 8, 9 and 10). The information, now available provides insights to
improve the UK’s resilience to future EAD outbreaks.
225
DISCUSSION11
This chapter provides an overarching discussion of this research. Here the core themes
are discussed and claims for novelty introduced and evidenced. The chapter concludes
with a critical analysis of the work. Conclusions are drawn in Chapter 12.
Figure 11.1 Discussion
[Key] Red boxes describe the topic addressed in the discussion. Numbers represent the
sections dedicated to each topic.
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11.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the results presented in Chapters 4, 5, 8, 9 and 10,
in relation to the prior literature and the implications of adopting systemic models to
improve the decision-making capacity to develop policies associated with EAD. Firstly,
I discuss the characteristics of systemic models that allow the improved quality of the
information available to support policy interventions (Section 11.2). Then a format for
communicating outputs that improves visualisation of system vulnerabilities (Section
11.3); the use of expertise in systemic models (Section 11.4) and; the role of systemic
models in the range of available tools (Section 11.5). Claims of novelty from this
research, in addition to the insights produced for the post outbreak phase (Chapters 4
and 5) and pre-outbreak phase (Chapters 8, 9 and 10), are associated with the superiority
of systemic models to identify system vulnerabilities and patterns of system behaviour,
to support policy interventions for managing EAD; a format for communicating outputs
that supports development of efficient policy interventions and; maximisation of
available expertise.
11.2 Critique of systemic models to EAD
In this section, I critique systemic models applied to EAD, in light of the research
presented in Chapters 4, 8, 9 and 10 and models available in the prior art. This section
focuses on their capacity to develop improved insights on system behaviour and system
vulnerabilities to inform policy developments to reduce UK’s vulnerability to EAD. In
the prior art, associated with the pre-outbreak (pre t0) and post-outbreak (post t2) phases
of an EAD outbreak, insights on the behaviour of EAD and on the vulnerabilities of the
system of controls resulted from the development of expert based and scenario based
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models (Section 2.2, 2.3). However, expert based and scenario based models present
limitations to their analytical capacity, which restricts the scope of the assessments
produced (Section 2.4), making them unable to provide comprehensive analyses of the
systems associated with the two outbreak phases (Dangerfield and Morris, 1992; Freeze
et al., 2005; Zio, 2009; Grundke, 2010). As a result, used individually, expert based and
scenario based models provide insights on system behaviour and on system
vulnerabilities, based on incomplete information, which may not be accurate.
Taylor, (2003) and Peeler et al. (2006) suggest that using the expert based and scenario
based assessments together can overcome the individual limitations of the models
available in the prior art (Section 2.5). This is a top-down approach, which uses expert-
based models to develop high-level priorities and scenario based models to study
pathways of exposure associated with those priorities. Work developed in other areas
of risk analysis exposes weaknesses in this approach (Dangerfield and Morris, 1992;
Freeze et al., 2005; Zio, 2009; Grundke, 2010). Priorities identified by the experts-
based assessments will influence the subsequent scenario based analysis. If information
on the behaviour of the system is limited, as is for the pre-outbreak and post outbreak
phase (Section 2.1.2), high-level priorities can overlook significant but unknown risks
and pathways of exposure. As a result, priorities defined through the conventional
approach can overlook significant vulnerabilities in the system (section 2.5). Standing
examples are the research opportunities identified in the literature review (Section 2.6).
A summary of the research opportunities of each phase follows:
 Risk assessments of the post-outbreak phase in the prior art have failed to assess
in detail the disposal activities performed on the farm, even though three of the
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four high category environmental contamination incidents recorded are
associated with these activities (Environment Agency, 2001).
 Risk assessments of the pre-outbreak phase in the prior art have failed to assess
the influence of low probability events (LPE) in UK’s vulnerability to EAD,
even though epidemiological reports identify LPE as possible introduction
routes for the CSF (2000), FMD (2001) and HPAI (2007) outbreaks (Gibbens et
al., 2000; Sharpe et al., 2001; Defra, 2007c; Scudamore, 2002).
In this thesis, I introduce and apply to the pre-outbreak and post-outbreak phases, a
modelling technique that overcomes the limitations of the models in the prior art.
Systemic models focus on developing comprehensive analysis of the entire system. The
results presented in Chapters 4, 5, 8 9 and 10 suggest these models improve the
information available on system behaviour and improve our understanding of the
breadth and depth of the system. I claim systemic models achieved in expanding the
quantity of information available by developing analyses of the entire system; the
quality of information available by minimising the influence of expert bias and
preconceptions in the definition of priorities and; detect patterns of system behaviour
that can influence the systems vulnerability to an EAD, generating insights for efficient
policy intervention solutions.
11.2.1 Expanding the quantity of data available
Systemic models expanded the number of pathways of exposure assessed for the two
outbreak phases by considering all pathways available in the system (Sections 4.2 and
6.3). The expert based and scenario based models in the prior art present limitations in
scope, which do not allow them to develop an analysis of the entire system (Sections 2.4
and 2.5). Qualitative models do not represent specific pathways of exposure (Section
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2.4). Scenario based models ““adopt certain characteristics of event tree analysis, but
systematically limit the number of (...) combinations” (Freeze et al., 2005), thus
reducing the number of pathways of exposure assessed (Section 2.4). As a result, the
models available in the prior literature to study the pre-outbreak and post-outbreak
phases develop incomplete images of the systems, which consider a fraction of the
pathways of exposure available.
Systemic models expanded the number of pathways of exposure analysed for the two
phases. The models were developed according to the principles of systemic modelling,
ensuring the development of comprehensive analyses of the systems (Murthy and
Krishnamurthy, 2009; Carré and Singer, 2008; Freeze et al., 2005; Newman, 2003). A
defining characteristic of systemic models is a predefined focus on assessing all
pathways of exposure and events that influence the EAD transmission (Section 2.1.4).
Examples from the research presented here are:
 Results presented in Chapter 4 describe a comparative analysis of the all options
available for carcasses disposal and of all stages of disposal considered for each
option (Figure 4.3). For each stage of disposal, a suit of available pathways is
assessed (Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5). Thus, the systemic model assessed all
pathways of exposure theoretically available in the system.
 Results presented in Chapter 8 and 9 display a network of connections that
includes all entities influencing the introduction of EAD into the UK (Figure 8.1
and Figure 9.1). The models analyse the interactions between those components
ensuring that all pathways of exposure (theoretically available) to introduce CSF
and FMD into the UK are assessed (Section 6.3).
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This characteristic of systemic models allows them to overcome the limitations in scope
associated with models in the prior literature, which either do not consider pathways of
exposure or focus in a small number of them (Section 2.4). The results presented in
Chapters 4, 8 and 9 describe that systemic models develop a comprehensive analysis of
the entire system and provide for an analysis of all pathways of exposure to EAD
(Section 4.3.1, 8.3 and 9.2.5). As a result, applications of systemic models assessed all
drivers of exposure associated with the pre-outbreak (pre t0) and post-outbreak (post t2)
phases, thus expanding the quantity of information available to intervene in the system.
11.2.2 Minimising the influence of expert biases
Systemic models minimise the influence of prior knowledge and biases in the outputs
produced, allowing them to detect vulnerabilities previously overlooked. The expert
based and scenario based models, available in the prior literature, follow a top-down
approach to model development. Models developed through this approach are
vulnerable to prejudices on system behaviour and system vulnerabilities (Section 2.4).
As stated by (Freeze et al., 2005) in conventional “top-down approaches, end-point
consequences are postulated and then the mechanisms by which these states may be
reached are considered” (Section 2.4). Specifically, prejudice biases the vulnerabilities
identified by expert based assessments and the selection of the pathways of exposure
analysed in scenario based assessments (Section 2.4). As a result, the conventional
models to develop risk assessment of EAD fail to identify events driving exposure that
are outside the concerns of the risk analysts and experts supporting the assessments,
thus compromising the accuracy of the vulnerabilities identified.
Here, we suggest a modelling approach that minimises the influence of prejudice in the
output. Systemic models consider all factors influencing transmission regardless of
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their preconceived contribution to EAD transmission (Murthy and Krishnamurthy,
2009; Carré and Singer, 2008). Here, a bottom up approach that ensures the system
behaviour emerges from the pathways of exposure assessed (Section 4.2 and 6.2). As a
result, systemic models develop analyses of systems, which are minimally influenced by
prior beliefs and motivational biases (Dangerfield and Morris, 1992; Freeze et al., 2005;
Zio, 2009; Grundke, 2010). The results presented support this claim and the application
of systemic models succeeded in detecting drivers of exposure that have a significant
impact on system behaviour, which were overlooked by previous assessments.
Examples from the research presented here are:
 Results presented in Chapter 4, for the post-outbreak phase of an EAD outbreak
describe that the disposal activities performed on farm (on-farm 3, 4a, 4b, 6a and
8a) pose a high level of risk of exposing the environment and to the livestock
and human population to hazardous agents (Figure 4.3). The level of risk is
comparable to that of disposal through pyres and uncontrolled burial of
carcasses (process 3, 4a, 4b and 5). Assessments available in the prior art
focused only on the stage of disposal where processing of carcass occurs (DH,
2001; Spouge and Comer, 1997b) (Section 2.3), whilst overlooking the impact
of the activities performed on farm.
 Results presented in Chapter 8 and 9, relating to the pre-outbreak phase of an
EAD, identify a set of pathways of exposure contributing the most to UK’s
vulnerability to EAD, which have not been assessed by the scenario based
models in the prior art (Section 2.2.3). For example, the interaction matrices
(Figure 8.2 and Figure 9.2) classify direct movements from source to receptor
(e.g. import of livestock and semen) as not influential in the system
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vulnerability. These are the pathways associated with scenario based models
(Section 2.2.2). Instead, the systemic models (Figure 8.3 and Figure 9.3)
identify the influence of the human population, domestic animals/backyard
farms and animal gatherings in enabling introduction and exposure of EAD,
claiming that exposure through pathways not associated with the livestock
industry pose the greatest concern (Section 10.1).
Systemic models adopt a framework that provides for an unbiased comparative analysis
of the pathways of exposure according to their influence on the system’s behaviour
(Section 4.2 and 6.2). This characteristic reduces the expert’s influence in defining the
system behaviour and its vulnerabilities. The results suggest systemic models have an
improved capacity to identify the system’s vulnerabilities. These are described as the
critical control points (CCP) of the system (Delgado et al., 2010) and are the pathways
of exposure and process/events where intervention is likely to produce a greater
reduction in the risk exposing livestock to an EAD (Section 4.3.1, 8.4.1 and 9.3.2).
Thus, the systemic models provide an increase in the quality of information available to
support policy interventions.
11.2.3 Identifying patterns of system behaviour
Systemic models provide an analysis of the system that focuses on developing an
understanding of the system’s behaviour. The models available in the prior art, expert
based models (Section 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.3.2) and scenario based models (Sections 2.2.2
and 2.3.1), provide incomplete characterisation of the system and therefore fail to
provide a comprehensive analysis of its behaviour (Section 2.4). Here, we advance on
the prior art by introducing models that provide a description of the entire system,
considering its boundaries and the role of its components in the exposure of EAD to
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susceptible receptors. Thus, systemic models provide a framework that represents the
system in its entirety and accounts for the interaction of its components (Section 4.2 and
6.2). The subject of system definition was reviewed in Section 1.3, resulting in
representations of the systems that are unique to the outbreak phase analysed.
Examples from the research presented here are:
 Results described in Chapter 4 and 5, describe the disposal options as a chain of
five independent environmental releases of hazardous agents (Figure 4.4 and
Figure 4.5). Here it acknowledges that each stage of disposal is independent and
impacts of disposal from one stage do not influence the next. However, it also
considers that some disposal stages are common to multiple disposal options
(Figure 4.2). Therefore, the impact caused by the disposal of carcasses in these
stages influences a range of disposal options.
 Results presented in Chapter 8 and 9 describe the system involved the
introduction of EAD into the UK and the multi-barrier system of controls to
prevent it, as a network (Figure 8.1 and 9.1). This representation of the system
acknowledges that pathways of exposure result from the intricate and complex
interactions between system components.
Systemic models develop an analysis of the system components, inserted in a
framework that aims to provide an accurate description of their real live behaviour.
This approach allows systemic models to provide a superior analysis of the system’s
behaviour, generating insights on efficient strategies to control exposure. Examples
from the results presented in this thesis are:
 Results in Chapter 4 identify stages of disposal common to a range of disposal
options. Policy intervention that address this stages of disposal, achieve in
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reducing the overall risk of exposure to hazardous agents to all disposal option
sharing that stage.
 Results presented in Chapter 10 address the concept of low probability events
(LPE) and their contribution the exposure of UK livestock to an EAD. Figure
10.1 displays an analysis of pathways lengths based on their influence on system
behaviour. Here pathways of introduction were separated into simple
introduction scenario (SIS - these are the pathways conventionally assessed in
scenario based models) and complex introduction scenarios (CIS – these
represent the LPE available in the system - Section 10.3). The results describe
that the likelihood of introduction through any one CIS it greater than
introduction through any one SIS, thus suggesting the need to improve control
over CIS. However, these represent more than 99% of the pathways of exposure
available in the system, thus making policy interventions addressing each CSI
individually inefficient. Here, systemic models provide further insight on
system behaviour. The framework recognises that process/events are common
to multiple pathways of exposure. Therefore, interventions targeting
process/events with a significant influence in exposure to EAD, the identified
CCP, will reduce exposure through SIS and CIS simultaneously (Section 10.4).
Systemic models focus on improving the available insight on system behaviour. This
characteristic of systemic models allows them to inform on efficient strategies to
improve control over the system’s behaviour and reduce likelihood of exposure. The
model applications presented here improve the understanding of the behaviour of the
systems associated with the pre-outbreak (pre t0) and post-outbreak (post t2) phases,
generating, for each phase, insights on efficient approaches to intervene in the system.
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11.2.4 Improving the quantity and quality of data to support policy
interventions
The analysis of the results presented reveals that systemic models develop analyses of
the system that consider all pathways of exposure; produce unbiased comparison of
pathways of exposure and process/events based on their influence on system behaviour
and; provide an understanding of system behaviour that generates insights on efficient
intervention strategies. This research, taken together (Chapters 4, 5, 8, 9 and 10),
presents the first application of systemic models to study EAD transmission during the
pre-outbreak and post-outbreak phases. The systemic models improved the information
and insights developed by the prior art and succeeded in providing insights over the
research opportunities identified in the literature (Section 2.6). Thus, expanding the
quantity and improving the quality of information available to support policy
developments to reduce UK’s vulnerability to EAD (Section 2.7). The significance of
this work is: analyses developed through the application of systemic models provide
insight on how to intervene in the system and, through the identification of CCP, on
where to intervene in the system. This information, made available to policy makers,
allows priorities to be set and policy intervention to be developed better.
11.3 3-tier format for communicating outputs
In this section, I critique the communication of the outputs produced to support policy
development, in light of the research presented in Chapter 4, 5, 8 and 9. Risk
assessments have a longstanding relation with the development of policy interventions
(Section 2.1.3). Thus, risk analysts and policy makers have a vested interest in being
presented with the most complete data to set priorities and support informed policy
decisions. The prior art demonstrates conventional risk assessment models associated
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with one-dimensional formats to communicate the outputs (Section 2.2 and 2.3). These
are nominal scales for expert based models (Section 2.2.1 and 2.3.2) and numerical
values of likelihood or quantity of EAD agent released for scenario based models
(Sections 2.2.3 and 2.3.1). These formats reduce the output to a value and fail to
integrate the significance of the findings onto the system’s behaviour. The
methodological limitations of conventional risk assessments (Sections 2.4 and 11.2)
alongside the format selected for communicating the output, results in a failure to
provide 1) an image of the entire system, i.e. describing all pathways of exposure
available in the system, and 2) fail to establish a relation between the priorities
identified and their influence on system behaviour. In short, conventional risk
assessment models develop and communicate outputs that are limited in their capacity
to inform policy interventions aiming to improve significantly system behaviour.
This research states, systemic models overcome the methodological limitation presented
by conventional risk assessment (Section 11.2). Here, we present an improved format
to communicate the outputs of systemic models, ensuring the full extent of the findings
is communicated to risk analysts and policy makers (Sections 4.3.1, 5.3.1 and 8.4.2).
These insights, now available allow priorities to be set and support the development of
informed policy decision. The format for communication of the outputs is based on
three tiers, thus providing an analysis of the system at three levels of detail.
The first tier is a high-level analysis, which displays an overview of the drivers of
exposure considered by the system. Examples from the research presented here are:
 The first tier analysis for the post-outbreak phase is presented in Figure 4.3,
comprising a Pareto assessment of all stages of disposal considered in the
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system. The Pareto principle is applied to identify the stages of disposal with
greatest influence on system behaviour (Section 4.3.1, (Delgado et al., 2010)).
 The first tier analysis for pre-outbreak phase is presented in Figures 8.4 and 9.3,
presenting an analysis of the network nodes, identifying those posing a greatest
influence in system behaviour.
Thus, the first tier communicates overall system behaviour and identifies the most
vulnerable aspects of the systems’ structures (Sections 8.4.1 and 9.3.2).
The second tier identifies specific activities and pathways of exposure responsible for
generating the high-level risk. Examples from the research presented here are:
 The second tier analysis for post-outbreak phase is presented in Figure 4.4 and
Figure 4.5, comprising a Pareto analysis of the pathways of exposure associated
with the disposal stages and identifying the pathways driving exposure within
each stage (Section 4.3.1).
 The second tier analysis for the pre-outbreak phase is presented in Figures 8.5
and Figure 9.4, providing an analysis of the process/events responsible for inter-
node connectivity for a specific node (in this case human population). This
analysis identifies the process/event with a higher influence in system behaviour
(Sections 8.4.1and 9.3.2).
The second tier analysis identifies the systems’ CCP, providing insights on specific
pathways and activities responsible for the vulnerabilities of the system. Here,
intervention is likely to improve significantly system behaviour (Delgado et al. 2010).
The third tier describes additional descriptive information on the failure causes
responsible for exposure. Examples from the research presented here are:
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 The third tier analysis for the post-outbreak phase identifies the hazardous
agents released at the end of each pathway, following the disposal of carcasses
(Table 5.2 and Table 5.3).
 The third tier analysis for the pre-outbreak phase identifies the causes for failing
to detect and eliminate an EAD prior to the exposure of UK livestock. For
example, for the arc representing movements between countries outside the EU
and the domestic residences, the third tier states “risk targeted enforcement was
unable to check all passengers and packages and there was a lack of awareness
amongst travellers” (Section 8.4.1).
The third tier provides context to the events driving exposure. This information has a
twofold function. Firstly, it provides access to the rationale used by experts to perform
the assessment. Secondly, it provides context to the values provided by the assessment,
allowing decision makers to develop risk mitigation solutions that target specific causes
of failure and specific hazardous agents released into the environment. Henceforth, it
contributes to the increase in efficiency of future intervention strategies that spawn from
these assessments.
The 3-tiered approach to communicating the output format presents, through a sequence
of perspectives the complete image of source-pathway-receptor relationships. This
format partitions the output into smaller size units. The results presented (Sections 5.3,
8.3 and 9.3.2) follow a sequential increase in detail that allows decision makers to move
from a general overview of the system towards a detailed analysis of individual
pathways or events driving exposure (Delgado et al., 2010), ending with the description
of the causes of barrier failure or hazards exposed.
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This research, taken together, offers a 3-tier approach to communicate the systemic
analysis of EAD risk. For the first time, risk analysts and policy makers can now see
the full extent of the system, from individual components to system structure, thus
allowing priorities to be set and intervention to be devised better.
11.4 Maximising expert opinion
In this section, I critique the improvements to the application of expert opinion in
systemic models, based on the research presented in Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7. Expert opinion
is used frequently in the prior art, in models used to study the pre-outbreak and post-
outbreak phases of EAD outbreaks (Sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.3.2). Models using
expert opinion rely on experts to provide information and to produce the outputs
(Taylor, 2003).
The research literature is vague, but suggests the elicitation process focuses on
promoting group discussion on commodities imported and classification according to a
nominal scale (Defra, 2011c; DH, 2001; BioNZ, 2006). There are exceptions in the
prior art (Section 2.2.2), however, these are the minority (Horst et al., 1998; Horst et al.,
1996; Nissen and Krieter, 2003; Gallagher et al., 2002). The criteria for selecting
experts targets high-level officials and animal health specialist, producing expert panels
with a general understanding of the system (Defra, 2011c; DH, 2001; BioNZ, 2006).
The combination of elicitation process and criteria for expert selection, results in the
superficial analyses of the system that is characteristic of expert based qualitative
assessments (Taylor, 2003, Peeler et al., 2006). All expert based assessments available
in the prior art, for the pre-outbreak and post-outbreak phase fail to assess specific
pathways of exposure (Sections 2.2 and 2.3). Thus, such models produce outputs that
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provide limited insights on system vulnerabilities and contribute little to expand the
existing understanding of system behaviour.
Here, we have advanced the use of expert elicitation as a source of information by
developing models combining the use of expert opinion and computer modelling. This
resulted in the development of models that do not rely on the experts’ rationale to
produce the output. This changes the role of experts in the models and with it the
criteria used for expert selection (Chapter 7), allowing improvement in the quality of the
expertise selected to provide input (Cooke, 1994; Cooke and Goossens, 2000). The
research, presented chronologically, describes a progressive transition from the
conventional use of expertise (Chapter 4) to a more efficient use of expert opinion
(Chapter 6 and 7).
The research presented in Chapter 4 explores the potential of the modelling approach
published by Pollard et al. (2008) to develop a systemic analysis of carcass disposal
activities (Delgado et al, 2010). This model applies a framework that represents the
entire system’s structure to ensure experts assess all pathways of exposure. It
introduces a description of the system that guides experts to providing a comprehensive
analysis of the pathways of exposure. The model uses expertise from high-level
officials and relies exclusively on the experts’ rationale to assess risk of exposure
presented by the pathways (Figure 4.2 and Table 4.2). Although a conventional panel
of experts is used to inform and produce the outputs, the combined use of expert
opinion and system representation, resulted in an analysis of the entire system with a
level of detail (Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5) that was previous unavailable in the prior art
(Section 2.3.2 and 2.3.3).
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The research presented in Chapter 5 builds upon the combination of a framework and
expert opinion (developed further in Chapters 6 and 7) to improve the use of the
expertise available. Here, the research presents a modelling approach that combines the
use of expert data and computer models. The framework representing the system is
associated with a computer model that is responsible for generating the pathways and
estimate exposure (Sections 5.2.3 and 6.3). Experts provide the input data for the model
but are not responsible for providing the output (Sections 5.2.4 and 6.2.2). This
application of expert opinion changes the role of the experts and with it the parameters
for expert selection (Section 5.2.4, &.7.2.2).
The research presented in Chapters 6 and 7 takes full advantage of this characteristic.
The model relies on experts to inform on the causes and frequency of failures of the
barriers within the system. A computer model integrates these data and generates
insight on system behaviour. This allows for selecting as experts, individuals that do
not have an understanding of the entire system. Thus, it expands the pool of available
experts to consider those individuals with a narrow but insightful expertise on specific
barriers to EAD transmission (Table 7.1). As a result, the model collects information on
barrier failure, form individuals that have the responsibility to enforce them, suggesting
a privilege insight on their performance and failure causes. This is defined a
“practitioner’s expertise” in Chapter 7, and suggests these models are based on the most
accurate and up to date information (Chapter 8 and 9).
The research presented here presents an alternative use of expert opinion applied to the
study of EAD. For the first time, the expertise sought after is not that of high-level
officials and animal health specialists, and instead focuses on those individuals with a
narrow but insightful expertise resulting from the daily tasks they perform (Table 7.1).
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The computer models integrate the insights from a large number of experts with
“practitioner’s” expertise, thus allowing the development of insights on system
behaviour, supported by expertise on specific system components (Section 6.2). As a
result, the research presented in Chapter 8 and 9 uses information from experts in
privilege positions to assess the efficacy of the controls in place, thus maximising the
use of information currently available to perform the assessment (Cooke, 1994; Cooke
and Goossens, 2000). Outputs produced through this approach are based on the most
accurate and up to date information. Thus, allowing better informed priorities to be set
and policy interventions to be defined better.
11.5 Comparison of models
In this section, I critique the role of systemic models based on the research presented in
Chapter 4, 8, 9 and 10. This section focuses on identifying the roles of systemic models
to support policy development for EAD, considering the range of tools available in the
prior art. The models used in the prior art were not originally developed to infer on a
systems behaviour (Section 2.4). Their use for such a purpose resulted in a
misapplication of the models. For example using a combination of expert based and
scenario based models to infer on system behaviour (Section 2.5) or the development of
comprehensive scenarios based models, which infer on system behaviour based on an
incomplete analysis of the system (De Vos et al., 2004). The introduction of systemic
models is followed by the need to redefine the role of the models now available, to
ensure their correct application within their modelling capabilities. From the analysis of
the models in the prior art we conclude that:
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Expert-based models develop scanning exercises considering the entire system, but
without specifying or considering pathways of exposure in any level of detail (Defra,
2011c; BioNZ, 2006). Thus, expert based models allow developing analyses of the
system in the short-term, but producing limited information on ways to improve the
detected vulnerabilities (Sections 2.2.1 and 2.3.2). The prior art associates expert based
models with emergencies, where the need to act, presses the time available to produce
the assessment (Defra, 2011c; DH, 2001).
Scenario based models analyse specific pathways of exposure with a great level of
detail (Sections 2.2.3 and 2.3.1). Here data is collected and applied to inform on all
barriers to transmission from source to receptor, making these models time and resource
consuming (Vose, 2008; Murray, 2002). This constrains the number of pathways
assessed to one or a small number of them, thus scenario based models fail produce
analyses of the entire system (Taylor, 2003; Morley, 1993; Yu et al., 1997; Martinez-
Lopez et al., 2008; Hoar et al., 2004; Jones et al., 2004; Astudillo et al., 1997; Weng et
al., 2010). The prior art associates these models with “times of peace” and applied to
understand past events, to generate insights to prevent future incursions through these
same pathways.
Here, systemic models expand the range of risk assessments models applied to study the
pre-outbreak and post-outbreak phases. Systemic models focus on developing analysis
of the entire system and assessing its pathways (all of them) to inform on system
behaviour (Section 4.3, 8.3 and 9.3). These models strike a middle ground between
expert based and scenario based models regarding the level of detail with which
pathways are assessed and the time necessary to develop analyses (Figure, 4.4, Figure
4.5, Figure 8.5 and Figure 9.3) . However, they produce superior insights on system
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behaviour and on opportunities to improve UK’s resilience to future EAD outbreaks
(Section 0).
Based on this review, we suggest using: 1) expert based models to identify
vulnerabilities in the system, during emergencies; 2) systemic models to produce a more
detailed analysis of the system, of its behaviour and vulnerabilities, when time is
available and; 3) scenario based models to explore further the vulnerabilities identified
by systemic models and to study past events identified in research literature and
epidemiological reports.
For the first time, risk analysis and policy makers have at their disposal a range of
modelling approaches to analyse vulnerabilities in systems associated with EAD
transmission. The systemic models presented here, do not replace the methods
available in the prior art. Instead, by expanding the list of models available, we ensure
model application is confined to its capacity, thus avoiding the misapplication of models
that compromise the quality of the insights generated. Using these models correctly
supports the development of high quality outputs, ensuring that policy interventions are
supported by accurate and relevant data.
11.6 Comparison with disease spread models
In this section, I critique the use of systemic models in light of the research presented
here (Chapter 4, 8 and 9) and the current use of disease spread models (Section 2.1.4).
The prior art describes similarities in the approach used to develop disease spread
models and our advanced approach to develop systemic models (Section 2.1.4). In
theory, the application of disease spread models can focus on assessing the inter-farm
movements, to detect vulnerabilities and opportunities to improve the controls in place
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to prevent exposure (Kitching et al., 2005; Harvey et al., 2007; Garner and Beckett,
2005). However, in current applications these models focus on producing a different
analysis of the system. These analyses are based on the development of a base case for
disease spread, followed by an assessment of the effects different policy interventions
have on the spread and exposure to EAD (Kitching et al., 2006; Kobayashi et al., 2007).
Thus, such application of disease spread models allow for considering the economic and
social aspects of disease intervention.
The similarities in approaches for model development (Section 2.1.4) suggest that
systemic models are able to analyse the effects that changes to the system, planned and
unplanned, have in UK’s vulnerability an EAD. This includes using systemic models to
test scenarios of exposure that consider factors exterior to animal health policies. For
example, the effect of the current budget cuts in the resilience against an EAD outbreak
(Alistair, 2010; BBC News, 2010). This use of systemic models produces information
to support decisions to increase the effectiveness of the available protections measures
and/or reduce their cost (Kitching et al., 2006; Kobayashi et al., 2007). Thus, it informs
on system behaviour in manner that focuses on developing strategies to produce cost-
effective solutions and thus optimising protection against an EAD outbreak.
The potential for such an application suggest that in the research presented in the
Chapters 4, 8 and 9, system models do not achieve their full potential. Testing such an
application of systemic models can provide an interesting challenge for the future. If
possible then for the first time, risk analysts and policy makers have at their disposal a
modelling technique that allows testing policy interventions considering the limits of the
available resources. Future applications of the systemic models can assess the cost and
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benefits of policy interventions, supporting the development of more informed policy
decisions.
11.7 Modelling with limited data
In this section, I critique the sources of uncertainty associated with the systemic models
presented in this thesis based on the methods described in Chapter 4 and 6.
Specifically, uncertainty associated with the limitations of the data available in the
research literature and expert opinion. The results presented in this thesis do not
provide an estimation of the level of uncertainty (Section 4.3 and 8.4.3). However,
systemic models are sensitive to the limitation of data available in the research literature
on the events taking place during the pre-outbreak and post-outbreak phases (Section
2.1.3), and the influence of biases in expert opinion is documented (Cooke, 1994;
Tversky and Kahneman, 2000). Therefore, uncertainty is likely to be present in the
results. Addressing the uncertainty is central to improve the systemic models capacity
to provide an output that is coherent with the events occurring during the two phases of
an EAD outbreak. Thus, it improves the quality of the information available for the
development of policy interventions. Here focus is on the uncertainty associated with
the elicitation exercises (Chapter 7) and with the information available in research
literature to develop representations of the systems (Section 2.1.3).
11.7.1 Uncertainty from expert opinion
Risk assessments based on expert knowledge depend on the expert’s capacity to
develop accurate expert judgements. Expert elicitation exercises are dominated by the
adequacy of the ranking scale to capture the magnitude of the event (Cobb, 1998; Cox
and Babayev, 2005), by the heuristics associated with expert biases (Cooke, 1994;
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Tversky and Kahneman, 2000) and by the experts understanding of the assessed events
(Jousselme et al., 2003; Lipshitz and Strauss, 1997). The prior art, associated with EAD
and with the wider field of risk assessments is vague in suggestions for the development
of elicitation exercises (Neale, 1988; Ford and Stermanb, 1998). The elicitation method
used was influence by this lack of guidance and as expert opinion is the sole source of
input data, the elicitation exercises are the subject of great concern.
Drawing upon large quantities of elicited data required elicitation protocols that
considered the limitations in resources regarding time, cost and expert availability
(Chapter 7). Our approach focussed on simplicity, easiness with which participants
understand the task and the nature of the materials provided for the exercise (Hoffman
et al., 1995), and efficiency, the rapid generation of information (Hoffman et al., 1995).
However, this constricted the capacity to confirm validity, i.e. exercises to confirm the
accuracy of the data collected (Hoffman et al., 1995). Specifically, the elicitation
protocol uses expert consensus to generate the variables, however the verification
exercises were performed post elicitation.
Limitations in time and expert availability excluded the use of more robust elicitation
techniques and to include data verification exercises as integrative part of the elicitation
protocol (Section 7.2). Ignorance prevails regarding the quality and accuracy of the
data produced. Considering the volume of information to elicit, alongside the
limitations in time and expert availability, the elicitation protocol selected fits the needs
of the model (Section 7.2). However, it is advisable that future applications of the
model revise and test its true potential and if need, improve or replace the elicitation
exercises currently proposed.
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11.7.2 Information available on the source-pathway-receptor relationship
Developing a representation of the system involves drawing upon information, available
in the research literature and as expert opinion, to inform on the system, the system
components and on the pathways of exposure. However, information on past EAD
outbreaks is limited (Section 2.1.2), thus challenging the level of insights available to
define accurately the systems and system components. Specifically, it influences the
capacity to identify all pathways of exposure. Here, a poor characterisation of the
system influences the pathways assessed by the systemic models and may result in an
application of the model that does not assess all available pathways of exposure.
Examples of the effect of prior knowledge in system development are:
 The systemic model for the post-outbreak phase (Chapter 4 and 5) uses prior
knowledge to define the disposal options, the stages of disposal considered for
each option and the suit of pathways of exposure considered from each stage of
disposal (Table 4.2). Specifically, the model application assumed there is a
sound understanding of the environmental fate of hazards and disposal activities
(Section 4.2). Thus, that it is possible to identify all pathways of exposure. If
this assumption is correct, the model represents a truly systemic analysis of
exposure to hazardous agents. However, if the assumption is incorrect, it may
have resulted in the exclusion of those pathways of exposure that are unknown.
Thus, this systemic model is vulnerable to the limitations of information on past
EAD outbreaks and the environmental fate of hazards.
 The systemic models for the pre-outbreak phase (Chapter 8 and 9) acknowledge
that the large number of pathways of exposure available for introduction of an
EAD (Section 1.3.1) alongside the limited information on past outbreaks
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(Section 2.1.2), challenges the capacity to define all pathways of exposure.
Thus, the model adopted an approach where it is a computer model that
generates the pathways of exposure (Pearce and Merletti, 2006; Dangerfield and
Morris, 1992; Freeze et al., 2005). The computer model draws on the
information produced by the elicitation process and generates all pathways of
exposure available in the network (Section 6.3). However, the elicitation
process depends on the prior identification of the system’s features (network
nodes) during the first elicitation phase (Section 7.2.1). The systemic models
used information from the research literature and expert opinion to define the
system and network nodes. Here, a poor definition of the system, which
excludes a network node results in the exclusion of all pathways associated with
it. Thus, the systemic model is vulnerable to the limitations of information on
past EAD outbreaks.
The level of insight available on the system’s behaviour generated from analyses of past
outbreak influences the development of the systemic models to EAD. Here, limited
information jeopardises the comprehensiveness of the system, compromising systemic
models from developing a truly systemic analysis of the system.
The development of a representation of the system represents a key stage of the
development of a systemic model (Murthy and Krishnamurthy, 2009; Freeze et al.,
2005; Zio, 2009). Thus, the use of prior knowledge, as data available from the research
literature and as expert knowledge, to develop system representations poses concern.
Model development, specifically the systemic model for the pre-outbreak phase
(Sections 7.2.1), dedicates significant resources to ensure the framework (network
nodes) representing the system is accurate. However, it is advisable that future
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applications of the model revise the use of prior knowledge and improve or replace
exercises currently proposed.
11.7.3 Overcoming data limitations in future applications
The research presented in this thesis represents a first application of systemic models to
develop analysis of EAD outbreaks, specifically for the pre-outbreak and post-outbreak
phases (Chapter 4, 5, 8 and 9). These models address systems for which limited
information is currently available to inform on system behaviour, pathways of exposure
and vulnerabilities (Section 2.1.2). The development and application of systemic
models to study EAD transmission improved the quantity and quality of the information
available to support policy interventions. However, the development of a novel tool for
assessing risk carries with it methodological challenges that need overcoming to
improve the robustness of the output produced.
Systemic models adopt modelling solutions from other areas of risk assessment, where
developments are still necessary. Namely the application of systemic models to open
systems and epidemiologic studies (Pearce, 1996; Pearce and Merletti, 2006; Mitchell,
2006; Boccara, 2004) and the management of uncertainty associated with expert
elicitation (Cooke, 1994; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Cooke, 1991; Slottje et al.,
2008). It is safe to assume that progress in these areas will advance the methodological
solutions available to build systemic models, making future applications to the study
EAD transmission more accessible.
The methods used to gather expert opinion currently represent a likely source of
uncertainty for the models’ outputs. Expert opinion allowed overcoming some of the
limitations of the records from past outbreaks (Section 2.1.2), providing the opportunity
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to develop the systemic analyses of the pre-outbreak (pre t0) and post-outbreak (post t2)
phases of an EAD outbreak. However, the scarcity of information on source-pathway-
receptor relationships influences the accuracy of the outputs. The limitation of the
available data affects the development and identification of the pathways, and may have
resulted in the exclusion of those pathways of exposure unknown to experts. Besides
this, data scarcity challenges and limits the possibilities for model validation through
external validation (sections 4.3 and 8.4.3) (Wooldridge et al., 2006). This is the
validation of the output through comparison with historical data, collected from
previous outbreaks, epidemiological studies and risk assessments (Sargent, 2007;
O'Keefe et al., 1987).
Defining the pathways and validation were predictable challenges (Murthy and
Krishnamurthy, 2009; Freeze et al., 2005; Wooldridge et al., 2006; O'Keefe et al.,
1987). Thus, model development ensured periodic verification exercises, using an
expert panel to ensure the modelling approaches are valid and fit for purpose and allows
to expert validation of the output (Sargent, 2007; O'Keefe et al., 1987). Despite the
solutions adopted to minimise the negative influence of data scarcity, uncertainty is
likely to be present in the outputs produced. Future applications of systemic models to
EAD must address the use of data from research literature and expert opinion to ensure
accuracy in the outputs produced.
11.8 Improving policy development associated with EAD outbreaks
This work defends a superiority of systemic model to produce information that supports
decisions that aim to optimise the level of protection against an EAD outbreak. This
assumption is based on the use of systemic model to study disease spread and in other
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areas of risk assessment. The strength of these models results from (i) establishing a
relation of cause and effect between the factors influencing EAD transmission and
system behaviour, and (ii) generating insight on all factors posing an influence
regardless of likelihood and impact. As a result, systemic models develop a
comprehensive analysis of the systems associated with the pre-outbreak (pre t0) and
post-outbreak (post t2) phases of an EAD outbreak, resulting in the identification of
high-level priorities and CCP and detection of trends leading to EAD exposure, such as
the low probability events (LPE). These insights on system behaviour expose system
vulnerabilities and provide insight on efficient approaches to minimising exposure, the
extent to which is beyond the reach of the predictive models previously applied to study
these phases of EAD outbreaks. As a result, these models help overcome some of the
information limitations identified in literature, regarding opportunities for controlling
the EAD transmission and exposure and thus strengthening the available information to
support decision across all phase of an outbreak.
Expert-based systemic models represent a development of the tools available to support
decision-making during the pre-outbreak (pre t0) and post-outbreak (post t2) phases of
an EAD outbreak. These models produce an analysis of the pathways system that is
consistent with that of disease spread models, reducing the inequality in available
information to perform decisions between the these two outbreak phases and the
outbreak (t0 t2) phase. Such models improve the decision-making capacity across all
stages of an EAD outbreak, nonetheless they do not achieve in producing information of
similar quality to that available to support decision in the t0-2 phase. Increasing the
quality of information produced involves development of modelling techniques that
address the concerns identified in model application. Most importantly is must include
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improving the source of available information in the research literature, particular by
producing a more accurate recount of the events occurring during EAD outbreak
(documentation of past outbreaks). Only the conjoint effort to improve these two
information sources can improve the existing understanding of system behaviour.
Despite this, in light of the insights produced by the systemic models, alongside the
current use of systemic models in other areas (Murthy and Krishnamurthy, 2009; Freeze
et al., 2005; Zio, 2009), systemic analyses present advantages to policy development.
Thus, it is logical to assume that these models are likely to be involved in the future on
EAD management.
The development of these tools for EAD suggests their wider application in other areas
is also possible. Systemic models are likely to prove useful at a time where threats are
not always foreseeable and in a society evermore risk conscientious as demonstrated by
the position adopted by the British government (Risk Support Team: HM Treasury,
2004).
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CONCLUSIONS12
The research in this thesis, presents the first application of systemic models to study
EAD outbreaks. Specifically, to study two critical phases of an EAD outbreak for
which information is to support policy interventions is limited (Section 2.1.3), the pre-
outbreak and post-outbreak phases. We have expanded the modelling solutions
available in the prior art to consider systemic models, and in light of the results
presented in Chapters 4, 5, 8, 9 and 10 with benefits to the insights available on
exposure to support policy development for these two outbreak phases. For the first
time, risk analysis and policy makers have at their disposal models that produce
analysis of the entire system, from system component to system structure. The
results suggest systemic models are superior in the capacity to understand the
system’s behaviour and identify its vulnerabilities thus, allowing priorities to be set
more accurately and policy interventions to be defined better. Insights and claims
of novelty in this thesis are associated with the insights developed for the two outbreak
phases and the characteristic of systemic models that are of benefit to policy
development. Based on the research and results presented we conclude the following:
1. The application of systemic models to study the post-outbreak phase brings an
improved level of understanding on exposure across the process chain
associated with the disposal options (Chapter 4 and 5). The systemic model
(Chapters 4 and 5) produces the first comprehensive analysis of exposure to
hazardous agents from disposal activities, considering all disposal options,
disposal stages and pathways of exposure. Furthermore, we believe this to be
the first application of Pareto analysis to generalized policy-level exposure
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assessments (Section 4.3.1). This research provides evidence base that allows
for the first time to:
 Highlight the large number of high-risk pathways during the initial phases of
carcass disposal and during the collection and loading of carcasses on farm
(Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5) that present a significant influence in exposure to
hazardous agents.
 Set priorities for policy interventions based on a comprehensive analysis of
all pathways of exposure and carcass disposal activities influencing system
behaviour.
Without the development and application of a systemic model, it would
have been difficult to state, with any authority, the vulnerabilities of the
existing controls (Delgado et al., 2010), allowing policy officials to direct risk
management efforts accordingly and communicate a rationale for intervention
priorities.
2. The application of systemic models to study the pre-outbreak phase brings an
improved level of understanding on the on causes of failure of the multi-
barrier system associated with preventing introduction and exposure of
EAD to livestock (Chapters 8, 9 and 10). The systemic models produced the
first comprehensive analyses of exposure to EAD, considering all system
components and their interactions and the multi-barrier systems of controls
to prevent exposure of livestock to EAD. We believe this to be the first
application of a model built from the bottom-up to support a generalised
policy level exposure assessment (Chapter 6), associated with the introduction of
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CSF and FMD. This research provides an evidence base that allows for the
first time to:
 Identify the influence of the role played by the human population, domestic
animals/backyard farms and animal gatherings in enabling introduction and
exposure of EAD (Figures 8.4 and Figure 9.3).
 Highlight the influence of low probability events in undermining the UK’s
resilience to EADs and determine the best approach to control them (Chapter
10).
 Set priorities for policy interventions based on a comprehensive analysis of
all process/events influencing system behaviour.
Without the development and application of systemic models, it would have
been difficult to state, with any authority, the vulnerabilities in the existing
controls, allowing policy officials to direct risk management efforts accordingly
and communicate a rationale for intervention priorities.
3. Models developed according to the systemic principles support the development
of systemic models that produce comprehensive analysis of the systems,
improving the level of understanding on the system’s vulnerabilities and
behaviour (Section 11.8), exemplified in the research presented in Chapters 4, 8,
9. These principles are:
 establish a relation of cause and effect between the factors influencing
EAD transmission and system behaviour, and
 generate insight on all factors posing an influence regardless of
likelihood and impact.
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The systemic models presented here expanded the number of pathways
assessed for the pre-outbreak and post-outbreak phases (11.2.1), improved the
quality of the output by minimising the effects of expert biases and prejudice
on the outputs (11.2.2) and; developed insights in system behaviour that
allowed to detect efficient ways to control exposure (11.2.3). As a result, the
output produced allowed to:
 Identify vulnerabilities overlooked by models in the prior art (Sections 4.3,
10.1 and 11.2.2),
 Identify patters of system behaviour that allowed developing more
efficient policy intervention (Section 10.3.3 and 11.2.3).
Considering the limitations in the prior art (Section 2.1.2), models developed
according to the systemic principle (systemic models) are an essential tool to
develop insights that allow priorities to be set and policy intervention to be
defined better.
4. This research improved the format used for communicating the results. This
improved on one-dimensional methods of communicating risk present in the
prior art (e.g. nominal scales and numerical outputs), to providing a 3-tier
approach to communicating the outputs (Section 11.3). For the first time,
policy maker and risk analysts can see the full extent of the system, from
system structure to individual components. This format allows to:
 Identify vulnerabilities in the system structure (Figure 4.3, 8.4 and 9.3);
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 Recognise the system’s critical control points (CCP) (4.4, 4.5, 8.5 and
9.4), were intervention is likely to improve significantly protection against
EAD (Chapter 4) and
 Provide insights on causes for system failure, to support the development
of efficient policy intervention (Tables 5.2 and 5,3 and Section 8.4.2).
The 3-tier format allows, for the first time to communicate the full extent of
the outputs, now available, to risk analysis and policy makers, from system
components to system structure (Sections 5.3, 8.3 and 9.3). Thus, priorities
can be set with confidence, and policy interventions defined better.
5. The research presented advanced the use of expert opinion in study of EAD. We
believe these are the first models applied to study the transmission of EAD to
combine expert opinion with computer models (Chapter 6). Here, experts
provide the input data but not the outputs of the models (Section 8.2.2 and
9.2.3), changing their role from that performed by experts in models available in
the prior art (Sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.3.2). This allows changing the expert
selection criteria. The systemic models developed to study the pre-outbreak
phase (Chapter 8 and 9) selects:
 Experts with a narrow but insightful expertise on specific system
components considered in the network.
Expertise selected through this criteria is defined as “practitioner’s” expertise
(Section 7.2.2) and targets experts that:
 Have privilege insights on barrier efficiency and failure causes, based on
the most accurate and up to date information.
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This research, offers for the first time risk assessment models that develop
insights on system behaviour supported by individuals with expertise on specific
system components (Table 7.1). Models using these criteria for expert
selection (practitioner’s expertise) provide the most accurate insights on
system behaviour and vulnerabilities (Section 11.4).
6. The research presented in this thesis is based on the development of novel
methodologies to develop comprehensive analysis of EAD transmission. The
research recognises that long-term commitments to improve records of EAD
outbreaks and modelling approaches are necessary to improve insight on
the EAD transmission during the pre-outbreak and post-outbreak phase.
Progress in that direction must include an analysis of the potential uses of
systemic models and identify methodological vulnerabilities for consideration in
future applications. Here I present the following suggestions for future work:
 Apply systemic models to study the effects of policy changes and to
analyse the cost and benefits of policy interventions (Section 11.6);
 Revise the use of prior knowledge and expert opinion in the systemic
models for the development of more robust models (Section 11.7.1 and
11.7.2) and;
 Improve systemic models according to the novel insights on the study of
open systems and epidemiological studies (11.7.3).
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ANNEX 115
Outputs of the first stage of elicitation develop for the Import risk assessment of Classic
Swine Fever. This activities developed in this stage provide a definition of the network
nodes.
15.1 Network nodes for Classic Swine Fever
15.1.1 Node definitions
Outside EU [Source] All Countries outside the European Union, including third world
countries, trading partners and bilateral [independent of absence/presence of CSF].
EU [Positive] [Source] All EU member countries where the disease is present,
currently without disease free status [Independent of the affected area, e.g. nationally or
regionally].
Laboratories [Source] Laboratory facilities that might handle CSF contaminated
material.
EU [negative] All EU member countries benefiting from the European free market
agreement, currently under the disease free status [including potentially false negative
countries].
Border Inspection Post All Border Inspections posts [independent of location airport
or nautical port].
Environment Potential fomites [grazing fields, water-bodies...], all flora and all fauna
not included in the list of receptors.
Wildlife [wild boar] Wildlife populations susceptible to the disease present within
English territory.
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Petting zoo /Pet shop includes Zoos [urban and rural] including petting zoos and pet
shops.
Food markets/Retailers/Restaurants/Caterer Entities responsible for making food
goods available to the general public, including supermarket, local market, butchers and
restaurants and caterers
Feed factory All facilities producing feed; feed additives; supplements; and other
products to be used in livestock feeding
Domestic residence The location of residence and movement for the human
population: including British Citizens, immigrant communities and migrant work forces
Veterinarian./fieldsmen/other intervenient The personnel involved in the farms
routine activities that might play a part in disease transmission performing movement
[Veterinary personnel; fieldsman; and other personnel in the position of acting as a
fomite]. Does not include commuting movements between domestic residence and farm
Slaughterhouse/meat processing plants All slaughter houses and all plants involved
in the transformation of meat products
Livestock vehicles Any vehicles involved in the transport of live animals. It represents
the vehicle as a fomite, where the contaminated material within the vehicle,
contaminates a group of disease free animals, environment...
Domestic animals/ Backyard Farms Livestock not bred for slaughter and small
livestock aggregates, includes pet pigs, hobbyists and backyard farmers
Waste disposal Waste disposal facilities capable with dealing with potentially CSF
contaminated waste.
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Animal gathering [Receptor] National and international animal gathering events
within English territory (animal shows, markets), these are associated with gathering of
animals from multiple proveniences.
Farm [Breeding units] [Receptor] All breeding company breeding herds (nucleus and
multiplier); weaner breed herds; and breeding finishing units It is usually associated
with intensive production systems and characterised by a high bio-safety level.
Outdoor Finishers [Receptor] All weaning and finishing outdoor units
Indoor Finishers [Receptor] All in-housing finishing units; and breeding companies
grow out units
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Figure 15.1 Collection of nodes develop in the first stage of elicitation applied to studying the introduction of CSF into England (Chapter 8)
[KEY] Blue nodes represent potential disease sources; red nodes represent receptors, simulation stops when CSF reaches these nodes, green
nodes represent full functioning nodes, providing a connection between source and receptors.
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ANNEX 216
16.1 Classic Swine Fever FEP LIST
Table 16.1 Outside EU
Receptor node
Flow
rate Minimum Maximum Comments
Domestic residence
1.E+05 1.E-01 1.E-02 Personnel imports are regulated
however risk targeted
enforcement unable to check all
lack of awareness amongst
travellers
Petting zoo/pet shop
1.E+02 1.E-05 1.E-07 Measures are in place to control
animal imports
Veterinarian./fieldsmen
/ other intervenient
1.E+03 1.E-04 1.E-05 No comments recorded
Waste disposal plant
1.E+05 1.E-05 1.E-06 Controls are on international
catering waste, licensed and
controlled - relies on cooperation
between carriers and delivery
agents involved
Food markets /
Retailers /
Restaurants/Caterer
1.E+02 1.E-03 1.E-04 Little evidence suggests direct
contact to restaurants, although
unknown (barriers are the BIPs,
Border controls, Licensing
catering permits
Feed factory
1.E+02 1.E-06 1.E-07 Licensing of feed factories is
highly controlled
Domestic animal/
backyard farms
1.E+04 1.E-01 1.E-02 No comments recorded
Environment
1.E+03 1.E-02 1.E-04 Direct connections to the
environment are unlikely
Wildlife
1.E+02 1.E-04 1.E-06 Only possible if feed is illegally
imported a fed to wild boars
Animal gathering 1.E+02 1.E-06 1.E-07 Negligible imports
Farms Breeders
0.E+00 0.E+00 0.E+00 No live animal (Pigs) imported
from outside the EU
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Outdoor Finishers
NA NA NA No live animal (Pigs) imported
from outside the EU
Indoor Finishers
NA NA NA No live animal (Pigs) imported
from outside the EU
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Table 16.2 EU [Positive]
Receptor node
Flow
rate Minimum Maximum Comments
Outside EU NA NA NA NA
EU [Positive]
EU [negative]
1.E+04 1.E-01 1.E-02 Personal imports are the greatest
concern. Barriers involve
legislation and certification, and
are more effective for commercial
transactions
Border Inspection Post NA NA NA Not applicable
Laboratories
1.E+02 1.E-05 1.E-07 *Values not used for simulation 1)
Variation of barrier efficiency
recognised routes vs. unknown
Note: Recognise efficacy of BIP for
product coming in through
recognised, less likely routes are
of higher risk
Slaughterhouse /meat
processing plants
1.E+02 1.E-05 1.E-06 Certification should effectively
stop movement
Livestock Vehicles
1.E+03 1.E-04 1.E-05 Livestock vehicles may come back
from a diseased area. Cleaning &
Disinfection is the main protective
barrier
Domestic residence
1.E+04 1.E-02 1.E-03 Personal imports (Illegal) of meat
products
Petting zoo/pet shop 1.E+02 1.E-06 1.E-07 Visitors to Zoos and Pet shops
Veterinarian./fieldsmen
/ other intervenient
1.E+02 1.E-05 1.E-06 Veterinarians pose minimal risk.
Fieldsman higher risk may visit a
farm in a diseased area
Waste disposal plant
1.E+02 1.E-06 1.E-07 Highly regulated - Unlikely for
waste to come from elsewhere in
the EU from processing main risk is
international catering waste
Food markets /
Retailers /
Restaurants/Caterer
1.E+02 1.E-06 1.E-07 Should come with certificate and
commercial document. Risks are
lower than those associated with
personal imports
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Feed factory
1.E+02 1.E-06 1.E-07 Unlikely to pose a risk -
contaminated vegetable matter
poses the highest risk
Domestic animal/
backyard farms
1.E+02 1.E-05 1.E-06 Domestic animals and backyard
farms are less controlled
comparatively to other pig farms.
There a is higher likelihood of
animals being fed food scraps
Environment 1.E+02 1.E-06 1.E-07 Ill Discarded food (meat products)
Wildlife
1.E+02 1.E-06 1.E-07 Direct contact between the disease
agent and the wildlife is highly
unlikely.
Animal gathering
1.E+02 1.E-06 1.E-07 Low throughput (there should be
no throughput) from diseased
areas (certification is the main
barrier)
Farms Breeders
1.E+02 1.E-06 1.E-07 Low throughput (there should be
no throughput) from diseased
areas (certification is the main
barrier)
Outdoor Finishers
1.E+02 1.E-06 1.E-07 Low throughput (there should be
no throughput) from diseased
areas (certification is the main
barrier)
Indoor Finishers
1.E+02 1.E-06 1.E-07 Low throughput (there should be
no throughput) from diseased
areas (certification is the main
barrier)
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Table 16.3 EU Negative
Receptor node Flow rate Minimum Maximum Comments
Outside EU NA NA NA NA
EU [Positive] NA NA NA NA
EU [negative] NA NA NA NA
Border Inspection Post NA NA NA NA
Laboratories
NA NA NA *Values not used for simulation
NA
Slaughterhouse /meat
processing plants
1.E+02 1.E-07 1.E-08 No comments recorded
Livestock Vehicles
1.E+02 1.E-07 1.E-08 Improper Cleansing & Disinfection
activity on a vehicle coming from
a unknown virus source
Domestic residence 1.E+05 1.E-07 1.E-08 No comments recorded
Petting zoo/pet shop
1.E+02 1.E-04 1.E-05 Import levels are very low; with
animals and products subjected to
normal import rules
Veterinarian./fieldsmen
/ other intervenient
1.E+02 1.E-04 1.E-05 Veterinarian contaminated from
an unknown virus source.
Waste disposal plant 1.E+05 1.E-07 1.E-08 Relies on source
Food markets /
Retailers /
Restaurants/Caterer
1.E+05 1.E-07 1.E-08 The sole concern is with internal
controls in countries with regions
that have CSF
Feed factory 1.E+02 1.E-07 1.E-08 Virtually zero - Most banned
Domestic animal/
backyard farms
1.E+02 1.E-07 1.E-08 From CSF free countries/region
Environment
1.E+02 1.E-07 1.E-08 Transmission levels between EU
countries and the environment
within UK is near zero
Wildlife 1.E+02 1.E-07 1.E-08 No comments recorded
Animal gathering
1.E+02 1.E-07 1.E-08 Low throughput (there should be
no throughput) from diseased
areas (certification is the main
barrier)
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Farms Breeders
1.E+02 1.E-06 1.E-07 No comments recorded [Low
throughput (there should be no
throughput) from diseased areas
(certification is the main barrier)]
Outdoor Finishers
1.E+02 1.E-06 1.E-07 Low throughput (there should be
no throughput) from diseased
areas (certification is the main
barrier)
Indoor Finishers
1.E+02 1.E-06 1.E-07 Low throughput (there should be
no throughput) from diseased
areas (certification is the main
barrier)
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Table 16.4 Border Inspection Post
Receptor node Flow rate Minimum Maximum Comments
Outside EU NA NA NA NA
EU [Positive] NA NA NA NA
EU [negative] NA NA NA NA
Border Inspection Post NA NA NA NA
Laboratories
1.E+02 1.E-03 1.E-05 *Values not used for simulation
No comments recorded
Slaughterhouse /meat
processing plants
1.E+02 1.E-04 1.E-06 No comments recorded
Livestock Vehicles 1.E+02 1.E-05 1.E-07 No comments recorded
Domestic residence 1.E+02 1.E-04 1.E-06 Theft from ports is a concern
Petting zoo/pet shop 1.E+02 1.E-05 1.E-07 No comments recorded
Veterinarian./fieldsmen/
other intervenient
1.E+03 1.E-04 1.E-06 Risk is higher when dealing with
live animal consignments that
with other products
Waste disposal plant 1.E+02 1.E-04 1.E-05 No comments recorded
Food markets / Retailers
/ Restaurants/Caterer
1.E+02 1.E-03 1.E-04 Risk results form a more
permissive regulations
Feed factory
1.E+02 1.E-08 1.E-08 Legislative barriers should
reduce risk to a minimum
Domestic animal/
backyard farms
1.E+02 1.E-06 1.E-08 No comments recorded
Environment 1.E+02 1.E-03 1.E-04 No comments recorded
Wildlife 1.E+02 1.E-06 1.E-08 No comments recorded
Animal gathering 1.E+02 1.E-06 1.E-08 No comments recorded
Farms Breeders 1.E+02 1.E-06 1.E-08 No comments recorded
Outdoor Finishers 1.E+02 1.E-06 1.E-08 No comments recorded
Indoor Finishers 1.E+02 1.E-06 1.E-08 No comments recorded
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Table 16.5 Environment
Receptor node
Flow
rate Minimum Maximum Comments
Outside EU NA NA NA NA
EU [Positive] NA NA NA NA
EU [negative] NA NA NA NA
Border Inspection Post NA NA NA NA
Laboratories NA NA NA NA
Slaughterhouse /meat
processing plants
NA NA NA NA
Livestock Vehicles
1.E+05 1.E+00 1.E-01 Contact between vehicles and
fomites (water/soil). Vehicles are
subjected to low levels of bio
security unless an outbreak occurs
Domestic residence NA NA NA NA
Petting zoo/pet shop NA NA NA NA
Veterinarian./fieldsmen
/ other intervenient
1.E+03 1.E-04 1.E-05 No comments recorded
Waste disposal plant NA NA NA NA
Food markets /
Retailers /
Restaurants/Caterer
NA NA NA NA
Feed factory 1.E+02 0.E+00 0.E+00 No Comments recorded
Domestic animal/
backyard farms
1.E+03 1.E+00 1.E-01 Backyard holding have low levels of
bio-security, ill-informed visitors
Environment NA NA NA NA
Wildlife
1.E+02 1.E-07 1.E-08 Wild boar may gain access to waste
bins on picnic sites is a potential risk.
Physical barriers alone prevent
transmission.
Animal gathering 1.E+02 1.E-06 1.E-08 No Comments recorded
Farms Breeders NA NA NA NA
Outdoor Finishers 1.E+03 1.E+00 1.E-01 No Comments recorded
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Indoor Finishers
1.E+02 1.E-02 1.E-03 Potential contamination of boreholes
and vermin
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Table 16.6 Wildlife [Wild boar]
Receptor node
Flow
rate Minimum Maximum Comments
Outside EU NA NA NA NA
EU [Positive] NA NA NA NA
EU [negative] NA NA NA NA
Border Inspection Post NA NA NA NA
Laboratories
1.E+02 1.E-06 1.E-08 *Values not used for simulation.
Laboratory admissions
Slaughterhouse /meat
processing plants
1.E+02 1.E-02 1.E-03 Infected wild boar sent to slaughter
or enter premises
Livestock Vehicles
1.E+02 1.E-06 1.E-07 Transmission from infected animals
to the wild animal boar [Barriers
include - behaviour of wild boar and
location of vehicles]
Domestic residence
1.E+02 1.E-03 1.E-04 Contact between wild boar
population and human population
[feeding the wild boar]
Petting zoo/pet shop
1.E+03 1.E-01 1.E-02 Contact with farmed animals is
dependent of the wild boar
population in the area route
Veterinarian./fieldsmen/
other intervenient
1.E+02 1.E-01 1.E-03 Wild boar population shot by farmer
and opportunity for transmission
during treatment
Waste disposal plant
1.E+02 1.E-01 1.E-02 Wild boar carcasses end up in a
landfill
Food markets / Retailers
/ Restaurants/Caterer
1.E+02 1.E-03 1.E-03 Illegal sale of wild boar in butchers/
restaurant trade
Feed factory
1.E+02 1.E-05 1.E-07 Hasap legislation makes this route
unlikely
Domestic animal/
backyard farms
1.E+03 1.E-01 1.E-02 No comment recorded
Environment
1.E+05 1.E+00 1.E-01 Environmental contamination by the
wild boar population
Wildlife NA NA NA NA
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Animal gathering
1.E+02 1.E-05 1.E-06 Legislation and physical bio safety
barriers reduce risk of transmission
Farms Breeders
1.E+04 1.E-01 1.E-02 Wild boar can enter the breeding
unit or young domestic pigs escape
from premises into the environment
and back [Evidence from Belgium]
Outdoor Finishers
1.E+04 1.E-01 1.E-02 Wild boar can enter the breeding
unit or young domestic pigs escape
from premises into the environment
and back [Evidence from Belgium]
Indoor Finishers
1.E+03 1.E-03 1.E-04 Wild boar can enter the breeding
unit or young domestic pigs escape
from premises into the environment
and back [Evidence from Belgium]
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Table 16.7 Laboratories
Receptor node
Flow
rate Minimum Maximum Comments
Outside EU NA NA NA NA
EU [Positive] NA NA NA NA
EU [negative] NA NA NA NA
Border Inspection Post NA NA NA NA
Laboratories NA NA NA *Values not used for simulation NA
Slaughterhouse /meat
processing plants
NA NA NA NA
Livestock Vehicles
1.E+02 1.E-02 1.E-03 Cleansing and disinfection of
vehicles often not done properly
Domestic residence 1.E+04 1.E-05 1.E-06 No comments recorded
Petting zoo/pet shop NA NA NA NA
Veterinarian./fieldsmen
/ other intervenient
1.E+02 1.E-04 1.E-05 No comments recorded
Waste disposal plant 1.E+04 1.E-06 1.E-07 No comments recorded
Food markets /
Retailers /
Restaurants/Caterer
1.E+02 1.E-06 1.E-08 Respect for the Good Laboratory
Practice [GLP] reduces greatly the
risk of transmission
Feed factory 1.E+02 1.E-06 1.E-08 Unlikely [no comments recorded]
Domestic animal/
backyard farms
1.E+03 1.E-05 1.E-06 Trained that are aware of the risks
and signs on undertaking not to
contact with susceptible species
Environment 1.E+03 1.E-05 1.E-06 No comments recorded
Wildlife 1.E+02 1.E-06 1.E-07 No comments recorded
Animal gathering NA NA NA NA
Farms Breeders NA NA NA NA
Outdoor Finishers NA NA NA NA
Indoor Finishers NA NA NA NA
305
Table 16.8 Pet Shop/Petting Zoo
Receptor node
Flow
rate Minimum Maximum Comments
Outside EU NA NA NA NA
EU [Positive] NA NA NA NA
EU [negative] NA NA NA NA
Border Inspection Post NA NA NA NA
Laboratories NA NA NA *Values not used for simulation NA
Slaughterhouse /meat
processing plants
1.E+03 1.E-05 1.E-08 No comments recorded
Livestock Vehicles
1.E+03 1.E-03 1.E-08 Vehicle movements to zoos are well
controlled
Domestic residence
1.E-03 1.E-08 The main risk of transmission lie on
the 1) Zoo visitors, and 2) the
animal keepers [higher threat]
Petting zoo/pet shop NA NA NA NA
Veterinarian./fieldsmen
/ other intervenient
1.E+03 1.E-05 1.E-08 Bio-safety protocol and personal
hygiene
Waste disposal plant
1.E+03 1.E-02 1.E-04 Transport of animal carcasses for
disposal and washing down of
vehicles
Food markets /
Retailers /
Restaurants/Caterer
1.E+04 1.E-05 1.E-08 On site restaurant and caterers can
be of concern
Feed factory
1.E+03 1.E-05 1.E-08 The main transmission route of is
via people
Domestic animal/
backyard farms
1.E+03 1.E-05 1.E-08 The main transmission route of is
via people
Environment
1.E+04 1.E-05 1.E-08 The main transmission routes are 1)
Disposal of various food goods and
feed, 2) Footwear and 3) Transports
Wildlife
1.E+04 1.E-05 1.E-08 The main transmission routes are 1)
Disposal of various food goods and
feed, 2) Footwear and 3) Transports
Animal gathering NA NA NA NA
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Farms Breeders NA NA NA NA
Outdoor Finishers NA NA NA NA
Indoor Finishers NA NA NA NA
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Table 16.9 Food Markets/Restaurant/Caterer
Receptor node
Flow
rate Minimum Maximum Comments
Outside EU NA NA NA NA
EU [Positive] NA NA NA NA
EU [negative] NA NA NA NA
Border Inspection Post NA NA NA NA
Laboratories NA NA NA *values not used for simulation NA
Slaughterhouse /meat
processing plants
NA NA NA NA
Livestock Vehicles
1.E+02 1.E-03 1.E-05 The main transmission routes are
the 1) drivers lunch, and a 2)
contaminated trailer
Domestic residence 1.E+05 1.E-07 1.E-08 No comments recorded
Petting zoo/pet shop
1.E+03 1.E-01 1.E-03 Transmission routes creating
concern are 1) packed lunch 2)
Accidental contamination of Bakery
waste 3) risk of restaurant waste.
Veterinarian./fieldsmen
/ other intervenient
NA NA NA NA
Waste disposal plant
1.E+05 1.E-01 1.E-05 Trading standards reduce risk of
transmission through legal
movements there are however no
physical or legal barriers against.
Waste disposal technologies such
as composting/Anaerobic digestion
may contribute to spreading the
disease (Paul Gale, )
Food markets /
Retailers /
Restaurants/Caterer
NA NA NA NA
Feed factory
1.E+03 1.E-01 1.E-05 Accidental contaminations of an
on-farm mixers [illegal use for pet
food production]
Domestic animal/
backyard farms
1.E+03 1.E-01 1.E-03 Catering waste used to feed hobby
pig/micro pigs by keepers
Environment
1.E+02 1.E+00 1.E-01 Ill disposal of food goods such as
throwing a sandwich
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Wildlife
1.E+03 1.E-02 1.E-08 Concerning routes of transmission
may involve 1) scavengers (Foxes
rummaging through waste bins), 2)
accidental contamination and 3)
feeding birds
Animal gathering NA NA NA NA
Farms Breeders
1.E+03 1.E-01 1.E+03 Concerns involve an accidental
contamination/illegal collection
and non-assured commercial
farms, smaller producers (cull sow
fattening)
Outdoor Finishers
1.E+03 1.E-01 1.E+03 Concerns involve an accidental
contamination/illegal collection
and non-assured commercial
farms, smaller producers (cull sow
fattening)
Indoor Finishers
1.E+03 1.E-01 1.E+03 Concerns involve an accidental
contamination/illegal collection
and non-assured commercial
farms, smaller producers (cull sow
fattening)
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Table 16.10 Feed factory
Receptor node
Flo
w
rate Minimum Maximum Comments
Outside EU NA NA NA NA
EU [Positive] NA NA NA NA
EU [negative] NA NA NA NA
Border Inspection Post NA NA NA NA
Laboratories
1.E+
04
1.E-08 1.E-08 *values not used for simulation -
samples for analysis
Slaughterhouse /meat
processing plants
1.E+
03
1.E-07 1.E-08 Concerns reside in 1) personnel
movements and 2) farmer owned
Trailers for transport of animal to
slaughter
Livestock Vehicles
1.E+
04
1.E-06 1.E-07 Farmer owned livestock
vehicles/tractors used to transport
animals feed to farms
Domestic residence NA NA NA NA
Petting zoo/pet shop
1.E+
04
1.E-08 1.E-08 Vehicles and personnel present the
highest risk of transmission risk
Veterinarian./fieldsmen
/ other intervenient
1.E+
05
1.E-07 1.E-08 Feed lorries and the lorries drivers
present the highest risk
Waste disposal plant
1.E+
05
1.E-05 1.E-08 Wasted disposal techniques involve
composting. Contamination of adjacent
fields to the composting pile and
subsequent contamination fields
Food markets /
Retailers /
Restaurants/Caterer
1.E+
02
1.E-07 1.E-08 Personnel behaviour is the main
concern
Feed factory
Domestic animal/
backyard farms
1.E+
05
1.E-07 1.E-08 Personnel behaviour is the main
concern
Environment
1.E+
02
1.E-08 1.E-08 Accidental contamination of the
environment by food.
Wildlife
1.E+
02
1.E-08 1.E-08 No comments recorded
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Animal gathering
1.E+
02
1.E-05 1.E-08 No comments recorded
Farms Breeders
1.E+
05
1.E-05 1.E-08 Concerns include on farm mixing of
feed, were waste from factories and/or
supermarket are included. It does not
does not include the risk of farm to
farm contamination by a feed lorry.
Outdoor Finishers
1.E+
05
1.E-06 1.E-08 Compound feed not be contaminated
with CSF. It does not does not include
the risk of farm to farm contamination
by a feed lorry.
Indoor Finishers
1.E+
05
1.E-06 1.E-08 Compound feed not be contaminated
with CSF. It does not does not include
the risk of farm to farm contamination
by a feed lorry.
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Table 16.11 Domestic residence
Receptor node
Flow
rate Minimum Maximum Comments
Outside EU NA NA NA NA
EU [Positive] NA NA NA NA
EU [negative] NA NA NA NA
Border Inspection Post NA NA NA NA
Laboratories NA NA NA *Values not used for simulation NA
Slaughterhouse /meat
processing plants
NA NA NA NA
Livestock Vehicles
1.E+
02
1.E+00 1.E-03 The main concerns are the lorry driver
[lunch pack up]. Pig gain access to the
sandwich
Domestic residence
Petting zoo/pet shop
1.E+
03
1.E+00 1.E-01 Illegal feeding of pigs [sandwiches]
Veterinarian./fieldsmen
/ other intervenient
1.E+
02
1.E-02 1.E-03 Contamination of Veterinary facilities
by pet pigs/ the car park is also a
concern
Waste disposal plant
1.E+
02
1.E+00 1.E-02 Disposal of dead pigs using a domestic
waste bin. Followed by disposal of the
carcass at an open air landfill
Food markets /
Retailers /
Restaurants/Caterer
NA NA NA NA
Feed factory
1.E+
02
1.E-08 1.E-08 Risk is close to null
Domestic animal/
backyard farms
1.E+
02
1.E-01 1.E-03 Micro and domestic pigs feed waste
food sent back to backyard farm
Environment
1.E+
02
1.E-02 1.E-04 Improper disposal of pig carcasses,
with these being buried or
abandoned. The release or escape of
live pigs
312
Wildlife
1.E+
03
1.E+00 1.E-01 Wildlife scavenging waste food from
bins or leftover food dumped in the
country side (foxes may carry off but
then wild boar may get access).
Unwanted pet pigs released in the
countryside.
Animal gathering
1.E+
02
1.E-02 1.E-03 Visitors feeding animals at shows
(heavier controls/lowers flows than
petting zoo)
Farms Breeders
1.E+
02
1.E-04 1.E-05 Migrant workers are of concerned.
Disease can be transported by a
packed up lunches and/or fomites
(clothes, footwear (controls are in
place on farm to avoid transmission)
Outdoor Finishers
1.E+
02
1.E-02 1.E-03 People feeding picnic food to outdoor
pigs out walking. Contact between
farmed animals Unwanted pet pigs
released into other countryside 3)
Migrant workers - post food access by
pigs
Indoor Finishers
1.E+
02
1.E-04 1.E-05 Migrant workers are of concerned.
Disease can be transported by a
packed up lunches and/or fomites
(clothes, footwear (controls are in
place on farm to avoid transmission)
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Table 16.12 Veterinarian/Fieldsman/other intervenient
Receptor node
Flow
rate Minimum Maximum Comments
Outside EU NA NA NA NA
EU [Positive] NA NA NA NA
EU [negative] NA NA NA NA
Border Inspection Post
1.E+0
2
1.E-06 1.E-08 No comment recorded
Laboratories
1.E+0
4
1.E+00 1.E+00 *Values not used for simulation
Submissions
Slaughterhouse /meat
processing plants
NA NA NA NA
Livestock Vehicles
1.E+0
5
1.E-06 1.E-08 No comment recorded
Domestic residence
1.E+0
5
1.E+00 1.E-01 No comment recorded
Petting zoo/pet shop
1.E+0
5
1.E+00 1.E-01 Bio-safety should apply [Barriers are
boot dips] however unlikely to have
wash on/wash off or specific boot
dips
Veterinarian./fieldsmen
/ other intervenient
NA NA NA NA
Waste disposal plant
1.E+0
3
1.E+00 1.E-01 No comment recorded
Food markets /
Retailers /
Restaurants/Caterer
1.E+0
4
1.E+00 1.E-02 No comment recorded
Feed factory
1.E+0
4
1.E+00 1.E-03 Concern resides in the movements
of fieldsman [a group inclusive of
personnel working in the feed
industry]
Domestic animal/
backyard farms
1.E+0
5
1.E+00 1.E-01 Concern resides in the movements
of fieldsman with the assumption
that the people working on these
farms are classed as fieldsman
Environment
1.E+0
5
1.E-03 1.E-05 No comment recorded
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Wildlife
1.E+0
2
1.E+00 1.E-01 No comment recorded
Animal gathering
1.E+0
5
1.E+00 1.E+00 Concern resides in the movements
of fieldsman and Veterinarians -
barrier failure higher for fieldsman
then a more informed Veterinarian
Farms Breeders
1.E+0
5
1.E-05 1.E-07 The range of likelihood of
transmission is varies with the
different types of unit
Outdoor Finishers
1.E+0
5
1.E-01 1.E-04 No comment recorded
Indoor Finishers
1.E+0
5
1.E-01 1.E-04 No comment recorded
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Table 16.13 Slaughterhouse/meat processing plants
Receptor node
Flow
rate
Minim
um Maximum Comments
Outside EU NA NA NA NA
EU [Positive] NA NA NA NA
EU [negative] NA NA NA NA
Border Inspection Post NA NA NA NA
Laboratories
1.E+
02
1.E+00 1.E+00 *Values not used for the simulation -
samples sent to laboratory
Slaughterhouse /meat
processing plants
NA NA NA NA
Livestock Vehicles
1.E+
05
1.E-03 1.E-05 Legal routes - hauliers (C &D) Farmers
are a less likely mode of transmission but
link to premises.
Domestic residence
1.E+
05
1.E-06 1.E-08 Staff is the main concern [division
between clean and dirty area as well a
dedicated working clothing/boots reduce
risk. Illegal movement of meat products
from smaller establishments
Petting zoo/pet shop
1.E+
02
1.E-06 1.E-08 Concerns are on the illegal use of by-
products
Veterinarian./fieldsmen
/ other intervenient
1.E+
05
1.E-06 1.E-08 Veterinarians working at the slaughter
house are expected to have and
implement a high level of bio security
awareness. Separation between dirty
and clean areas
Waste disposal plant
1.E+
05
1.E-02 1.E-03 The presence of transport skips in yards
and accessible to birds how can steal
infected material
Food markets /
Retailers /
Restaurants/Caterer
1.E+
05
1.E-06 1.E-08 Very low risk of meat from
slaughterhouse or cutting plant escaping
on the way to retailers
Feed factory
1.E+
02
1.E-06 1.E-08 Illegal movement without a foreseeable
gain. Sabotage
Domestic animal/
backyard farms
1.E+
01
1.E-05 1.E-07 Concerns are the illegal use of offal and
occasional live animals leaving to be
moved to the farm (5-10 per year)
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Environment
1.E+
05
1.E-06 1.E-07 Risk are washed water from lairise and
straw /bedding from vehicles
Wildlife
1.E+
02
1.E-06 1.E-08 Very low risk of pigs living in the wild
getting into a dirty lairage
Animal gathering
1.E+
02
1.E-06 1.E-08 Illegal movement without a foreseeable
gain. Sabotage
Farms Breeders
1.E+
02
1.E-06 1.E-08 Illegal movement without a foreseeable
gain. Sabotage
Outdoor Finishers
1.E+
02
1.E-04 1.E-06 Escape, rodents/birds dropping
scavenged waste. Man-made
movements are illegal without a
foreseeable gain. Sabotage
Indoor Finishers
1.E+
02
1.E-06 1.E-08 Illegal movement without a foreseeable
gain. Sabotage
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Table 16.14 Livestock Vehicles
Receptor node
Flow
rate
Minim
um Maximum Comments
Outside EU NA NA NA NA
EU [Positive] NA NA NA NA
EU [negative] NA NA NA NA
Border Inspection Post NA NA NA NA
Laboratories NA NA NA *Values not used for simulation NA
Slaughterhouse /meat
processing plants
NA NA NA NA
Livestock Vehicles NA NA NA NA
Domestic residence
1.E+
05
1.E-03 1.E-05 The concerns are the drivers and farmers
no legal barriers exist - common sense
alone
Petting zoo/pet shop
1.E+
02
1.E-06 1.E-08 No comments recorded
Veterinarian./fieldsmen
/ other intervenient
1.E+
05
1.E-02 1.E-06 Vehicles attend market/shows/farms and
may have driver attending animals on
vehicles. No barriers exist - common
sense alone [bio safety awareness places
Veterinarians on one end of the scale
and drivers on the other]
Waste disposal plant
1.E+
04
1.E-05 1.E-07 There are no legal barriers avoiding this
movement but very low risk is expected
Food markets /
Retailers /
Restaurants/Caterer
Feed factory
1.E+
04
1.E-04 1.E-07 Farm vehicles go to feed mills to collect
feed where tractor units are common
between livestock trailers and feed
trailers. Also common sense the only
barrier to transmission.
Domestic animal/
backyard farms
1.E+
03
1.E-02 1.E-04 Uncontrolled and unaware people make
this moves
Environment
1.E+
03
1.E-06 1.E-08 Spillage from vehicle and standing dirty
vehicle attracting rodents etc.
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Wildlife
1.E+
02
1.E-06 1.E-08 Very tenuous link between pigs living in
the wild getting access to the dirty
vehicle
Animal gathering
1.E+
05
1.E-05 1.E-07 Hauliers and farmers are the greatest
concerns. Low volume of pigs sold at
market, however higher for animal
shows
Farms Breeders
1.E+
04
1.E-06 1.E-08 These units are very bio secure minded
Outdoor Finishers
1.E+
05
1.E-05 1.E-07 High bio security in big operations
Indoor Finishers
1.E+
05
1.E-05 1.E-07 High bio security in big operations
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Table 16.15 Domestic animals/Backyard Farms
Receptor node
Flow
rate
Minim
um Maximum Comments
Outside EU NA NA NA NA
EU [Positive] NA NA NA NA
EU [negative] NA NA NA NA
Border Inspection Post
1.E+
02
1.E+00 1.E-01 Illegal supply of home killed meat
Laboratories
NA1.
E+02
1.E-06 1.E-08 *Values not used during simulation
Samples from backyard to lab
Slaughterhouse /meat
processing plants
1.E+
04
1.E-05 1.E-06 The controls in place at the
slaughterhouse should prevent
transmission
Livestock Vehicles
1.E+
03
1.E+00 1.E-03 There is a wide range of unprepared
vehicles used to transport pet pigs.
Domestic residence
1.E+
02
1.E+00 1.E-04 Movement of pet pig form breeders to
domestic residence and home killed meat
to domestic residence
Petting zoo/pet shop
1.E+
02
1.E-03 1.E-03 Re-homing of pet pigs moves for
breeding/sharing boar etc.
Veterinarian./fieldsmen
/ other intervenient
1.E+
02
1.E+00 1.E-06 Pigs taken to the Veterinary premises for
treatment and movement of fieldsman
Waste disposal plant
1.E+
02
1.E+00 1.E-01 Improper [illegal] disposal of pet pigs and
leftover of home kill disposed in waste
bin
Food markets /
Retailers /
Restaurants/Caterer
1.E+
02
1.E+00 1.E-01 Illegal supply of home killed meat to
markets and restaurants
Feed factory
1.E+
02
1.E-03 1.E-03 Illegal supply of home kill by-products to
pet food manufacturing
Domestic animal/
backyard farms
NA NA NA NA
Environment
1.E+
02
1.E+00 1.E-01 Pet pig owners abandoned/release pigs
into the environment once to big escaped
pigs 3) incorrect disposal of dead pigs
and/or By products
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Wildlife
1.E+
02
1.E+00 Live and dead pigs abandoned/escaped
pigs contact with wild boar 2) incorrect
disposal of carcasses and/or by-products
(home kill)
Animal gathering
1.E+
03
1.E-01 1.E-01 Movement of animals to shows.
Movement to markets (pigs markets)
from this type of farm is increasing.
Farms Breeders
1.E+
02
1.E-06 1.E-06 Very unlikely
Outdoor Finishers
1.E+
03
1.E-03 1.E-04 Outdoor finishers could purchase pigs
from backyard premises possibility of
weaning pig coming into contact with an
outdoor finisher
Indoor Finishers
1.E+
02
1.E-06 1.E-06 Very unlikely
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Table 16.16 Waste Disposal
Receptor node
Flow
rate Minimum Maximum Comments
Outside EU NA NA NA NA
EU [Positive] NA NA NA NA
EU [negative] NA NA NA NA
Border Inspection Post NA NA NA NA
Laboratories NA NA NA *Values not used for simulation NA
Slaughterhouse /meat
processing plants
1.E+03 1.E-04 1.E-06 Illegal diversion of meat (waste) to
food processing
Livestock Vehicles
1.E+03 1.E-01 1.E-02 Tractor units common to both
operations and improper C&D due to
cost of disinfectant [perception that
metal corrodes metal, parts of vehicle
difficult to reach, cost of time, no
records of the amount of disinfectant
purchased]
Domestic residence NA NA NA NA
Petting zoo/pet shop NA NA NA NA
Veterinarian./fieldsme
n/ other intervenient
1.E+03 1.E-04 1.E-05 Veterinarians get everywhere as part
of inspection regime. They visit
diverse waste facilities and may be
contaminated
Waste disposal plant NA NA NA NA
Food markets /
Retailers /
Restaurants/Caterer
NA NA NA NA
Feed factory 1.E+04 1.E-01 1.E-02 Transport through birds
Domestic animal/
backyard farms
1.E+02 1.E-07 1.E-08 Concern that employees of waste the
disposal establishment take home
condemned products/contaminated
feedstuff, transmission via employees
clothes, footwear - more unlikely
Environment NA NA NA NA
Wildlife NA NA NA NA
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Animal gathering NA NA NA NA
Farms Breeders NA NA NA NA
Outdoor Finishers NA NA NA NA
Indoor Finishers NA NA NA NA
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ANNEX 317
17.1 Elicitation form used in the second elicitation stage for Classic
Swine Fever.
Figure 17.1 Form developed second elicitation stage workshop performed for studying the
introduction of Classic Swine Fever.
RPV21 Project - Risk Pathways & VulnerabilitiesNetwork Connections – Form
Source node: ____________________________________________________________________
Reception node: __________________________________________________________________
Comments:
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Figure 17.2 Collective output of the calibration exercises performed in the second
elicitation stage workshop performed for studying the introduction of Classic Swine Fever.
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ANNEX 418
Delegate list and questionnaire used for expert selection for the second elicitation stage
workshop performed for studying the introduction of Classic Swine Fever.
Table 18.1 List of delegate invites
Delegate list: RPV21 workshop (Innovation Centre 29 June 2010)
Name Organisation Role
1 Elwyn Rees ADAS
2 Richard Hepple Animal Health Veterinary Services Manager
3 David Mouat Animal Health Head, Veterinary Exotic Notifiable Diseases
Unit
4 David Harris Animal Health Veterinary Business Partner, Wales
5 Kate Sharpe Animal Health Head of Epidemiology
6 Brenda Foster Animal Health Veterinary Service Manager - Animal by-
products
7 Animal Health Veterinary Officer
8 Peter Anderson Animal Health Veterinary Officer
9 Marcus Bates British Pig
Association
CEO
10 Jeremy Adams Cambridgeshire
County Council
Trading Standards (LA responsible for animal
by-products)
11 Michael Seton City of London Veterinary Service team leader City of London
Animal Reception Centre at Heathrow, The
Ports (Tilbury & Thamesport) & covering animal
health obligations for LAs in Greater London
12 John Pascoe Cornwall County
Council
Trading Standards (Coastal LA concerned with
smuggling)
13 Victor del Rio
Vilas
Defra Epidemiologist and Surveillance
14 John Bell Defra Livestock ID & Movements Policy
15 Teresa Mills Defra Lead imports policy adviser
16 Rolf Kluttig Defra Imports policy adviser
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17 Julian West Defra Disease legislation and biosecurity
18 Edgar Black Defra Departmental Risk Co-ordinator
19 Lisa Smith Defra Animal Demography and Disease Informatics
20 Arik Dondi Defra Deputy Director, Policy
21 Bill Parish Defra ex-RPV Project Leader
22 Andy Paterson Defra Risk advice on horses and dangerous
pathogens (representing Matt Hartley)
23 Mia Carbon Defra Veterinary Adviser for Imports
24 Jo Nettleton HSE Head of Biological Agents
25 Susie Child LACORS Animal Health and Welfare Policy Officer
26 Jon Averns London Port Health
Authority
EHO
27 Lewis Grant MHS
28 Zoe Davies National Pig
Association
Regions Manager
29 Eirian Williams Somerset County
Council
(LA with livestock market)
30 John Chaplin Suffolk County
Council
Trading Standards (LA with high density of
livestock keepers)
31 Simon Rowell Suffolk Port Health
Authority
OV representing APHA
32 Mike Gregson Oxfordshire County
Council
Trading Standards (for Kevin Chesson)
33 Katherine Page UK Border Agency UK Border Agency Heathrow illegal imports of
animal products
34 Amie Adkin VLA Senior Risk Analyst
35 Stan Done VLA Veterinary Investigation Officer
36 Helen Crooke VLA Head of Research on Pestiviruses
37 Richard Smith VLA Epidemiologist
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18.1 Email invitation sent to workshop delegates (experts)
Thank you for agreeing to attend this workshop. To help us with the smooth running of
the event, it would be helpful if we captured a little bit of information about you and
your expertise. We would appreciate you completing the template below and sending it
through to Edgar Black by close on Monday 28th. Some of this information will help
us as we plan the group exercises.
Name
Organisation
Role
Special
dietary
requirements
Special access
requirements
We will be considering the main ‘nodes’ in the network of contacts that could allow the
introduction of Classical Swine Fever into the country, potentially giving rise to a
disease outbreak. Some of our group work will involve us looking in detail at the
disease controls that are in place at each node, so it would be helpful if you could
indicate which nodes your knowledge and experience relates to.
Network node Knowledge or experience here? (Yes/No)
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EU (disease-free countries)
EU (disease-present countries)
Outside EU
Border inspection post
Environment
Wildlife
Laboratories
Zoos, pet shops
Animal gatherings
Retailers, restaurants, caterers, food
markets
Feed factory
Domestic residence
Vets, fieldsman, contractor
Slaughterhouse, meat processing plant
Livestock vehicles
Domestic animals, backyard farms
Waste disposal
Farm (breeding units)
Outdoor finishers
Indoor finishers
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Table 18.2 Questionnaire for defining the experts' preferences
RPV21 workshop (Innovation Centre 29 June 2010)
Delegates sorted into 'node' groups
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Name
Andy Paterson 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Brenda Foster 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
David Mouat 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Helen Crooke 1 1 ? 1 1 1 1
Jennifer Heald 1 1 1
Jeremy Adams 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
John Chaplin 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
John Pascoe 1 1
Julian West 1 1
Kate Sharpe 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Lewis Grant 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Lisa Smith 1 1 1
Marcus Bates 1 1 1 1
Mia Carbon 1 1 1 1
Mike Gregson 1 1 1 1 1
Mitch Sanders 1 1 1 1
Peter Thomas 1 1 1 1 1 1
Richard Hepple 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Richard Smith 1 1 1
Richard
Stoddart 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Rolf Kluttig 1 1 1 1
Simon Rowell 1 1
Stan Done 1 1 1 1 1 1
Zoe Davies 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
John Bell 1
Eirian Williams
Susie Child
Victor del Rio
Vilas
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Table 18.3 Expert group compositions, developed for the second stage CSF elicitation –
workshop.
[KEY] based on the information provides by the experts in the questionnaire.
EU (free) BIP Wildlife Backyard
Rolf Kluttig Simon Rowell Kate Sharpe Marcus Bates
Lewis Grant Mia Carbon John Chaplin Mike Gregson
Stan Done Mitch Sanders Lisa Smith Jeremy Adams
Richard Hepple
Labs Slaughter Feed factory Waste
Andy Paterson Julian West Zoe Davies John Pascoe
Helen Crooke John Bell Brenda Foster Jennifer Heald
Peter Thomas Richard Smith David Mouat Richard Stoddart
World (non-EU) EU (disease) Environment Vet
Jennifer Heald Helen Crooke Mitch Sanders Simon Rowell
Kate Sharpe Lewis Grant Zoe Davies Richard Smith
Rolf Kluttig Stan Done Helen Crooke Lisa Smith
Mia Carbon
Home Zoo Retailers Vehicles
Jeremy Adams David Mouat Brenda Foster John Pascoe
Andy Paterson Peter Thomas John Chaplin Julian West
Richard Hepple Richard Stoddart Marcus Bates Mike Gregson
Groups for activity 3
Groups for activity 4
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ANNEX 519
Outputs of the first stage of elicitation develop for the Import risk assessment of
Foot and Mouth Disease. This activities developed in this stage provide a
definition of the network nodes.
19.1 Network nodes for Foot and Mouth Disease
19.1.1 Node definitions
World (all remaining countries)/trading partners/Bilateral [Source] Countries
outside the European Union, this includes third countries, trading partners and bilateral
countries [New Zealand, Australia, Canada and USA]. There is no differentiation
between countries where the disease is present; for ones were the disease is absent.
European Union and trading partners [Positive] [Source] Countries within the
European Union currently without a disease free status. There is no differentiation
between countries or regions within a country where the disease is present [national or
regional trade limitations]
Laboratories [Source] Laboratories that have clearance to manipulate the Foot and
mouth disease under consideration according to the SAPO regulations SOURCE NODE
European Union and trading partners [Negative – disease free status] Countries
within the European Union that are considered under a disease free status. This includes
countries benefiting with the European free market policy including recent Eastern
Members, and Scotland and Wales (trading partners outside EU included). There is no
differentiation from countries where the disease is not present from countries where the
disease is present but not detected.
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Border Inspection Post Border inspections posts [independent of location airport or
nautical port]. Products legally imported from countries outside the EU, have to be
check at a Borders inspection post. However illegal imports might bypass BIPs
Environment The environment encloses flora, water-bodies and other inanimate
natural structures that can aid in the transmission of the disease agent and living
creatures not included in terminal and wildlife population nodes. The node does not
differentiate between pests and fomites: Pests include foxes, rodents and other potential
FMD mechanical carriers; Fomites: any structure existing in the environment that can
pose a potential threat in the transmission of the disease, such as grazing fields, water
sources
Pet shops/ Zoo/ City farms/ Safari parks Entities possessing susceptible animals,
located particularly within urban areas. Pet-shops and city farms present the
opportunity for contact between the general human population and susceptible animals
Food markets / Retailers / Restaurants / Caterer Premises supplying food for human
consumption for the general public (Super markets, local markets, restaurant and
caterers)
Feed factory Facilities producing feed, feed additives, supplements and other products
to be using in animal feeding to commercial farms and domestic animals
Domestic animals/backyard farms Livestock not usually breed for slaughter and small
farms where livestock production is not the central activity, including, hobbyists and
backyard farmers, and domestic susceptible species such as micro-pigs.
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Human Population Section of the British population that does not have professional or
regular contact with commercial animal farms (urban and rural population).
Vet\ Fieldsmen\ Workers This node encloses the section of the human population
excluded from the human population node. There are included two particular groups.
People of the human population that have a close contact or work commercial livestock
farms (workers, migrant workers, owners and veterinary personnel)
Slaughterhouse \ food processing plants Slaughterhouses and meat products
processing plants
Livestock vehicles Vehicles involved in the transport of live animals. The vehicle is
the contaminated source, acting a fomite allowing for the transmission of the disease
with the potential to infect healthy animals (include any straw used for bedding)
Animal gatherings within UK The node represents all sorts of animal gatherings
within UK territory (Animals shows, Markets, national or international).
Waste disposal The node encloses all waste facilities allowed to with deal with
potentially contaminated waste (e.g. landfills, incineration and rendering plants) within
UK
Wildlife (Boar/Deer) Wildlife population susceptible to the diseases, within UK
territory [wild boar and deer populations.
Pig indoor production units [Receptor] Indoor, intensive production of slaughter
generation pigs (includes not only finishing units but also rearing and weaning units)
Pig outdoor production units [Receptor] Outdoor production of slaughter generation
pigs (includes not only finishing units but also rearing and weaning units)
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Pig breeding units [Receptor] Top of the pyramid, in-house breeding farms dedicated
to the production of GGP, GP and sow lines. It also includes units that perform the
complete cycle from reproduction to finishing. These are intensive production systems,
characterised by a high bio-safety level. Multiplication units, pigs are not produced for
slaughter.
Dairy production [Receptor] Dairy farms producing milk for milk products for human
consumption (include milk for human consumption from goat and sheep farms).
Beef production [Receptor] Farms producing bull beef, steer and heifer for slaughter,
without differentiation between extensive or intensive systems
Cattle breeding units [Receptor] Breeders for pedigree animals (high volume)
Sheep Outdoor production units [Receptor] Sheep farms producing animals for
slaughter and/or for wool (animals bred for slaughter, collection of wool and rearing
units); The vast majority of sheep farms are outdoors (hill, upland or lowland breeds)
Sheep breeding units [Receptor] Breeding units represents breeding farm for hill,
upland and lowland breeds. These are characterised by higher levels of bio-security,
when compared with commercial sheep farms including the replacement stock breed
form within the flock
Mixed species farms [Receptor] Terminal node mixed species farm represent all units
that produce more than one species, (includes different combination of pigs, cattle and
sheep).
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Figure 19.1 Collection of nodes develop in the first stage of elicitation applied to studying
the introduction of FMD into England (Chapter 9)
[KEY] Source, common nodes and receptor are identified by the labels in the left;
Colour schemes were used for guiding the assessors in terms of expertise needed.

337
ANNEX 620
20.1 Elicitation form used in the second elicitation stage for Foot and
Mouth Disease
Figure 20.1 - Elicitation form for legal and airborne internode connections (even pages)
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Figure 20.2 - Elicitation form for illegal internode connections (odd pages)
